

Commentary

Volume Sixty, Number Two, August 1975

Was Alger Hiss Guilty? Irving Younger

Israel's Rights
and Arab
Propaganda

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in
Retreat

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Books in Review: Edward N. Luttwak / Martin Green /
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
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Commentary

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Case Histories . . . Part III

On how to LIVE 90 to 100 HEALTHY years (The syndrome of longevity . . . its 7 great "constants")

"He who would live long must sometimes leave his way of living."
—Basil Fane

The errors of our younger years are drafts upon our older years, payable (with interest) some 30 years from date.

The so-called "diseases of old age" are essentially the diseases of 50 to 70 . . . the "dangerous years."

Research scientists have observed that people who survive these "dangerous years" successfully without acquiring some "chronic" disease such as cancer or heart trouble, are likely to live on for another healthy quarter of a century. They seem to have developed what might almost be called an "immunity" to these killers. Why?

To try to find out, some careful studies have now been made of these comparatively long-lived individuals. What do these show? Is it what you might expect . . . just a matter of sheer chance . . . amazing luck? Luck plays a part, of course. (This world is a dice

game, after all.) But there is more to it than that. Other factors, most of all dependent on chance, seem dependent, albeit, present "constants." As you study the case histories of these extraordinarily long-lived individuals, 7 of these great "constants" almost invariably turn up. They form what is now becoming known as the "syndrome of longevity."

As an executive, you should pause to ask in what you should do, or not do, to live a long, healthy life in good health in old age, and try to apply to your own life, these 7 great "constants" as evidence in the lives of other executives who have outlived their contemporaries by a generation. Nearly four years ago in *Executive Health* (Vol. III, Nos. 5 and 6) we gave you some detailed case histories of distinguished men whose lives clearly exemplified the

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Because you are not going to get out of this world alive, doesn't it make sense to learn how to live in it as long as you can? Never forget: "Men's lives are chains of chances" but as Euripides saw clearly so long ago: "Chance fights ever on the side of the prudent."

Your only insurance against tomorrow is what you do today! To put it bluntly, the mistakes you make in your younger years are drafts upon your older years, payable with interest, some 30 years later. The so-called "diseases of old age" are essentially the diseases of 50 to 70; "the dangerous years." Medical research now indicates that men who survive these dangerous years without acquiring a chronic disease (such as heart trouble or cancer) are likely to live on another healthy quarter of a century. What keeps well people well? Medical men have long concentrated upon sick people and how to get them well . . . not upon well people and how to keep them well. Now many top research scientists are concentrating their efforts on preventive medicine . . . how to keep well people well.

May we suggest that you get the benefits of this new research for yourself? Do as so many thousands of executives do. Subscribe to Executive Health Report. The members of our Editorial Board are among the world's most distinguished authorities on preventive medicine. Their wise advice can help you not only live longer but enjoy those extra years!

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Letters from Readers

The Third World

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Daniel P. Moynihan's distinction and stature and the major insights of his article, "The United States In Opposition" [March], insure that its considerable impact will be more than ephemeral. Much of what he says is both welcome and long overdue: the neglect by the United States and the West generally of the political significance of ideas, and its perception by the Communist powers; the failure of Western diplomacy in dealing with the Third World (to accept reluctantly this infelicitous term); the benefits the Third World derives from multinational corporations. But I believe that Mr. Moynihan's essay incorporates major and potentially very damaging misconceptions.

1) It is fanciful to envisage the Third World as a community of nation states which have undergone a moderate, gradualist reformist British revolution of Fabian inspiration. The distinctive features of the official ideology of the Third World are: pronounced and often bitter hostility to the West, the market system, and liberal economic order (expressed on platforms supported or even provided by the West); virulent allegations of Western exploitation as the cause of Third World poverty; and insistence on large-scale international redistribution of income and on the right to expropriate politically powerless groups. These components of Third World ideology are reflected in Mr. Moynihan's citations, and even more so in the activities of Third World governments.

2) The *Washington Post* (a newspaper notably friendly toward the Third World, especially Africa) reported on May 6 that \$310 million in aid, said to be indispensable to the government, had gone from the World Bank to Tanzania, Robert S. MacNamara's favorite African country. The same dispatch reported the largest ever population movement in Africa, the enforced herding of several million people into collective or quasi-collective villages in Tanzania. (This process, largely unreported in the West, has been going on since about 1967.) It also reported the introduction of "scientific socialism" in Somalia, a country largely made up of nomadic tribesmen,

and similar developments elsewhere in Africa. And in the same month the President of Zambia announced the nationalization of the vestiges of private commerce in that country.

Large-scale maltreatment of many millions of politically ineffective or defenseless people is commonplace in the Third World. The maltreatment includes expropriation, expulsion, or even massacre, and is tolerated, encouraged, or supported by governments prominent and articulate in the UN.

Many, perhaps most, Third World countries are not communities or nation states in the accepted sense of these terms, but collections of radically diverse or even hostile groups with deep-seated ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences. This heterogeneity casts further doubts on the meaning of democracy or majority rule, questionable in any case in countries where the vast majority know little about politics beyond the village or district level. The diversity is even more pronounced internationally. The mutual enmity of many Third World countries is bitter and patent. What they share mainly is politically and materially profitable hostility to the West.

The internal heterogeneity of many Third World countries is often reflected in wide group differences in economic performance (e.g., the Chinese, Indian, and more nearly indigenous populations of Southeast Asia; Asians and Africans of East Africa; Levantines, Ibo, and others in Nigeria). And again, these differences are magnified internationally: the Third World comprises such widely different societies as the Chinese communities of Southeast Asia, the peasantry of South Asia, the Muslim Middle East, the tribal societies of Africa, the millions of aborigines, desert people, and many others. The internal heterogeneity of many Third World countries is pertinent to the general tendency to establish state-controlled economies in the Third World. The consequent politicization of life greatly enhances the prizes and significance of political power, thereby provoking or exacerbating political and social tensions, especially so in racially heterogeneous societies. Over much of Africa, the

One of a series of reports on the first hundred years of the telephone.

How there came to be only one telephone company in town.

"In many cities of the United States, and in rural communities as well, there are dual and competing telephone systems, doing both local and long-distance business...Patrons of these telephone systems are put to endless annoyance and increased expense. In order to reach all the people using telephones, the telephone patron finds he must install two telephones in his house and office...Double systems of cables, wires and conduits burden the streets and highways."

"Number please."



to customers that the number wanted was on the town's other telephone system. And each month there were two telephone bills to pay.

A solution to the problem had been worked out long before by John Stuart Mill.

In 1847 Mill had studied the situation of two other new industries that supplied water and gas through pipes to the homes and businesses of London:

"It is obvious, for example, how great an economy of labour would be obtained if London were supplied by a single gas or water company instead of the existing plurality. While there are even as many as two, this implies double establishments of all sorts, when only one, with a small increase, could probably perform the whole operation equally well; double sets of machinery and works, when the whole of the gas and water required could generally be produced by one set only; even double sets of pipes, if the companies did not prevent this needless expense by agreeing upon a division of the territory. Were there only one establishment, it could make lower charges, consistently with obtaining the rate of profit now realized."

—Report of the House of Representatives
Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 67th Congress (1921)

When Alexander Graham Bell's telephone patents expired in 1893 and 1894, new telephone companies sprang up almost overnight. The accepted way of organizing communications was to have the "dual and competing telephone systems" cited in the Congressional report.

"Call us. We're on the Bell," was a frequent invitation in those days, to friends or customers. Central, the voice of "Number, please?"; spent a lot of time explaining

Such a consolidation, Mill saw, was clearly in the public interest. The concept of a "public utility" was reinforced.



John Stuart Mill

When Edison's electric light superseded illuminating gas, the parallel was obvious. It was not quite so obvious for the telephone.

It was not hard to see that the public benefited from having water piped into homes. But while some viewed the telephone companies as providing a similar vital service, others regarded them as being more akin to manufacturers selling ingenious machines in the luxury class. When only a few people had telephones, one observer called them "electric toys." Should Bell's invention be compared with Edison's new electric light, or was it more like his phonograph? As the proportion of homes and businesses with telephones grew, the usefulness of the telephone increased greatly.

Then there was the matter of geographic area served. An exclusive franchise for a specified area is a natural corollary of Mill's concept of a public utility. And exclusiveness was a troublesome subject.

When two or more rivals supply a similar service, competition keeps each up

to the mark, or else some eventually lose customers and go out of business. If in the public interest, government removes that rivalry by granting exclusive franchises, then government must provide the mechanisms for preventing arbitrary or excessive charges or unreasonable or discriminatory regulations.

The doctrine of public regulation of privately owned resources has its roots in Roman law and the tenet of *justum pretium*—"just price." English common law provided a rationale for regulation. In an essay on rates for wharf services, Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of England, established in 1670 the criterion that private industries "affected with a public interest" may be regulated by the public:

"If the King or subject have a public wharf unto which all persons that come to that port must come and unload their goods...because they are the only wharfs licensed by the King...or because there is no other wharf in that port...there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties...but the duties must be reasonable and moderate....For now the wharf and crane and other conveniences are affected with a public interest."

Various municipal boards did undertake to control the quality of service provided by water, gas and electric companies, usually through periodic reviews of franchises granted. It was no easy task. For quality of service leads quickly to questions of cost: good service for the price charged;

equal prices for all customers for services of a similar nature, so that no one is discriminated against; adequate service capacity so that anyone able to pay for the service can have it.

Local officials had their hands full regulating the three industries already mentioned (water, gas, electricity). They were not eager to take on the responsibility of regulating the telephone business. And so redundant companies continued to exist in many towns. Confusion multiplied geometrically as the companies strung long distance lines to connect various cities.



Theodore N. Vail

Soon after he was elected A.T.&T. President in 1907, Vail enunciated the goal: "One policy, one system, universal service." He saw that the future of the business depended on having one unified telephone service for the entire nation—a service that every family and business could enjoy. That meant ending duplicate telephone companies, replacing them with exclusive telephone franchises. In other words, Vail understood that it was not enough for the nation to have telephone companies. What was needed—and what he sought to create—was a *telephone system*. Vail saw, too, that the very "exclusivity" of the franchises invited—

indeed, demanded—regulation by officials elected or supported by the public to protect the public interest.

Vail thus agreed with the efforts of Gov. Charles Evans Hughes of New York and Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin, who were working to persuade state legislatures to try a new approach to regulation through state utility commissions—responsive to the public at the state level—as best serving the public interest.

The state commissions, supported by public desire for efficient regulation, worked. Most public utilities came to be regulated on a statewide basis, and a framework of efficient regulation was set.

Vail recognized, however, that national regulation also was a necessary complement to state regulation, particularly since one company—A.T.&T.—was chiefly responsible for interconnecting the individual telephone companies into a telephone system.

As noted earlier, regulation of telephone companies already had begun to develop at the state level. But on the national level—for telephone lines and services crossing state boundaries—there was no federal counterpart to the state regulatory commissions, although telegraph companies had been regulated to some extent by the Postmaster General and the Interstate Commerce Commission under statutes dating back to the 19th century.



Alexander Graham Bell

The first effort at comprehensive federal regulation came in the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, amending the Interstate Commerce Act. Telephone, telegraph and cable companies were declared to be common carriers subject to ICC regulation.

Federal regulation took a new turn in 1934 with the passage by Congress of the Communications Act, which established the Federal Communications Commission. The intent of Congress—as it had been the intent of both Bell and Vail—is outlined in Section I of the Communications Act:

“For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign communications by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide and

worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges...”

Almost alone among the nations of the world, then, this country entrusted the development and operation of its communications resources to private enterprise. It endowed companies with the rights and responsibilities of common carriers, each solely privileged to purvey its services within its territory but all in turn strictly accountable through state and national regulation to the public they serve.

Has it worked?

In 1968, President Johnson’s Task Force on Communications Policy concluded, “It can be truly said that the United States has the finest telephone system in the world.”

That kind of service didn’t just happen. It was planned that way, right from the start.

One Bell System. It works.



Bell System

Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, different ethnic and cultural groups which have coexisted for decades or even centuries have been set against each other. Who has government has become life and death for very many people in many Third World countries—e.g., Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. The Third World is scarcely a brotherhood of gradually evolving Fabians.

Mr. Moynihan cites Nigeria as relatively libertarian. This is so only by the standards of the Third World. In Nigeria the export of all major agricultural products is handled by state monopolies which effectively limit the incomes of producers; the government is a military dictatorship; there is extensive and avowed discrimination against minorities; and a few years ago there were large-scale tribal massacres, followed by a murderous civil war.

The disregard of these patent realities in Mr. Moynihan's essay is disturbing. . . .

3) Tracing the intellectual origins of ideologies and policies is always speculative. In the context of the contemporary Third World the distinction between a Fabian-inspired British revolution, and a Marxist-Leninist inspired stance is not so significant as Mr. Moynihan suggests. The Leninist idea of imperialism owes much to British writings, especially to Hobson's *Imperialism*, which directly inspired the central notions of Lenin's tract, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. This book has been enormously influential both in the West and in the Third World, especially among the millions of vicarious readers who know of its contents only by hearsay. Some of the most influential Third World leaders in recent times have been explicit and avowed Marxist-Leninists, notably Nkrumah, perhaps the single most influential black African politician since World War II. And the policies currently pursued in many Third World countries are obviously not Fabian-inspired. Fabianism has contributed primarily by promoting the politicization of economic life, and also by reinforcing widespread feelings of guilt in the West. Even in India the priorities of the second Five Year Plan and the pronouncements of many of the leading academics (including Mahalanobis, the principal architect of

that plan) were plainly Soviet-inspired and owed little to Fabianism.

Many Third World countries are indeed mixed economies and not totalitarian societies. This is not because the leaders reject totalitarian ideas or methods; it reflects mainly the limitations of the official administrative machinery. The present state controls of many Third World countries rely heavily on expatriate personnel; still more would be needed to run a full-fledged totalitarian system. A totalitarian system may also often be uncongenial to the traditional culture. But if the rulers have the political will and the required administrative apparatus, the traditional culture is unlikely to offer effective resistance. And the traditional culture in most of Africa and Asia is not individualistic and libertarian (as Mr. Moynihan suggests), but authoritarian, though not totalitarian. It upholds authority but does not favor all-embracing politicization of life.

4) Mr. Moynihan's conciliatory remarks toward the Third World on the alleged damage to it by Western exploitation and ethnic discrimination are inappropriate. Contacts established by the West have been the principal instruments of material progress throughout the Third World, where the most advanced and advancing sectors are those with most extensive contacts with the West, and the poorest and most backward those with fewest external contacts, with pygmies, aborigines, and desert people being only limiting cases. For instance, all the foundations and ingredients of modern social and economic life were brought to sub-Saharan Africa by Westerners, mostly during the colonial period.

The allegations of exploitation are not only unfounded but also harmful to the peoples of the Third World. They divert attention from the personal and social determinants of material progress—namely aptitudes, attitudes, motivations, social and political institutions, and government policies—and thus from the possibilities of influencing these determinants favorably. Indeed, these allegations facilitate damaging policies, such as restrictions on external economic relations which are potent instruments of material advance. Finally, allegations of exploitation both reflect and encourage the notion that incomes are extracted rather than

generated. Besides provoking international tension, this notion often spills into domestic discussion where it encourages expropriation of groups who are economically productive but politically weak.

Ethnic discrimination need not impede material progress—witness the Chinese in Southeast Asia or the Asians in Africa. Nor is it substantially imported from the West. Discrimination on the basis of color pervades the Third World, notably so in India. And in Africa discrimination against Asians is far more vicious and virulent than was ever practiced by Europeans. These matters are rarely publicized in the West.

5) The official ideology of the Third World is Western inspired: Marxism-Leninism, state socialism, and Fabianism are all of Western origin. So is the notion of a Third World broadly uniform, homogeneous, and exploited by the West. The spokesmen and staff members of the international organizations have helped to spread these notions. They frequently consider themselves as agents of the Third World, and derive major material and political advantages from such a stance. They have both promoted the familiar standard ideology and helped to put it into practice, notably by organizing and briefing the spokesmen of the Third World, both at regular meetings and at special conferences, such as those which preceded the first UNCTAD. They also help Third World countries in carrying out the policies of the standard ideology, such as the operation of economic controls, the organization of commodity cartels, and the advocacy and administration of foreign aid.

There are also other groups in the West engaged in promoting this ideology, such as churchmen or professional humanitarians, who derive emotional and material benefits from the image of the peoples of the Third World as helpless victims of Western misdeeds in need of their ministrations. Finally, there are the disaffected groups in the West who welcome any ideology with which to assail their own societies and especially the market system, and who consider the governments of the Third World, the official ideology of the Third World, and indeed the very concept of the Third World, as useful instruments in a conflict within the West. Altogether it is the West which supplies both the

arguments and the financial resources with which it is assailed by the Third World.

6) The hope that the substantial economic growth rates registered in the Third World in recent years will diminish its antagonism toward the West is also misplaced. To begin with, much of the less developed world was progressing rapidly already long before the 1950's. Again, the optimistic liberal assumption that economic improvement and reduction in economic differences probably or even necessarily diminish or avert political conflict is unfounded. Two world wars should have taught us better. And as has often been observed, when economic differences are diminished, those still remaining often appear especially intolerable. Moreover, the dominant ideology and policies of the Third World are unlikely to promote a rise in mass living standards, though they may produce misleading statistical growth rates unrelated to it.

7) One contention of Third World spokesmen is more substantial than Mr. Moynihan recognizes. This is their criticism of the advocacy of birth control for raising living standards. Even extensive adoption of birth control would not by itself greatly affect Third World living standards. Here are some reasons why. Most of Africa and Latin America, and much of Asia, are very sparsely populated. Some of the poorest groups live in largely empty areas (even where the land is not particularly infertile), as for instance Borneo, Sumatra, and much of Latin America. Indeed, the population is often too sparse for the construction of transport facilities. Conversely some of the most advanced areas of the Third World are very densely populated, as witness Hong Kong, Singapore, parts of Malaysia, and West Africa. The relation between population density and living standards cannot be examined usefully without noting people's aptitudes and attitudes. This is obvious from the wide differences in economic performance between different ethnic and religious groups in the same country or region with the same physical resources—Chinese, Indians, and Malays in Malaysia; Punjabis and Bengalis in India; Asians and Africans in East Africa; Ibo and others in Nigeria; Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs in the Levant; and Chinese,

Lebanese, and West Indians in the Caribbean.

The relation between the size and rate of growth of population and general living standards is far more complex than is recognized in Western-inspired discussions, including Mr. Moynihan's article. To begin with, the standard approach ignores that the generation and possession of children, or a reduction in mortality with a resulting longer life expectation, are significant benefits. Most people like children, and they certainly value longer life for themselves and for their children. Moreover, reduction in population growth could not by itself raise living standards appreciably; the prime determinants of the level of income and the rate of progress are not the level of physical resources, but the personal, social, and political factors already noted. (The unwarranted contemporary preoccupation with numbers and physical resources is notable in much of Mr. Moynihan's essay, including the view that the higher cost of oil has blighted the development prospects of many Third World countries.) Reduction in birth rates has indeed often coincided with substantial economic improvement: both reflect a change in outlook and motivation, notably increased interest in material living standards. Unless a decline in population growth is a concomitant of other changes, it cannot by itself bring about significant improvement in the level of living standards over a few years or even decades. These considerations do not add up to a conclusive argument against birth control, but exaggerated claims about its economic potentialities understandably arouse suspicions.

8) Mr. Moynihan argues that the United States cannot withdraw from a new world order in which there is a large measure of majority rule, interpreted apparently in the sense of the acceptance of majority decisions based on the number of member states in the UN. He envisages the appropriate role for the United States as that of a loyal opposition, engaged in a potentially pleasant and fruitful dialogue with the majority, a role made possible by the British, Fabian character of the official Third World ideology. There are wide, unwarranted, and unstated assumptions behind this approach; it is also shot through with major paradoxes and fraught with peril.

Neither the official ideology of the Third World nor the practices of most Third World governments conform to Western social democracy and Fabian reformism. As I have already suggested, a distinctive characteristic of this ideology is hostility to the West and to a liberal social and economic order; and the policies inspired by this ideology are all too often radical and even brutal.

Majority rule in the accepted sense of uncoerced compliance with the decisions of the representatives of the majority presupposes a community with a large measure of shared experiences of culture, history, living conditions, and purpose, as well as comparatively limited objectives of the majority. These prerequisites of a genuine community and of acceptable majority rule are not present in most of the Third World. . . . The worldwide aggregation implied in the idea of a new world order based on majority rule is therefore inappropriate. This inappropriateness is made even more glaring by the primary thrust of the Third World ideology, namely hostility to the West and its institutions. And the politicization of life advocated by the standard ideology is likely to exacerbate political tensions both within the Third World countries and also on the international level.

Mr. Moynihan's essay does not convey the extent and depth of the heterogeneity of the Third World, nor the paucity of the human, material, and military resources of most Third World countries. For instance, most East and Central African countries are very sparsely populated. A few decades ago they were virtually empty. They have been developed almost entirely by Asians and Europeans. It is paradoxical that people whose numbers are small, and whose resources are so meager (and indeed even negligible), should be so influential in world affairs as are the spokesmen of African countries. Much the same applies to the great majority of Third World countries—that is, the majority in the new world order. Mr. Moynihan does not consider this paradox. It is explicable largely by the unfounded but widespread feeling of guilt in the West; the operation of various articulate and politically effective interest groups in the West; and by various repercussions of internal discontent and conflict. A discussion which does not take

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
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note of the paradox misleads about the power and resources of the Third World. . . .

The idea of a loyal opposition within a world order in any serious sense implies an appreciable measure of world government and administration. I wish to note here only one major implication of this far-reaching and far-fetched notion. Contemporary governments try almost of necessity to equalize and standardize material conditions in the area under their control, by redistributive taxation, direct controls, and other forcible means. This tendency is reinforced by the familiar official ideology of the Third World and of the international organizations, with its emphasis on international income redistribution. Because of the diversity of social and physical living conditions in the world, the wide differences in economic attainment, and what is more important, the deep-seated causes behind these differences, attempts substantially to reduce international income differences would require large-scale and far-reaching powers of coercion. Such measures would provoke pronounced political tensions, likely to become increasingly severe, until the concept of a world order based on majority rule is abandoned or opposition is forcibly suppressed.

P. T. BAUER

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and Political Science
London, England

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN writes:

P. T. Bauer's letter arrives just as I leave the pages of COMMENTARY for another tour of government service, and so I hope he will not be offended if I forbear to comment. I would ask instead for comment from those who might take exception to his views. I would especially welcome comment from those who thought my views harsh.

Defense Spending

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In "The Defense Budget and Israel" [February] Edward N. Luttwak makes two basic arguments. First, he argues that there is a direct relationship between Israel's security and the level of American military spending and that any reduction in the American defense budget will weaken deterrence and will also make it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to supply

Israel with the tools it needs for its own defense. Second, Mr. Luttwak says that those liberals, Jews and non-Jews alike, who propose the elimination of certain defense programs are anti-defense and that they work against the best interests of the U.S. and Israel.

In discussing the second issue, he points out that while certain Jewish interests strongly support Israel's security and American aid to underwrite Israel's defense, these same interests lack an understanding of the necessity for adequate U.S. defenses and thus they continue to press for cuts in the U.S. military budget.

The determining factor in Mr. Luttwak's assessment of U.S. defense policy is his deep pessimism about the relative status of the U.S. as a military power in the world, particularly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Mr. Luttwak shares this fundamental alarmism with spokesmen of the Defense Department whose constant theme is the decline of American power. Though his analysis is far more balanced than theirs, the underlying theme presents the same prophecy of gloom and doom: the image of the U.S. as an emergent "pitiful, helpless giant" in need of a massive infusion of military spending to solve its problems.

I cannot agree with Mr. Luttwak's prediction that the U.S. is on the verge of becoming a second-class power. That assessment is not supported by the facts and actually contributes to the undermining of support for the United States and to a loss of confidence at home and abroad. As trumpeted far and wide by Defense Department officials, the myth of American weakness is a self-fulfilling prophecy that does more harm than good. Those of us who support an adequate U.S. defense establishment and a U.S. foreign policy that fulfills our essential international commitments would do better to spend less time belittling U.S. strengths and exaggerating Soviet power. The world as a whole forms its perceptions and opinions on relative Soviet-U.S. strengths primarily on the basis of information and interpretations emanating from the United States.

A survey of comparative Soviet and U.S. military capabilities in important areas indicates that U.S. military power continues to be sufficient and is not being significantly overtaken by the Soviet Union. The U.S. is still the dom-

inant military power in the world. U.S. strategic forces are superior to those of the Soviet Union and will remain so for many years into the future. Defense Department projections indicate that ten years from now, in 1985, the United States will continue to have nearly twice the number of strategic nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union will have. The Soviet Union is still struggling to catch up and lags significantly in a number of important areas. Soviet military lag time is a reflection of the comparative economic and technological inferiority of the Soviet economy.

It should be pointed out that there are many areas of agreement between Mr. Luttwak and the Center for Defense Information. For example, Mr. Luttwak agrees with our judgments on the qualitative superiority of many U.S. weapons. We have pointed out many times that U.S. tanks, ships, missiles, and aircraft are significantly better than their Soviet counterparts and that this balances the numerical superiority the Soviets maintain in some of these areas.

But I must take exception to Mr. Luttwak's willingness to label the Center for Defense Information as an "anti-defense lobby" because it opposes certain defense-spending programs. The Center for Defense Information has always supported a strong U.S. defense. At the same time, however, CDI has always opposed excessive or unnecessary spending which contributes only in marginal ways to our defense posture. Certainly in my mind this . . . is not an anti-defense position. I am sure that Mr. Luttwak is well aware that strong political, social, and economic structures contribute equally to the strength of our country and its national security. In view of a potential \$70 billion deficit in 1976 and its potential catastrophic impact on the security of this nation, one would expect Mr. Luttwak to place greater stress on economics. . . . We cannot be a secure nation, much less secure the freedom of other nations, without a strong economy. The thought of a \$105 billion defense budget for 1976 rising to \$148 billion in 1980 for a total of \$636 billion during the five-year period is of greater immediate concern to me than what our major adversary might do to us during this same period.

Mr. Luttwak would have us believe that every dollar and every program in the U.S. defense bud-

get contributes to the defense of Israel. Surely our strategic or tactical nuclear weapons would not be used by Israel against Syria, the PLO, or Egypt, and these programs are among those that are specifically challenged by the Center for Defense Information. CDI opposes spending on obsolescent ICBM's. Over the next ten years, the United States could spend \$50 billion on new mobile and heavy throw-weight ICBM's. Existing ICBM's carry more than 2,000 nuclear weapons. If we can destroy every Russian city of 100,000 or more in population 36 times over, CDI has the right to question further expenditures. We cannot see where such programs would contribute either to the strength of the U.S. or Israel.

CDI opposes the B-1 program. The B-1, at over \$87 million each, will simply not be worth the total \$75 billion program life-cycle cost. We now have three times more bombers (500 to 160) and three times more strategic nuclear weapons (8,500 to 2,800) than the Soviets have. Again, CDI has the right to question the worth of this program and this does not mean we are against a strong U.S. military posture. Not only would the B-1 program not contribute to the defense of the U.S. or Israel, it could reduce the U.S. capability to assist Israel because of money it takes from other programs. CDI opposes the new strategic cruise missiles because we feel that there is no need for a fourth strategic force. It will not contribute to our strength, but will needlessly subtract billions of dollars from our economy. CDI would cut overseas forces substantially and would not start a program for the militarization of the Indian Ocean which could only escalate Russian efforts in the area and begin an additional round of expenditures for more naval forces and their required bases. None of these programs in our view would significantly contribute to the defense of either the U.S. or Israel. It is in the best interests of our country to point out the lack of an adequate military rationale behind such programs.

It should be obvious that CDI's principal opposition is toward a dozen or so expensive programs that would provide only marginal, if any, additional strength to our defense posture. Such programs, in our view, undermine national security.


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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port the many hundreds of defense programs which we feel contribute to a strong U.S. defense and additionally to the defense of our allies. The military balance is not disadvantageous to our allies. However, nothing will promote insecurity more than exaggerations of approaching American military weakness.

GENE R. LA ROCQUE
Center for Defense Information
Washington, D.C.

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK writes:

In the first substantive paragraph of his letter, and again later on, Gene R. La Rocque accuses me of arguing that every dollar in the defense budget makes a direct contribution to Israel's security. I wrote nothing of the kind. I merely pointed out that there is a direct relationship between the overall military power of the United States and the security of marginal areas in the Western world, such as Israel. In the more exposed positions, the impact of weakness at the center is felt more or less immediately. Compare the cautious conduct of the Soviet Union in 1967 with its reckless activism in 1973. It is not true that my argument is motivated by a "deep pessimism" on the relative status of the U.S. as a military power, and it is unworthy of Mr. La Rocque to use the old trick of the orphan quotation to imply as much: I have never used, nor would ever allow myself to use, a phrase such as "pitiful, helpless giant"—which appears, complete with quotation marks, in *his* letter.

My premise is rather that as the status quo power the United States needs sufficient authority to deter attacks upon its interests—including the security of its allies—and sufficient military strength to defeat, directly or indirectly, such attacks as are not effectively deterred. Hence direct comparisons between U.S. and Russian weapon inventories are meaningless. Instead the United States needs as much military power as can be deployed up to the point where on margin the value of the interests defended is equal to the cost of the military forces required to defend these interests. In my view, we are at, or below, this point as far as a variety of interests are concerned, and we are far too near for comfort as far as the interest labeled Israel's security is concerned. Mr. La Rocque accuses me of being one of those who undermine the strength of the

United States by deliberate alarmism which undercuts the authority projected by U.S. military power. If he had seen my book, *The Political Uses of Sea Power*, now used as a text at the U.S. Naval War College, he would have found that I myself deplore such tendencies in the body of a whole chapter. Nevertheless, where there *are* areas of weakness, it is important to draw attention to them, both in the internal policy process and on Capitol Hill. In the Soviet Union there is multi-track communication, so that Russian propaganda can boast to the world while at the same time officials can use internal communications to draw attention to weak spots. Here this cannot be done, and I hope that Mr. La Rocque would agree that this is for the better. Mr. La Rocque has always argued that he supports a strong defense but that this or that particular program is wasteful and unnecessary. In fact, a glance at the Center for Defense Information pamphlets shows that over the last year or so the Center has opposed every major U.S. strategic program (Trident, B-1, and ICBM development); has called for troop cuts in both Europe and the Pacific; and has opposed every non-strategic weapon program large enough to be visible, notably the CVAN-70, SAM-D, etc. I rather fancy that if his Center published a full list of the items separately opposed it would include almost every major weapon program. And this surely is *not* compatible with a "strong defense" because even present areas of superiority will eventually become areas of weakness unless the cycle of research, development, introduction, and deployment continues.

As for his specific comments on the B-1, I will not dispute the questionable figures (less than 350 U.S. bombers are operational B-52's) but note that the bomber force is the *only* instrument in the American arsenal that would be useful to defend the territory of any remote ally that came under sudden, large-scale, non-nuclear attack. Non-nuclear strategic bombing is a very questionable instrument when the goal is to break popular morale or coerce governments, but there is no doubt whatsoever that it is highly effective against conventional military forces moving over ground, especially in open desert areas. I myself support the B-1 primarily because it would become the *only* non-nuclear long-range

striking weapon in the American arsenal. Since the U.S. has global interests it must have global "reach" over both land and water, and only the strategic bomber is effective as a prompt strike weapon with more or less worldwide reach. In the worst-case scenario of an Arab invasion from Sinai, for example, the only prompt and effective move open to the United States in order to assist Israel would be to send B-1's on non-nuclear bombing missions. If available in adequate number, the latter could alone inflict decisive damage on massed ground forces. The Center has persistently viewed the B-1 as a purely strategic nuclear weapon, even though the Defense Department has made it clear (as indeed is obvious) that the B-1 is inherently a multipurpose, long-range, strike aircraft much better for non-nuclear missions (including naval missions) than the present force of old B-52's. As for the Indian Ocean, the Russians are already in place. It is the United States that is absent.

We need careful scrutiny of the defense budget, but this the Center does not provide. It does not contest the overall strategic concept and has no alternative strategy. It merely attacks targets of opportunity—large, highly visible, defense programs. It has never to my knowledge publicized areas of inadequacy where more could be done and more money spent. It always calls for less.

Business & the People

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Since the mid-60's, we have been witnessing the third wave of relative public hostility to business during the 20th century. Until recently, it has faithfully followed the Progressive formula discussed by James A. Nuechterlein ["The People vs. the Interests," March]: moralistic in tone, legalistic in content, politically rooted in an educated affluent middle class, and hence, for all its anti-corporate rhetoric and substantive legislative accomplishments, essentially unthreatening to private economic accumulation.

The recent deterioration in economic performance does, however, add an important new dimension, one that I think Mr. Nuechterlein does not consider carefully. Since its rise less than a century ago, the modern corporation has been viewed with varying degrees of

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suspicion by both middle-class and working-class Americans. They have tolerated its size and power because of its proven ability to deliver a relatively steady, but over the long run continual, increase in material living standards. What makes the current economic crisis unique is the growing consensus by economists as well as business itself that due to a number of complex factors, including acceleration of the business cycle, the limitations of government economic management, the maturation of the economy, and the declining international economic position of the United States, we can no longer look forward to a repetition of the growth rates of either the 50's or the 20's during the next few decades.

American business is only beginning to confront the persistence of quality-of-life issues, left over from the 60's, combined with widespread resistance on the part of organized labor, welfare recipients, and the middle class to reduce their economic expectations so that the private-investment system can remain viable in the 70's—expectations painstakingly created by both liberals and Madison Avenue copywriters.

Mr. Nuechterlein should not be misled by the often confused rhetoric of the contemporary opponents of business: the issues which divide business and non-business groups are becoming more clearly defined around such matters as the "just price" for essential commodities, the continued expansion of the welfare state, the control over U.S. investment abroad, the content of public investment, and the distribution of scarce resources—including wealth. In America, serious class conflict may yet materialize, though couched in Populist rhetoric.

DAVID VOGEL

University of California
Berkeley, California

JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN writes:

David Vogel argues that the American economy will be unable in the future to sustain acceptable growth rates. Because of this failure by business to deliver sufficient economic payoffs, he suggests, long-latent hostilities toward the business community will emerge and produce in America genuine class conflict, as opposed to the limited and "essentially unthreatening" anti-business impulses of earlier Progressive and Populist movements.

My article was concerned with historical and political analysis, not economic prediction, and so did not really consider the matters Mr. Vogel raises. His prognostications may or may not be accurate; since I am a historian and not an economist, I can offer no expert comment, though I would question his description of a "consensus" among economists (much less businessmen) in support of his pessimistic forecasts. For what it is worth, my own guess is that American capitalism will be in the future, as it has been in the past, considerably more adaptable, resourceful, and successful than its critics regularly predict. I am reminded of all the death-of-capitalism analysts of the 30's, with their assumptions of "secular stagnation" and the end of economic expansion. Given the far deeper economic crisis of those years, such pessimistic predictions had more immediate plausibility than do current ones. That they were wrong provides, of course, no necessary clues to what might happen today, though it is a perspective perhaps worth keeping in mind.

It is striking, finally, that Mr. Vogel's letter provides an example of one of my points concerning the distinctive qualities of the American Left. His comments generally speak of opposition to business, yet his indicated antipathy to "private economic accumulation" suggests a deeper questioning of capitalism itself. Yet he does not clearly say so, an instance, perhaps, of the typically populist ambiguity of American leftists in failing to specify how fundamental their quarrel with the business community actually is.

"Global Reach"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I was interested in Martin Mayer's quite devastating review of *Global Reach* by Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Müller [Books in Review, April] because the authors have relied rather heavily on a 1972 study of mine to support their thesis that multinational corporations have been a force for evil. My study is cited not only in the book, but also in the briefer versions of it that appeared in the *New Yorker* and the *New York Times*.

My study reported a 1958-70 trend toward inequality for earned income (wages, salaries, and self-employment income) of individ-

uals. In *Global Reach* this conclusion was used carelessly as applying to total income (including dividends, interest, etc.) for families. Of course, distribution of the latter is affected by quite different forces (such as the increasing flow of government social security and other transfer payments) from the former.

Of more concern to me was the complete failure of the authors to relate my work to the effects of the multinationals. As far as I could ascertain, the jumbled discussion of trends began in midair and wandered aimlessly from there without any logical link to the case the authors were trying to prove.

PETER HENLE

The Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.

On Richard Tucker

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I was delighted to read Jacob Cohen's "In Memory of Richard Tucker" [April], for he expresses some of my own views of Tucker's qualities and achievements.

My knowledge of Richard Tucker began when, going to speak at a remote village church hall in South Wales, . . . I noticed in a music-shop window, a small record jacket: "Richard Tucker. *Kol Nidre. Eli Eli.*" I had never heard of the man . . . or of the particular series of records. However, the next day I ordered the record. Once I had heard it, I had to know more about him. . . .

A few years later, I was staying for part of Passover at a certain "borscht-belt" hotel. . . . As we were about to enter the "temple," I was told, "Oh, by the way, our cantor for the services is Richard Tucker." . . . A few minutes later, I heard, first, the voice of the rabbi, who touched a sentimental chord in that he had ministered to my own home congregation in Wales until a few years earlier, and then I listened, fascinated, to the *hazzanut* of Richard Tucker. He was the first man to make me weep at the sound of music. It is no insult to say that he brought back for me the memories of the *hazzanim* of London's East End. . . . They were men who had wonderful voices which were not always properly trained and developed, or truly appreciated. And as Richard Tucker led the *davening* that day, I wept. . . .

LEN GOSS

Council of Christians and Jews
London, England

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
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SOME ARGUMENTS YOU CAN SETTLE AND BETS YOU CAN WIN: A majority of the population of Jerusalem was Jewish more than a century ago (page 307). The Jewish star has sometimes been Christian (page 390).

People you may not think of as Jewish: Melissa Hayden (page 245). Houdini (page 272). Lorne Greene (page 226). Erich von Stroheim (page 575). Victor Borge (page 99).

For people who could use a little help in explaining the difference between the Talmud, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: All the books of the "people of the Book" and what they contain. For instance, the two different books called Talmud, and why the one with Jerusalem in its name is considered the lesser authority (page 585).

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TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I have two questions concerning Jacob Cohen's wonderful article. . . . What does Mr. Cohen mean by the words "*an unanswerable demonstration of how Puccini should be sung*"?

Mr. Cohen also writes: "Tucker was absolutely riveting in the third act [of *Carmen*]." I don't know what Tucker was doing riveting in the midst of *Carmen*, but this doesn't make sense either, as Mr. Cohen says Tucker was *absolutely riveting*. . . .

JAMES I. ROTHSCHILD
Winnetka, Illinois

JACOB COHEN writes:

James I. Rothschild is quite right. Don José does not actually rivet in the third act of *Carmen*. He glowers a lot, fights a little, and in the fourth act stabs, but he does not actually rivet. Mr. Rothschild has provided an absolutely unanswerable demonstration of how the English language should be protected.

Oil & the West

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

To someone removed from the American scene, perhaps the most disquieting feature of Robert W. Tucker's articles [*"Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,"* January, and *"Further Reflections on Oil and Force,"* March] is the insight they offer into the attitude prevailing in what, for the want of a more elegant term, might be called "opinion-making circles" in the United States toward the defense of Western interests in the Middle East. The burden of Mr. Tucker's argument in his January article, that a situation could well arise which would necessitate a resort to force to insure the security of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to the Western world and Japan, is so eminently reasonable as to preclude the need for comment. Yet it is evident in every line that he wrote that he felt compelled to put his case with the utmost circumspection, a compulsion he would surely not have felt if the critical air had not been rank with the smell of appeasement. As it is, the reaction to his article proves his caution to have been amply justified, even though unavailing: the familiar voices have been raised in the usual quarters in outraged denunciation of anything so reckless and so wicked as to suggest that the West might

take up arms in defense of an interest vital to its survival.

What Mr. Tucker's critics seem to overlook in their indignation is that the Persian Gulf is a highly unstable area, subject to frequent and often violent shifts of political fortune. It would be a gross dereliction of duty on the part of any major Western government, not least the government of the United States, if it were not to keep this fact constantly in mind and to shape its policy toward the countries of the region accordingly, even to the extent, if need be, of preparing to intervene militarily to keep oil supplies flowing freely. Yet all the evidence so far indicates that the major Western powers have chosen to ignore the reality of the Gulf's condition, that they are fecklessly hoping that nothing will upset the status quo there, or that Iran and Saudi Arabia between them will somehow maintain the peace and security of the area. It is a forlorn hope: the Shah of Iran himself represents perhaps the greatest single threat to the tranquility of the Gulf, while the record of Saudi Arabia's relations with the minor states of the peninsula is one of friction and antipathy. Despite the efforts of the United States over a quarter of a century to promote the paramount position of Saudi Arabia in the peninsula, the Saudi government has shown itself to be incapable of exerting a hegemony over its neighbors. Its attempts to do so, however, have been, and will continue to be, a major source of disturbance in the Gulf.

Like Chamberlain facing the dictators, the governments of the major Western powers have failed to take the measure of the regimes with which they are dealing. As a consequence, they have not yet fully comprehended the nature of the menace which now hangs over the West. For all the brouhaha raised about it, the Arab-Israeli conflict is not the reason the Arabs and the Shah are now wielding the oil weapon against the West, however much the conflict might have been the excuse for the imposition of the embargo in October 1973. The Shah, after all, has been in the forefront of those demanding ever higher prices for oil, and he has been neither at war with Israel nor reluctant to sell her oil. It is the price raises, not the threats of an embargo, which are the essential element in the strategy which he and the Arabs

are now pursuing toward the West, a strategy which began to take shape early in 1971, long before the Arab-Israeli war in the fall of 1973. What they are endeavoring to do in concert is to hold the Western world for ransom, to place it in thrall, and so to effect a massive transfer of resources from the Christian West to the Muslim East, thereby redressing the balance of power between Western Christendom and Islam which has been tilted in favor of the former for the past three centuries or more.

There is no mistaking the mood of exultation which now grips Sunni Islam, and, to only a lesser degree, Shii Islam. Having suffered for generations from a powerful sense of grievance at the manifest political and economic superiority of the West, the Arabs and the Iranians now believe that in their control of the greater part of the world's proven reserves of crude oil they possess the means of bringing the West to heel and of reasserting the primacy of Islam. Far-fetched though these ambitions may appear to Western eyes, they nevertheless are real to those who cherish them, and infinitely more seductive than the cooler intimations of reason.

The reaction of most of the Western powers to the economic blackmail being practiced against them by the Shah and the governments of the Arab oil-producing states has been a supine and pusillanimous acquiescence, deriving apparently from the belief that such an attitude will guarantee them continued access to the oil reserves of the Middle East. It will, of course, do nothing of the kind: appeasement will only increase the truculence which the Arabs and the Shah are at present displaying, and confirm them in their conviction that they have the West at their mercy. The Middle Eastern members of OPEC, it should be recalled, have broken every agreement they have made since 1970 concerning prices, levels of production, and the rate at which they were to acquire a majority holding in the oil companies' equity. Every promise they have made to lower oil prices has been unfulfilled, every threat to restrict production carried into effect. Yet the governments of the West still affect to believe that the various economic nostrums now being peddled around—long-term barter deals, "recycling" of surplus oil funds, "partnership" arrangements, and

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
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
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Her work has been exhibited in Israel, the United States, and Europe—in private collections and in such major institutions as the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, Rose Art Museum of Brandeis University, the Museum of Modern Art, and the Israel Museum in Jerusalem.



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so forth—will somehow extricate them from the financial difficulties into which they have been plunged by the inordinate increases in the price of oil, and at the same time safeguard the supply of oil in the future. They will not, for the basic reason that none of the Middle Eastern oil-producing states can be relied upon, on the evidence of its past conduct, to honor its undertakings.

Oil is a strategic commodity of prime importance, and it is folly of an almost suicidal order for the West to have allowed itself to drift into a situation where it is incapable of controlling its major source of supply. With the decline of Western influence in the Middle East, and more particularly after the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and from the Gulf in 1971, the West lost the control it had previously exercised over the Gulf's oil. It will somehow have to recover that control, not necessarily directly or by a physical presence, but at least to a degree that affords greater security than the present state of near anarchy. The advocates of appeasement in the West maintain that the acquisition of oil is a purely commercial transaction, and they buttress this contention with glib arguments about a sense of self-interest on the part of the Middle Eastern oil-producing states and a further sense of mutual interest between them and the Western oil-consuming countries in keeping oil flowing, arguments whose purpose is to demonstrate that all is really for the best in the best of all possible worlds and that there is no cause for the West to fret. But these arguments not only ignore or distort the record of the past few years, they also depend upon assumptions about good sense, reasonableness, moderation, and the sanctity of agreements which are native to the West but which are not subscribed to by the Middle Eastern governments in question. The issue, contrary to all that OPEC's Western apologists may say, is by no means a purely commercial one but, as the motives which impelled the Arabs and the Shah to raise oil prices to exorbitant levels clearly reveal, it is almost exclusively a political one and should be treated primarily as such. We have got ourselves into the predicament in which we find ourselves today by ignoring this fact—a melancholy consequence of following Keynes instead of Clausewitz.

The vast surplus funds now at the disposal of the Middle Eastern oil-producing states pose a further, and potentially more sinister, threat to the West than mere financial embarrassment. Given the nature of the regimes in power in these states, it is inevitable that they should employ these funds for political purposes, as likely as not of a *louche* variety, beyond their own borders. What signs there may be in the United States of the deployment of these funds for such purposes I have no way of knowing; but here in Britain evidence grows with the passing of each week of the creeping corruption of our political, economic, and social institutions by both the overt and the covert use of oil money, predominantly Arab. Since Britain is now on the verge of economic collapse, mainly as a result of its own profligacy, there is an understandable, if far from commendable, reluctance to resist the inflow of this money, and a corresponding readiness to truckle to the Arab oil magnates and the Shah, especially since the depositing here of the Danegeld they have extracted helps to keep up the spurious appearance of financial solvency which the British government is desperately anxious to maintain. But the canker is by no means confined to political and financial circles in Britain: it has spread far and wide, into commerce and industry, into publishing and journalism, even into the universities and learned societies, to the extent that London is beginning to wear the aspect of being, after Mecca and Medinah, the third holy city of Islam.

To a considerable extent the West has got itself into the precarious situation in which it now stands with respect to the security of oil supplies from the Gulf and the crippling prices it is paying for them by treating the petty states which control the Gulf's oil reserves with far more deference than their standing in the world warrants. None of the oil-producing states of the Middle East is the peer of any of the major powers of Europe, and it is simply ridiculous as well as profoundly humiliating to see the foreign and finance ministers of Europe scurrying from one dusty Middle Eastern capital to another, to wait patiently upon the pleasure of some disdainful potentate, to attend gravely to his complaints, and to plead humbly for his favors. Here, in

truth, increase of appetite grows from what it feeds upon: all that Western cajolery serves to achieve is to make these petty despots more intransigent and arrogant than ever and to heighten their contempt for Western power. It is high time that the West began to disabuse them of their illusions by employing the array of political and economic weapons it has at its disposal to end the extortion currently being practiced by Iran and the Arab oil-producing states. It can be done, if the will is there. Cracks have already appeared in the façade of OPEC unity under the pressure of the present glut of crude oil in the world's markets. Further pressure will split the cartel wide open, especially since none of its members, not even the Middle Eastern ones, is the natural partner of the others.

Even if the price-fixing ring is broken, however, the problem of the security of oil supplies remains, which brings us back to the point with which this letter opened. Western Europe and Japan are dependent for their principal supplies of oil upon the good will of regimes notorious for their fickle and perverse behavior. The political situation in the Gulf is highly volatile and dangerous, and it has been made even more so by the thoroughly shameful and senseless conduct of Britain, France, and the United States in flooding the region with arms for the ignoble purpose of soaking up excess oil revenues. Every state in the Gulf nurses a grievance of one kind or another against its neighbor, and recent events have only sharpened their mutual suspicions and antagonisms. The assassination of Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz has given encouragement to the subversive elements in the Arabian peninsula, while the accord between Iraq and Iran, at least for as long as it lasts, has freed their hands for adventures in the Gulf. No doubt it suits the Shah and others to proclaim that the affairs of the Gulf are solely the concern of the states around its shores, and to weary the world with a lot of gasconade about the terrible things that will happen if the Western powers so much as dare to show their faces in the region. The Shah, however, is a paper tiger, and the West should not allow itself to be duped by his growls, or those of his Arabian counterparts, into resigning its economic destiny into his or their hands.

Mr. Tucker has courageously grasped the nettle by facing up to the basic question of whether, in the end, the West might have to resort to force to insure control over its major source of oil. His critics have evaded this painful duty by conjuring up instead all manner of dreadful apparitions which, they say, will become reality if the West takes military action in the Gulf—the gigantic figure of the Russian bear, lurching down the valleys of Mesopotamia, snow still clinging to its paws; the sky over Arabia rent with flames from a thousand exploding oil wells; the ferocious hordes of Araby sweeping out of the sands to strike like lightning at the invading infidel, and then vanish, as swiftly as they came, into the desert wastes, there to prepare to strike again before the sun is up (or down). How the Russians would react to armed Western intervention is unknown, probably even to themselves and most certainly to the Western oracles now vociferously prophesying calamity. As for the prospects of a determined and effective Arab guerrilla campaign, they cannot be judged very formidable if the history of warfare in eastern Arabia in the past century or so is a reliable guide. Yet by arguing in the way they do, Mr. Tucker's critics have in a sense, and despite themselves, answered the question to which he addressed himself and which they have refused to face up to squarely. The answer they have given is a depressing one, for it is characteristic of the want of spirit and resolution which today dominates much of the Western world. Instead of congratulating themselves for having so faithfully manifested this malaise, they would do well to reflect that if the West persists in its present abject policy of appeasement toward the Arabs and the Shah, it will render inevitable an eventual recourse to the kind of measures the very thought of which now makes them pale.

Stanley Hoffmann's letter, which appears in the correspondence on Mr. Tucker's articles [Letters from Readers, April], might have been written to illustrate what I have said about the nervelessness and make-believe which characterize fashionable thinking these days about Western relations with Asia and Africa. His arguments are all depressingly familiar: they are

those used by a collection of sophists and cut-rate sages in Britain in the 1960's to justify the abandonment of its responsibilities in Africa and the Middle East. Every confident calculation made by these *fossoyeurs* about the beneficial consequences of such an abandonment has been disproved by subsequent events, yet they are still rhapsodizing about the ineffable joys of retreat and appeasement. One of their more sublime moments of triumph came at the end of 1967, when Britain slunk out of Aden, surrendering the British colony and protectorate to a gang of terrorists. Would Mr. Hoffmann care to assert that this retreat and the British withdrawal from the Gulf four years later had no bearing whatever upon the increasing use of intimidation by the Middle Eastern members of OPEC from 1971 onward in order to raise the price of crude oil, expropriate the oil-companies' holdings, and constrict the supply of oil to the West?

I don't know what Mr. Hoffmann's qualifications may be to pronounce upon the affairs of Arabia and the Gulf, but from the remarks he makes about the Anglo-French intervention at Suez in 1956 he would seem to understand little of the political tradition of the East. He might try impressing his theories about the pacific settlement of disputes and the voluntary renunciation of force as a means of achieving political ends upon the Marxist-Leninist junta in Aden, whose bloody deeds of repression provoke such delighted squeals in the cafes of the *rive gauche* and other fashionable intellectual watering-places, where the politics of Asia is excitedly discussed in an ideologically hygienic atmosphere into which the rude breath of reality is forbidden to intrude. Or he could equally well explain his convictions to the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, who know a thing or two about how to settle sectarian quarrels or territorial disputes, or to the Marxist *fedayeen* who plot to overthrow them and who also know a thing or two about the power that resides in the barrel of a gun. Mr. Hoffmann is welcome to his breast-beating: for my part, I would prefer to go tiger-shooting in the company of Mr. Tucker.

J. B. KELLY

London, England

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
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


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Was Alger Hiss Guilty?

Irving Younger

IT is time to think again about Alger Hiss. The cold war is over, and its casualties petition for rehabilitation. While committees publish advertisements demanding posthumous justice for the Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss acts for himself. He asks the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to reinstate him to the Bar of the Commonwealth on the ground that he is presently of good moral character, and in New York he announces to the press that he will soon move to reopen his case and demonstrate his innocence. "In 1948," he says, "a man named Whittaker Chambers swore that he had been a Communist spy, and that I, a State Department official, had given him government papers in 1938. I never gave him secret papers. But largely because a young Congressman named Nixon said he believed Chambers, I was convicted of perjury when I denied the charges and went to jail for 44 months." Nixon ended his career in fraud, Hiss seems to suggest, and he began it with fraud. The prosecution was yet another Nixon connivance, a deception whose purpose was to destroy Hiss and convict an entire generation of American liberals.*

Before making up our minds, we had better find out what happened in the case. There are 3,307 printed pages of testimony, another thousand pages of exhibits, 595 pages of lawyers' briefs and affidavits, and three judicial opinions. Out of this welter of materials, let me try to winnow answers to the two questions which are the subject of this article. What was the evidence? Does the evidence justify the verdict of guilt?

I have relied almost entirely upon the transcripts, the exhibits, and the briefs, telling the story largely in the words of the witnesses and the lawyers. I have no new information to offer and hence no revelations to make. I am personally acquainted with none of the participants except the prosecutor, Thomas F. Murphy, who in 1951 became a federal judge and before whom I tried several criminal cases in the early 1960's, first as an Assistant United States Attorney and then as de-

IRVING YOUNGER, Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques at Cornell Law School, has been an attorney in private practice, an Assistant United States Attorney, and a judge in both the civil and criminal courts of New York City. He has also taught evidence at both Columbia and NYU Law Schools and contributed many articles to legal journals. This is his first appearance in COMMENTARY.

fense counsel. If I have any special claim to competence in the matter, it is this: I am a trial lawyer, and, so far as I know, no one with the skills and experience of a trial lawyer (apart from those who prosecuted and defended Alger Hiss) has ever publicly examined the evidence.†

On September 3, 1939, two days after the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Whittaker Chambers went to see A. A. Berle, the Assistant Secretary of State. Berle made notes of the conversation, listing the names of various people in government who, according to Chambers, were Communists. Of Alger Hiss, the notes say:

Ass't. to Sayre—CP—1937
Member of the Underground Com—Active
Baltimore boys—
Wife—Priscilla Hiss—Socialist—
Early days of New Deal.

Nothing happened until March 20, 1945, when Raymond Murphy, a security officer for the State Department, interviewed Chambers. Murphy's memorandum of the interview reads in part:

It seems that in 1934, with the establishment of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the introduction of much reform legislation in Washington, the Communist party decided its influence could be felt more strongly by enlisting the active support of underground workers not openly identified with the party and never previously affiliated with the party, but whose background and training would make them possible prospects as affiliates under the guise of advancing reform legislation. The Hungarian, party name J. Peters, was selected by the Central Committee to supervise the work from New York. His Washington representative and contact man was the informant [Chambers], and he personally met and discussed many times various problems with the persons listed below except those specifically named as coming under another person's jurisdiction. The persons listed below are said to have disclosed much confidential matter and to have arranged among themselves a program committing this government to

* I have adapted the phrase from Alistair Cooke's book about the case, *A Generation on Trial*.

† I do not except Earl Jowitt, a distinguished English lawyer, who says several times in his *The Strange Case of Alger Hiss* that much about the way the case was tried is foreign to him.

a policy in keeping with the desires of the Communist party.

The opportunity presented itself for the formation of an underground group with the appointment to a leading position in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in 1934 of one Harold Ware. Ware had worked for years in agricultural collectivization projects in Russia. He was a son of Ella Reeves Bloor, veteran American Communist, by one of her numerous marriages. On being assigned to this agency, Ware found a group of very promising, ambitious young men with advanced social and political ideas. Among them were Lee Pressman, Alger Hiss, Henry Collins, and Charles Kramer (Krivitzky). They all joined the Communist party and became leaders of cells. No cell had over ten members. This was the nucleus of the Communist underground organization in Washington. The purpose was for each member to advance as high as possible in the government to shape legislation favorable to the program of the Communist party. The top leaders of the underground were:

1. Harold Ware
2. Lee Pressman
3. Alger Hiss

In the order of their importance.

Murphy spoke with Chambers again on August 28, 1946. His memorandum reads in its entirety as follows:

The Communist underground in Washington is believed to have been set up some time in 1933 after the inauguration of President Roosevelt. My informant [Chambers] does not know how or when it was set up, but he believes that Harold Ware had a prominent part in creating the underground and in enlisting key members. Ware, of course, would have acted pursuant to orders from the Central Committee of the Communist party of the United States.

My informant entered into the Washington picture in the summer of 1935 and left it and the party at the end of December 1937. The group was already in being and functioning actively. His superior was the Hungarian known as J. Peters, the national head of the Communist underground movement. My informant acted as a courier between Washington and New York. He participated in oral discussions in Washington with the group which Peters himself conducted. They met only the top layer—in other words, leaders of cells of the Communist underground in government circles.

My informant did not know the Coe who taught at McGill University, but he understood that he was a Communist. The other Coe he definitely knew to be a Communist. Harry White was reported to be a member of one of the cells, not a leader, and his brother-in-law, a dentist in New York, is said to be a fanatical Communist. Alger Hiss was never to make converts. His job was to mess up policy. The Post of the State Department was a cell member. He thought he was of Nat Perlow's group. Post was formerly on the WPA, where he measured

skulls. He was definitely of minor importance in the movement compared with Hiss.

The heads of the various underground groups in Washington who met with Peters were the Hisses, Kramer (Krivitzky), Henry Collins, who was either secretary or treasurer of the group, John Abt, Lee Pressman, Nat Perlow, and Nat Witt. These men met regularly at special meetings. With the exception of Donald Hiss, who did not have an organization, they headed parallel organizations. But they did not know the personnel of the different organizations.

Hal Ware was the top man of these organizations. Upon his death in 1936 a fight broke out for leadership, but Nat Witt won out. Some time after 1937 Witt is said to have been succeeded by Abt.

(There were other underground Communist groups operating in Washington, but this was the elite policy-making, top-level group.) This group did not exchange secret documents from the government departments, but did give sealed reports on the membership of the groups and on policy. It was not a spy ring, but one far more important and cunning because its members helped to shape policy in their departments. Henry Collins, as secretary or treasurer, delivered most of the sealed reports to my informant. At that time Henry Collins was believed to be working in the Forestry Division of Agriculture.

Peters was in the agricultural department of Hungary under Bela Kun. He was in the Austrian army in World War I. He is a little dark fellow, small feet and wavy black hair.

At the meetings in Washington with this group Peters would give pep talks on Communist theory. He would then talk to each leader separately. Peters often discussed the morale with my informant. He praised the Hiss boys to my informant very highly, but was doubtful of Pressman. He had a high opinion of Witt, a slightly less high opinion of Abt, thought Kramer was a nice boy but shallow, and had very little use for Perlow. He liked Henry Collins.

My informant asked Alger Hiss personally to break with the party in early 1938, but Hiss refused with tears in his eyes and said he would remain loyal to the party.

After his break with the party, Grace Hutchins telephoned the mother of my informant on Long Island one night and said that if he did not return to the party by the following Thursday it was a question of his death.

WHO was the man telling this lurid tale?*

Whittaker Chambers was born in 1901 in Phila-

* What follows is the recitation, moderately edited, of Chambers's life contained in a question asked by Hiss's lawyer of Dr. Binger, a witness at the second trial. For more nuanced pictures of Chambers, see Chambers's autobiography, *Witness*, and Lionel Trilling's recreation of Chambers as Gifford Maxim in *The Middle of the Journey*, written before Trilling had heard anything about the Hiss case.

delphia and spent his boyhood years on Long Island. He attended the Rockville Centre High School, where he wrote the class prophecy. The school authorities read it and told him not to deliver it. Chambers wrote a second prophecy, but, at the graduation ceremony, read the first. The consequence was that he did not receive his diploma with the rest of his class.

When he was eighteen, Chambers ran away from home. He did day labor on street railways in Washington and in New Orleans under a false name. He returned home and worked for about six months in an advertising agency under another false name. Then he enrolled at Williams College, leaving after two days. A few weeks later, he wrote his former roommate at Williams asking him to pick up a letter at the post office addressed to someone other than Chambers and forward it to Chambers. The roommate picked up the letter, opened it, and recognized it to have been written by Chambers.

In 1920, Chambers enrolled at Columbia College. He edited a student magazine called *Morningside*, which published a play by Chambers entitled, *A Play for Puppets*. The play represents Jesus dressed in a gray kimono with long red hair, obstinate and proud, distrustful of women. This caused trouble at Columbia; and Chambers withdrew from the college in January 1923. He reapplied for admission in September 1924. That month, Chambers wrote to Professor Mark Van Doren that he had "quite simply lied" at his readmission interview by saying that he wanted to return to school in order to teach history, whereas the truth was that he had acquired an "unconventional partner" who wanted him to complete his education. He was readmitted, but left again after one semester.

On February 17, 1925, Chambers joined the Communist party. He was working at the time in the New York Public Library. In April 1927, his employers accused him of theft. They went to his locker and discovered eight library books and some Communist leaflets. Chambers took the officials to his home, where 56 books from the Columbia library were found. He was fired.

Chambers had a brother, Richard, born in 1904 (the year of Hiss's birth). In September 1926, Richard committed suicide by putting his head in an oven. Before this, Richard had asked Whittaker to enter into a suicide pact with him. Richard's death had a paralyzing effect on Whittaker. He remained in bed immobile for two or three months.

Attributing the suicide to Richard's inability to cope with an irrational world, Chambers now became a fanatical Communist. In 1929, because of an intramural dispute, he left the party, but returned in 1932. His job was writing for the *Daily Worker*. Throughout these years, Chambers used false names and gave false information on applica-

tions for a passport, government positions, and the like. He broke with the Communist party in 1937 or 1938.

Having professed atheism until then, in 1940 Chambers was baptized an Episcopalian. About a year later, he and his wife and children became Quakers.

In April 1939, Chambers went to work for *Time* magazine as a book reviewer. He wrote foreign news, art, and cinema, finally becoming a senior editor. A physical breakdown required that he rest at home for some eight months, after which he returned to the magazine as a writer of cover stories on such people as Pope Pius XII, Arnold Toynbee, Marian Anderson, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Albert Einstein, earning \$30,000 a year. He resigned on December 10, 1948.

AND who was Alger Hiss, the man Chambers said was a member of the Communist underground?*

He was born in 1904. After graduation from Johns Hopkins (and election to Phi Beta Kappa), he went to the Harvard Law School, where he was an editor of the *Law Review*. His first job, in 1929, was that of law clerk to Justice Holmes. In October 1930, Hiss became associated with the firm of Choate, Hall, and Stewart in Boston, which he left to work for the firm of Cotton, Franklin, Wright, and Gordon in New York. In 1933, he entered government service as assistant general counsel of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Two years later, he became legal assistant to the Special Committee of the United States Senate Investigating the Munitions Industry (the Nye Committee). After a year, he entered the Justice Department, where he served as a special attorney in the office of the Solicitor General. In 1936, he transferred to the State Department as assistant to Francis Sayre, the Assistant Secretary of State. When Sayre left to become High Commissioner to the Philippines, Hiss joined the staff of Stanley Hornbeck, Adviser on Political Affairs. From that position, he went to the newly created Office of Special Political Affairs. In 1944, he was secretary to the American delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Early in 1945, he was appointed director of the Office of Special Political Affairs and accompanied President Roosevelt to Yalta. He was secretary-general of the San Francisco Conference where the Charter of the United Nations was signed, and it was he who carried the executed copy of the Charter to President Truman in Washington. At the end of 1945, with the title of principal adviser, he accompanied the United States delegation to the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in London. In February 1947, Hiss left government service to become president of the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-

* This is Hiss's *curriculum vitae* as narrated by him from the witness stand.

tional Peace, of which John Foster Dulles was chairman of the board.

Given each man's record and asked to choose between the two, I think that any fair-minded person would have taken the word of Alger Hiss. Until August 3, 1948, however, no one needed to make the choice, for Chambers's allegations were unknown to Hiss.* Things soon changed.

ON August 3, 1948, J. Parnell Thomas† of New Jersey was chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, Richard M. Nixon of California was a member, and Robert E. Stripling was the Committee's chief investigator. In the spring of 1948, Stripling had sent two investigators to New York to speak with Chambers. Chambers said that he had been a Communist, that he had broken with the party, and that he did not want to appear before the Committee. Stripling paid no further attention to him until July (immediately after Elizabeth Bentley named several government employees for whom she had been a Communist courier). A subpoena was served on Chambers, and he appeared in executive session on the morning of August 3. At 11:00, the Committee heard him in public. Chambers testified that he had worked for the Communist underground in Washington, attached to a group which included Alger Hiss.

The next morning, the Committee announced that it had received a telegram from Hiss:

My attention has been called by representatives of the press to statements made about me before your Committee this morning by one Whittaker Chambers. I do not know Mr. Chambers and insofar as I am aware have never laid eyes on him. There is no basis for the statements made about me to your Committee. I would appreciate it if you would make this telegram a part of your Committee's record, and I would further appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee to make these statements formally and under oath.

Hiss testified in public session the following day. This was his prepared statement:

I was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on November 11, 1904. I am here at my own request to deny unqualifiedly various statements about me which were made before this Committee by one Whittaker Chambers the day before yesterday. I appreciate the Committee's having promptly granted my request. I welcome the opportunity to answer to the best of my ability any inquiries

* Sometime in 1947, Hiss had been asked by the FBI whether he knew various people, Chambers among them. Hiss said that he did not know Chambers. Perhaps this explains the curious bit of testimony by Donald Hiss, Alger's brother, that in June of 1947, Alger had told him that he (Alger) might need a lawyer.

† Later convicted and sent to jail for padding his Congressional payroll.

the members of this Committee may wish to ask me.

I am not and never have been a member of the Communist party. I do not and never have adhered to the tenets of the Communist party. I am not and never have been a member of any Communist-front organization. I have never followed the Communist party line, directly or indirectly. To the best of my knowledge, none of my friends is a Communist.

As a State Department official, I have had contacts with representatives of foreign governments, some of whom have undoubtedly been members of the Communist party, as, for example, representatives of the Soviet government. My contacts with any foreign representative who could possibly have been a Communist have been strictly official.

To the best of my knowledge, I never heard of Whittaker Chambers until 1947, when two representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation asked me if I knew him and various other people, some of whom I knew and some of whom I did not know. I said I did not know Chambers. So far as I know, I have never laid eyes on him, and I should like to have the opportunity to do so. [Here, Hiss says that Collins, Pressman, Witt, Abt, Kramer, and Perlow, all named by Chambers as members of the Communist group, were nothing more than professional acquaintances of Hiss.]

Except as I have indicated, the statements made about me by Mr. Chambers are complete fabrications. I think my record in the government service speaks for itself.

Stripling showed Hiss an Associated Press photograph of Chambers taken three days before. Hiss said that he could not swear he had "never seen that man. I would like to see him. Then I think I would be better able to tell whether I had ever seen him." After some additional testimony, Hiss was excused with the Committee's thanks for his cooperation and candor.

On August 7, the Committee examined Chambers in executive session. He confirmed that the Alger Hiss shown in newspaper photographs was the Alger Hiss he had known as a Communist, and went on to describe various personal facts about Hiss and his family. Hiss was interested in ornithology, for example, and had once seen a prothonotary warbler.

On August 16, the Committee examined Hiss in executive session. Shown two different pictures of Chambers taken in the 1930's, Hiss said that he could not "recall any person with distinctness and definiteness whose picture this is, but it is not completely unfamiliar." He wanted to see the man face to face. After being asked several questions about his children and his wife, Hiss complained "that details of my personal life, which I give honestly, can be used to my disadvantage by Chambers if he knows them." After further discussion along these lines, the following occurred:

MR. HISS: May I say something for the record?

MR. NIXON: Certainly.

MR. HISS: I have written a name on this pad in front of me of a person whom I knew in 1933 and 1934, who not only spent some time in my house but sublet my apartment. . . . If I had not seen the morning papers with an account of statements that he knew the inside of my house, I don't think I would even have thought of this name. I want to see Chambers face to face and see if he can be this individual.

I do not want and I don't think I ought to be asked to testify now that man's name. I have written that name on a piece of paper. I gave that name to two friends of mine before they came to this hearing. Perhaps I am being over-anxious about the possibility of unauthorized disclosure of this testimony. But I don't think, in my present frame of mind, it is fair that I be asked to put on record personal facts which, if they came to the ears of someone who, for no reason I can understand, had a desire to injure me, would assist him in that endeavor.

MR. NIXON: Is this man who spent the time with you in 1933 and 1934 a man with whom you are still acquainted?

MR. HISS: He is not. He was not named Carl and not Whittaker Chambers. . . . The name of the man I brought in—and he may have no relation to this whole nightmare—is a man named George Crosley. I met him when I was working for the Nye Committee. He was a writer. He hoped to sell articles to magazines about the munitions industry.

There was more testimony about Hiss's personal life, including ornithology and the prothonotary warbler, ending with arrangements for a confrontation between Hiss and Chambers.

THE confrontation took place on the afternoon of August 17, in Suite 1400 of the Hotel Commodore in New York City. Chambers was in the bedroom when Hiss arrived. After Hiss read a statement complaining about news leaks of supposedly secret testimony, Chambers entered.

MR. NIXON: Sit over here, Mr. Chambers. Mr. Chambers, will you please stand? And will you please stand, Mr. Hiss? Mr. Hiss, the man standing here is Mr. Whittaker Chambers. I ask you now if you have ever known that man before.

MR. HISS: May I ask him to speak? Will you ask him to say something?

MR. NIXON: Yes. Mr. Chambers, will you tell us your name and your business?

MR. CHAMBERS: My name is Whittaker Chambers.

MR. HISS: Would you mind opening your mouth wider?

MR. CHAMBERS: My name is Whittaker Chambers.

MR. HISS: I said, would you open your mouth? You know what I am referring to, Mr. Nixon. Will you go on talking?

MR. CHAMBERS: I am senior editor of *Time* magazine.

MR. HISS: May I ask whether his voice, when he testified before, was comparable to this?

MR. NIXON: His voice?

MR. HISS: Or did he talk a little more in a lower key?

MR. McDOWELL: I would say it is about the same now as we have heard.

MR. HISS: Would you ask him to talk a little more?

MR. NIXON: Read something, Mr. Chambers. I will let you read from—

MR. HISS: I think he is George Crosley, but I would like to hear him talk a little longer.

MR. McDOWELL: Mr. Chambers, if you would be more comfortable, you may sit down.

MR. HISS: Are you George Crosley?

MR. CHAMBERS: Not to my knowledge. You are Alger Hiss, I believe.

MR. HISS: I certainly am.

MR. CHAMBERS: That was my recollection. (Reading): "Since June"—

MR. NIXON (interposing): Just one moment. Since some repartee goes on between these two people, I think Mr. Chambers should be sworn.

MR. HISS: That is a good idea.

MR. McDOWELL: You do solemnly swear, sir, that the testimony you shall give this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. CHAMBERS: I do.

MR. NIXON: Mr. Hiss, may I say something? I suggested that he be sworn, and when I say something like that I want no interruptions from you.

MR. HISS: Mr. Nixon, in view of what happened yesterday, I think there is no occasion for you to use that tone of voice in speaking to me, and I hope the record will show what I have just said.

MR. NIXON: The record shows everything that is being said here today.

MR. STRIPLING: You were going to read.

MR. CHAMBERS (reading from *Newsweek* magazine): "Tobin for Labor. Since June, Harry S. Truman had been peddling the labor secretaryship left vacant by Lewis B. Schwollenbach's death in hope of gaining the maximum political advantage from the appointment."

MR. HISS: May I interrupt?

MR. McDOWELL: Yes.

MR. HISS: The voice sounds a little less resonant than the voice that I recall of the man I knew as George Crosley. The teeth look to me as though either they have been improved upon or that there has been considerable dental work done since I knew George Crosley, which was some years ago. I believe I am not prepared without further checking to take an absolute oath that he must be George Crosley.

MR. NIXON: May I ask a question of Mr. Chambers?

MR. HISS: I would like to ask Mr. Chambers, if I may.

MR. NIXON: I will ask the questions at this time. Mr. Chambers, have you had any dental work since 1934 of a substantial nature?

MR. CHAMBERS: Yes; I have.

MR. NIXON: What type of dental work?

MR. CHAMBERS: I have had some extractions and a plate.

MR. NIXON: Have you had any dental work in the front of your mouth?

MR. CHAMBERS: Yes.

MR. NIXON: What is the nature of that work?

MR. CHAMBERS: That is a plate in place of some of the upper dentures.

MR. NIXON: I see.

MR. HISS: Could you ask him the name of the dentist that performed these things? Is that appropriate?

MR. NIXON: Yes. What is the name?

MR. CHAMBERS: Dr. Hitchcock, Westminster, Maryland.

MR. HISS: That testimony of Mr. Chambers, if it can be believed, would tend to substantiate my feeling that he represented himself to me in 1934 or 1935 or thereabout as George Crosley, a free-lance writer of articles for magazines. I would like to find out from Dr. Hitchcock if what he has just said is true, because I am relying partly, one of my main recollections of Crosley, was the poor condition of his teeth.

MR. NIXON: Can you describe the condition of your teeth in 1934?

MR. CHAMBERS: Yes. They were in very bad shape.

MR. NIXON: The front teeth were?

MR. CHAMBERS: Yes; I think so.

MR. HISS: Mr. Chairman.

MR. NIXON: Excuse me. Before we leave the teeth. Mr. Hiss, do you feel that you would have to have the dentist tell you what he did to the teeth before you could tell anything about this man?

MR. HISS: I would like a few more questions asked. I didn't intend to say anything about this, because I feel very strongly that he is Crosley, but he looks very different in girth and in other appearances—hair, forehead, and so on, particularly the jowls.

* * *

MR. HISS: Did you ever go under the name of George Crosley?

MR. CHAMBERS: Not to my knowledge.

MR. HISS: Did you ever sublet an apartment on Twenty-ninth Street [he meant Twenty-eighth Street] from me?

MR. CHAMBERS: No; I did not.

MR. HISS: You did not?

MR. CHAMBERS: No.

MR. HISS: Did you ever spend any time with your wife and child in an apartment on Twenty-ninth Street in Washington when I was not there because I and my family were living on P Street?

MR. CHAMBERS: I most certainly did.

MR. HISS: You did or did not?

MR. CHAMBERS: I did.

MR. HISS: Would you tell me how you reconcile your negative answers with this affirmative answer?

MR. CHAMBERS: Very easily, Alger. I was a Communist and you were a Communist.

MR. HISS: Would you be responsive and continue with your answer?

MR. CHAMBERS: I do not think it is needed.

MR. HISS: That is the answer.

MR. NIXON: I will help you with the answer, Mr. Hiss. The question, Mr. Chambers, is, as I understand it, that Mr. Hiss cannot understand how you would deny that you were George Crosley and yet admit that you spent time in his apartment. Now would you explain the circumstances? I don't want to put that until Mr. Hiss agrees that is one of his questions.

MR. HISS: You have the privilege of asking any questions you want. I think that is an accurate phrasing.

MR. NIXON: Go ahead.

MR. CHAMBERS: As I have testified before, I came to Washington as a Communist functionary, a functionary of the American Communist party. I was connected with the underground group of which Mr. Hiss was a member. Mr. Hiss and I became friends. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Hiss himself suggested that I go there, and I accepted gratefully.

MR. HISS: Mr. Chairman.

MR. NIXON: Just a moment. How long did you stay there?

MR. CHAMBERS: My recollection was about 3 weeks. It may have been longer. I brought no furniture, I might add.

MR. HISS: Mr. Chairman, I don't need to ask Mr. Whittaker Chambers any more questions. I am now perfectly prepared to identify this man as George Crosley.

MR. NIXON: Would you spell that name.

MR. HISS: C-r-o-s-l-e-y.

MR. NIXON: You are sure of one "s"?

MR. HISS: That is my recollection. I have a rather good visual memory, and my recollection of his spelling of his name is C-r-o-s-l-e-y. I don't think that would change as much as his appearance.

MR. STRIPLING: You will identify him positively now?

MR. HISS: I will on the basis of what he has just said positively identify him without further questioning as George Crosley.

On August 25, Hiss and Chambers testified in public. Hiss identified Chambers as George Crosley, the writer he had met in 1933 or 1934. Chambers identified Hiss as a member of the Communist underground in Washington. And that would have been that—one of the two obviously a liar, no corroboration of either, and thus no possible conviction for perjury*—when, on August 27, Chambers appeared on a radio program, *Meet the Press*. The first question was, "Are you willing to say now [when your statements are not privileged] that Alger Hiss is or ever was a Communist?" Chambers replied, "Alger Hiss was a Communist and may be now." One month later, Hiss sued Chambers for libel.

* A perjury conviction may not be obtained in a case of one man's testimony against another's. Corroborating evidence is required.

As is customary in civil actions, Hiss's attorney in the libel suit took Chambers's deposition. He asked Chambers, at a session on November 5, 1948, whether Chambers had ever obtained documents from Hiss for transmittal to the Communist party.* Chambers had not. The examination was then adjourned to November 16. On that day, Chambers's attorney told Hiss's attorney that Chambers was unavailable, and Mrs. Chambers was questioned in his place. On the afternoon of November 17, Chambers appeared. At the trial, Chambers described his activities over the preceding three days as follows:

I went to New York—or I went to Brooklyn to see Nathan Levine, my wife's nephew, to get an envelope in which, as I recalled it, were some handwritten specimens from Mr. Hiss. I remembered giving [Nathan Levine] the envelope; I remembered that there were some typewritten notes. I believe it was in May or June of 1938. I went first [on November 14, 1948] to Mr. Levine's apartment, which is on Sterling Place, and then walked over to his mother's house—no, I am mistaken about that—we drove over to his mother's house. That is the house at 260 Rochester Avenue. We went upstairs, and Mr. Levine stood on the bathtub and reached into an old dumbwaiter shaft, and brought out an envelope which was very dusty, and handed it to me. I took the envelope into the kitchen which was at the end of the little hall from which the bathroom was, and opened it. Mr. Levine came into the kitchen for a moment to get a broom and a dustpan, or something, to clean up the mess he had made in the bathroom. He came back into the kitchen . . . in five or more minutes, I am not quite sure. In the envelope I found . . . three or four handwritten notes, in Mr. Hiss's handwriting, and some 45 pages of typed documents which Mrs. Hiss typed . . . and three cans of film, I believe, and a small cylinder of strip, developed film, two short strips of developed film. I did not appear the following day to continue my deposition. I told Mr. Cleveland, my lawyer, that I would like a day to consider the question of introducing these documents into the pre-trial examination. Mr. Cleveland therefore arranged with Mr. Marbury [Hiss's lawyer] for my wife to depose on the day when I would otherwise have deposed. On November 17, I

* One might speculate why Hiss had the temerity to sue and to allow his lawyer to ask this question, if he really had given papers to Chambers. As to the suit, Hiss's need to save his reputation, the likelihood that any judge or jury would prefer him to Chambers, and the failure of Chambers to produce any corroborating evidence at the HUAC hearings, would have led Hiss, I think, to risk everything on the outcome of a libel action. Oscar Wilde had done the same. As to the question, one of the purposes of a deposition is to "pin the witness down." The lawyer asking the question already knows what the answer will be; he asks it to insure that the witness will not later testify to something else. Since HUAC had asked nothing about espionage, Hiss could be confident that Chambers had made no such accusation. That being so, it was good practice to pin Chambers down to a denial that Hiss had ever given him documents.

continued my deposition and gave my lawyer [the notes in Hiss's handwriting and the documents typed by Mrs. Hiss].

These papers were produced at the deposition on the 17th. They were copies or summaries of State Department documents dated in the early months of 1938. Chambers stated that he had received them from Hiss for transmittal to Colonel Bykov, a Soviet agent in the United States.

CHAMBERS's testimony at the trial continued as follows:

The film [photographs of State Department documents] I kept in my house for a few days. I was called to Washington to testify before a Loyalty Board in the State Department, and that morning, as I was about to leave the house—I already had my overcoat on—the telephone rang, and Mr. Stripling of the House Un-American Activities Committee asked me to meet him in Washington that day. When I stepped into Mr. Stripling's office, about two o'clock in the afternoon, he served me with a subpoena duces tecum to bring with me or turn over to the Committee all materials in my possession relative to a list of people who were specified in the subpoena. When I finished in the State Department, I was accompanied home by Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Appell, two investigators of the Committee. At the farm [Chambers's home in Westminster, Maryland] I took them into the kitchen and went out into the yard to get the documents, and get the film. Before I went to Washington that day, I had put the film inside a pumpkin. The investigators for Mr. Hiss had been in and out of my farm and the neighborhood for some time . . . and so I put these documents in a hollow pumpkin. I took these men from the Committee out into the yard. I picked up the pumpkin and took out the documents and handed them over to them. This pumpkin which contained the documents grew naturally at the edge, the far edge of this little patch, and I was able to find it by its position on the edge but by no Euclidean direction. I handed the documents over to the investigators and they left directly thereafter.

When I handed the handwritten and typewritten documents to Mr. Marbury at the deposition, I told him that I had had a twofold purpose in testifying up until that time: one part of the purpose was to destroy or paralyze the Communist conspiracy within the country and the government; the other part of my purpose was to do as little injury as possible to the human beings involved in that conspiracy.

I pointed out that in my own case a kind of grace had been given me to find the strength to break and time had been given me in which to work out a new life.

I pointed out that in breaking with the Communist party that time is a most essential factor. Therefore I had wanted to give these people some of the same opportunity which had been given me. But I had now been forced into a position where I had no choice but to introduce

those documents into evidence. I had previously testified both in the House Committee and the grand jury that I had no evidence of espionage, and what I have just said is the reason why I so testified. After the introduction of the documents [at Baltimore on November 17], I went before the grand jury and told about these espionage activities. I added in the grand jury that in disclosing the conspiracy, some damage was inevitably done to the people involved, people mentioned by me, but that there was a distinction, at least in my mind, between disclosing the ultimate perfidy, by which I mean espionage, and merely disclosing the fact that these people were Communists.

I further said to the grand jury that, I think in general, there are two kinds of men; the one kind that believes God is a God of justice and the other kind believes that God is a God of mercy, and I am so constituted that I will always range myself on the side of mercy.

Hiss's response to Chambers's assertions is contained in a statement he gave to the FBI on December 4, 1948. It reads in part as follows:

On the afternoon of November 17, 1948, in the course of the pre-trial examination, Mr. Chambers introduced 56 letter-sized pages of typewritten material and four small sheets of paper bearing handwritten material. For simplification, hereafter in this statement the 65 pages will be referred to as the large documents and the four smaller pages as the small documents.

* * *

With reference to the large documents, I would say from a cursory examination of them that they appear to be authentic copies of United States State Department documents or summaries of such documents. From the date standpoint, these documents appear to be restricted to a period extending from about January to March 1938. At that time I was assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State, the Honorable Francis B. Sayre. Documents similar to these normally passed over my desk for perusal prior to being referred to Mr. Sayre. I do not have any independent recollection of having seen any of these documents or the documents summarized while I was in the employ of the State Department. By and large, these do not appear to be documents of a very highly confidential nature, and would not have been treated in the State Department with any special precautions at that time, according to security regulations in effect then.

With reference to the smaller documents, three of the four pages appear to be in my handwriting. The fourth page, consisting of five handwritten lines, may or may not be in my handwriting, but it does not look to me as if it were.

I have learned from talking with Mr. Marbury and from reading the above-mentioned deposition that Mr. Chambers claimed these

documents and others like them were obtained by me from the State Department, and that I took them to my home, where typewritten copies of the larger documents were made on a typewriter in my home by either my wife or me. Chambers claimed that I then returned the documents to the State Department files. The agents have told me that Mr. Chambers claims that on some occasions I turned over the actual State Department documents to him, upon which he would have photographic copies made in a manner unknown to me, and then would return the original documents to me for replacement in the files of the State Department.

I deny that any of the above claims of Mr. Chambers is true. I also deny that I ever gave the originals of the small documents to Mr. Chambers at any time for any purpose whatsoever.

From Mr. Marbury and the deposition, I have also learned that Chambers claims he introduced me to a Russian named Peter, whom he claims later to have discovered was Colonel Bykov. Chambers claims that this meeting took place on the mezzanine floor of a movie theater in Brooklyn, New York. Chambers claims that after the meeting, the three of us took a long walk and that during the conversation while walking, Colonel Bykov asked me if I could obtain documents for him from the files of the State Department. Chambers claims that I agreed to cooperate in this regard with this Colonel Bykov and that as a result of this oral agreement I later produced the documents mentioned above. I deny that any of these claims of Chambers is true. I have never met and had never heard of any Russian named Peter or Colonel Bykov until I was told of the testimony given by Mr. Chambers.

ON December 15, 1948, Hiss was called before a grand jury sitting in the United States Court House, Foley Square, Manhattan. Asked whether he had ever given government documents to Chambers, he said no. Asked whether he had ever seen Chambers after the winter of 1936, he said no. That afternoon, the grand jury handed up an indictment charging Hiss with two counts of perjury.* Each of his denials, the grand jury alleged, was false.

The case of Alger Hiss went to trial on May 31, 1949, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York before Judge Samuel H. Kaufman and a jury. Thomas F. Murphy represented the government, Lloyd Paul Stryker†

* The statute of limitations had run out on espionage.

† Stryker was one of the celebrated courtroom performers of his generation. It is rumored among lawyers that, before the trial began, Judge Jerome Frank of the Court of Appeals (who had been the general counsel of the AAA for which Hiss worked when he first went to Washington) urged Stryker to waive a jury and let Judge Kaufman decide the case. "I can't," Stryker replied. "It would be like a ball player going to bat with one hand tied behind his back."

the defendant. The trial lasted until July 8, 1949, when the jury reported itself deadlocked and was discharged. The final vote had been eight to four in favor of conviction.

The retrial began on November 17, 1949, before Judge Henry W. Goddard and a jury. Murphy again represented the government; Claude Cross of Boston now represented Hiss. Because both sides wanted to appear to the jury to be holding nothing back, to present every person they could find whose life had touched Chambers's or Hiss's, no matter how tangentially, the witnesses numbered one hundred and twelve.

The case may well have been overtried. The story was essentially simple, be it the government's or the defendant's, and the verdict turned on only one thing—the jury's assessment of the credibility of the two protagonists, Chambers and Hiss. As we shall see, most of the "corroborating" witnesses on both sides in fact corroborated nothing. The documentation, however, was a different matter entirely.

THIS was the substance of Chambers's testimony:

In 1934, while in Washington as a member of the Communist underground, Chambers was introduced to Alger Hiss at a downtown restaurant by Harold Ware (organizer of a Communist apparatus in Washington) and J. Peters ("head of the whole underground of the American Communist party"). Peters stated that Hiss "was to be disconnected from [Ware's] apparatus" and "was to become a member of a parallel organization" under Chambers.

At the time, Hiss was counsel to the Nye Committee, and his first assignment in the new organization was to obtain official documents dealing with the munitions traffic. He did so.

In 1936, Hiss entered the State Department. In January 1937, Chambers arranged a clandestine meeting among himself, Hiss, and Colonel Bykov, Chambers's superior in the underground. At this meeting, Bykov stated that Russia was endangered by the Fascist powers and that Hiss "could greatly help if he would procure documents from the State Department." Hiss said that he would. He began to bring documents home every week or ten days. Chambers would pick them up, take them to Baltimore for photographing, and return the originals the same night. This proved unsatisfactory, in that "just the documents of a single day" were obtained. In the middle of 1937, Chambers instructed Hiss to change the practice—"to have the papers brought out every night, or approximately every night and some of them typed as nearly verbatim as possible and some of them paraphrased." This was done. The typist was Mrs. Hiss.

In addition to the typed copies, Hiss would turn over to Chambers the originals of those documents which came to hand on the day of a visit from Chambers, as well as handwritten notes "about

documents which had passed under his eyes quickly and which, for some reason, he was unable to bring out." Everything was photographed. Chambers then returned the original documents to Hiss, burned the typed copies and handwritten notes, and delivered the photographs to Bykov.

On April 15, 1938, Chambers broke with the Communist party and ceased his espionage activities. He retained some of the papers and exposed film which Hiss had given him earlier in the year. Sealed in an envelope, he delivered them to Nathan Levine for safekeeping.

Apart from the covert relationship between them, Chambers and Hiss and their families saw each other frequently and intimately. They stayed in each other's homes and took out-of-town trips together.

THIS was the substance of Hiss's testimony:

In December 1934, or January 1935, Hiss was counsel to the Nye Committee. Chambers came to see him, introducing himself as George Crosley, a free-lance writer of articles on the munitions investigation. At one of several subsequent luncheon meetings, Chambers (as Crosley) told Hiss that he was planning to come to Washington for a few months to complete his articles, and was looking for a place to live with his wife and child. The Hisses had recently moved from an apartment at 2831 28th Street, Washington, to a house at 2905 P Street, and Hiss had the balance of the apartment lease at his disposal. Accordingly, he sublet the apartment to Chambers.

When the time came for him to move in, Chambers said that the furniture van had been delayed. Hiss thereupon allowed the Chamberses to live for a few days with the Hisses in the P Street house. Chambers later moved into the apartment. He never paid the rent, however, and he and Hiss met only a few more times. The last meeting was in the spring of 1936, when Hiss refused Chambers's request for the latest in a series of small loans.

The Hisses never visited the Chamberses. The Chamberses never visited the Hisses except for the brief time the two families spent together in the P Street house. There were no trips together except for one occasion when Hiss gave Chambers a ride from Washington to New York City.

Hiss had never been a Communist. He had never given State Department documents to Chambers. His loyalty and devotion to the interests of the United States were known to a large number of persons of unquestionable integrity.

IN studying the evidence at the second trial, it has struck me that a reasonable juror trying to determine where the truth lay would consider ten points.

FIRST, Chambers's familiarity with Hiss's personal life. This has figured large in later writing about the case. How could Chambers know that

Hiss once saw a prothonotary warbler, for instance, unless his story were true? The answer, I think, is that Chambers's knowledge of Hiss's personal life is irrelevant. Chambers's ability to recount the homely details of daily existence in the Hiss household does nothing to prove the grand jury's charge, which, one must keep in mind, was perjury: that Hiss had lied about delivering official documents to Chambers. Since by Hiss's own testimony he and Chambers had been acquainted, with the Chambers family once spending a few days as house guests of the Hisses, Chambers's knowledge of personal details was understandable and perfectly consistent with Hiss's innocence.

SECOND, the testimony of the "corroborating" witnesses. As stated earlier, both sides seem to have called every possible witness who might have buttressed or contradicted one story or the other. This evidence amounts to very little. Three examples:

Chambers said that, in 1934 or 1935, while lunching with Hiss at a Georgetown restaurant, Hiss had introduced him to a woman named Plum Fountain. Hiss said that it never happened. Mrs. Olivia Fountain Tesone testified that her nickname was "Plum" and that she knew Hiss but had no recollection of ever meeting or seeing Chambers. So what? If Chambers were telling the truth, it is hardly remarkable that Mrs. Tesone would fail to remember a passing introduction some fourteen years after it occurred. And if Chambers were lying, he might have heard Hiss once mention his friend, Plum Fountain, and simply retained the name for future use.

Chambers said that, on August 10, 1937, he and the Hisses took an automobile trip to Peterboro, New Hampshire, where they saw a production of *She Stoops to Conquer* and stayed overnight at an inn called Bleak House. The Hisses denied it all. The prosecution proved that *She Stoops to Conquer* was performed by a local company in Peterboro on August 10 and that Hiss's employment records showed him on annual leave from August 2 to August 14. The defense proved that the Bleak House guest book contained no registration for Chambers or the Hisses under their own or any other name. The evidence is equal, then. It corroborates each man in part and positively proves the truthfulness of neither.

Hiss said that the Hisses never visited the Chamberses. In 1936, the Chamberses were living in an apartment on Eutaw Place, Baltimore, under the name "Cantwell." Mrs. Edith Murray was their maid. She was called as a government witness and testified on direct examination that Mrs. Hiss was a frequent visitor to the Cantwell home, on one occasion accompanied by Mr. Hiss. On another occasion, Mrs. Hiss stayed the night to care for the Chamberses' child while Mrs. Chambers went to New York for a doctor's appointment.

This seems powerful, especially since the Hisses denied any such events. But on cross-examination, Mrs. Murray testified that, before coming to the courthouse and identifying Mr. and Mrs. Hiss, she had been shown photographs of them by the FBI. To Mrs. Hiss's picture, her first response was, "It looked like—I thought maybe it was an actress or something . . . I said to myself maybe it was in the movies." To Alger Hiss's picture, Mrs. Murray's first response was, "It looked like I had seen him, but I told [the FBI] I wasn't sure . . . I told [the FBI] I did not know." Further, it developed that Mrs. Murray had suffered a nervous breakdown in 1942 and that, before testifying, the FBI had taken her to Chambers's farm for a three-hour conversation with him. I do not know whether Mrs. Murray's testimony was false*: I doubt that any juror would be persuaded by it.

THIRD, Chambers's testimony about other persons. Chambers named several persons other than Hiss as part of the Communist underground in Washington—Julian Wadleigh, Donald Hiss, Lee Pressman, Nathan Witt, John Abt, etc. One, Wadleigh, admitted it. He testified at the trial that he had given government documents to Chambers but knew nothing about Hiss's activities. Another, Donald Hiss, denied it. The others wouldn't say. They were called before HUAC in 1948 and declined to testify on the ground of self-incrimination. In 1950, after the trial, Pressman told a HUAC hearing that he had been a member of Harold Ware's Communist group in Washington and that Hiss was not a member. The jury at the second trial had only Wadleigh's admission and Donald Hiss's denial. They cancel each other, and since in any event neither of them was able to shed any light on the relations between Chambers and Alger Hiss, I think the entire matter of little relevance. The question, really, is not whether Chambers told the truth about Wadleigh, *et al.* It is whether he told the truth about Hiss.

FOURTH, Hiss's character. Nineteen persons of great eminence testified to Hiss's reputation for loyalty, honesty, and veracity. In his summation, Cross urged:

Mr. Hiss has been in government service; he has been with the Carnegie Foundation; and everyone who has taken that stand as a character witness has told you of the high respect in which he is held. . . . Something may be said by Mr. Murphy about character witnesses, that anyone can get character witnesses. Maybe they could before the facts are out, but after all the newspaper publicity since August of 1948, since the first trial, you can rely upon the fact that every witness in that chair who testified to the character of Alger Hiss believed in his innocence or he would not have been in that chair.

* In his 1952 motion for a new trial, Hiss presented the affidavit of a man who attested that the Cantwells (Chamberses) employed no maid at Eutaw Place.

Mr. Murphy in summation did say something about character witnesses:

What else is extraordinary? The defendant has called nineteen character witnesses, more than one-third the number of his total witnesses, and they have testified to his reputation for integrity, loyalty and honesty, veracity. They have told you what the gossip is that they have heard, the accumulation of gossip over the years that they have known him and what that is. Most of them said his reputation was good. . . .

I ask you ladies and gentlemen what kind of a reputation did a good spy have? Of course it must be good. The fox barks not when he goes to steal the lamb. It has to be good. But we are here on a search for truth. We are not concerned with reputations. Poppycock.

Just think how many people could call good reputation witnesses. Just think. Benedict Arnold, a major general in our army—a major general—and he sold out West Point to the enemy. Before they caught Major André right up here in Tarrytown don't you believe that Major General Benedict Arnold could call George Washington? Couldn't he call all of the members of the General Staff, one of their men?

And Brutus: before he stabbed Caesar don't you think he could have stood in front of the Roman Senate and called upon the great Augustus and said, "Tell him what a man I am."

And Judge Manton, he had character witnesses. You might recall one of the character witnesses who testified in this trial was one of his.

And lastly the devil himself. You remember that story that Mr. Chambers wrote. The devil was a fallen angel and before he was thrown out of Heaven he was in the sight of God. He could have called upon the Almighty himself for his reputation.

Ladies and gentlemen, character witnesses belong to another era. This is the age of reason. This is the age of common people. And what we want are facts. We are here, you are here, Judge Goddard is here to ascertain the facts. We don't want gossip.

There is no answer to this. The evidence of Hiss's reputation comes to nothing one way or the other.*

FIFTH, Chambers's mental state. The defense proposed to call a psychiatrist to give his professional opinion of Chambers's mental state. Murphy objected:

This is the first time in the history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that the testimony of a psychiatrist is being admitted to impeach the credibility of a mere witness, when there has not been one scintilla of proof indicating that the witness, Mr. Whittaker Chambers, has had any institutional confinement or treatment by a doctor other than for his teeth and heart. . . .

Cross argued that the outcome of the trial depended upon the jury's determination of Cham-

bers's credibility and that the psychiatrist's opinion might well help the jury come to a conclusion on the matter. Judge Goddard agreed: he would allow the testimony.†

Dr. Carl Binger took the stand. An alumnus of Harvard College and of the Harvard Medical School, he had studied psychiatry at Heidelberg and Zurich and presently was associate professor of clinical psychiatry at the Cornell Medical School. He had never met Chambers, but he had observed his testimony, he had read many of his writings, and he had been told the facts of Chambers's life, upon the basis of all of which he had "an opinion within the bounds of reasonable certainty as to the mental condition of Whittaker Chambers."

What was it? "I think Mr. Chambers is suffering from a condition known as psychopathic personality, which is a disorder of character, of which the outstanding features are behavior of what we call an amoral or an asocial and delinquent nature." Among the symptoms of the condition are "chronic, persistent, and repetitive lying . . . and a tendency to make false accusations."

Murphy's cross-examination of Dr. Binger is famous among trial lawyers. It runs some 190 pages, of which this is one:

Q. Doctor, when you testified the other day on direct examination you made these statements—I am reading from page 3686—the question was in relation to what you had observed at the last trial of Mr. Chambers as a witness when you were here those five or six days, and the question was:

Q. What did you observe about Mr. Chambers when you saw him in court at the first trial and here?

A. May I say that I would not attempt to make a diagnosis of psychopathic personality purely on the observation of a person. . . . [But] there are certain confirmatory things that I did see.

Q. Will you tell us what they were?

A. Well, he sat in this chair or in a similar one, and he apparently had very little relationship with the inquirer. He frequently looked up at the ceiling as if trying to recall something that he had previously said.

Now, Doctor, we made a count this morning of the number of times that you looked at the ceiling, and during the first ten minutes you looked at the ceiling 19 times; the next 15 minutes 20 times; and the next 15 minutes 10 times; and the following 10 minutes 10 times, making a total in 50 minutes of 59 times, and I was wondering, Doctor, whether that had any symptoms of a psychopathic personality?

A. Not alone.

Q. Not alone?

A. No.

* In his charge, Judge Goddard told the jury that "evidence of good character may, in itself, create a reasonable doubt where, without such evidence, no reasonable doubt would exist."

† In the first trial, Judge Kaufman had excluded it.

It was good sport, and when the jury retired to deliberate, I doubt that Dr. Binger's testimony played any part at all.

SIXTH, the time of Chambers's break with the Communist party. In his conversation with Raymond Murphy of the State Department on August 28, 1946, and again in his testimony before HUAC, Chambers fixed the time of his break as the end of 1937. At the trial, he said it was April 15, 1938. The difference is crucial. Most of the government documents which Chambers produced at the Baltimore deposition or turned over to HUAC are dated in 1938 (none later than April 1). If Chambers had left the party in 1937, he could not have obtained the documents from Hiss in the manner he described. If he had left the party on April 15, 1938, he could have.

The only explanation offered by Chambers was that his earlier statements had been mistaken and that, when he came to testify at the trial, his memory was more accurate. Considering that his break with Communism was perhaps the most important event of his life, I find Chambers's fuzziness of recollection somewhat difficult to accept (and so, I think, might the jury). Were there nothing else to support his testimony, the verdict would have to be for Hiss. The government must prove the charge, remember, beyond a reasonable doubt. But there is a great deal else to support Chambers's testimony.

SEVENTH, the rug. Chambers testified that, a short time before the clandestine meeting among himself, Hiss, and Bykov, he had been given money by Bykov for the purchase of four Oriental rugs, one of which was to be presented to Hiss as "a gift from the Soviet people in recognition of the work of the American Communists." Chambers sent the money to a friend from his days at Columbia, Professor Meyer Schapiro, asking Schapiro to buy the rugs and send them to a George Silverman in Washington. In January 1937, behind a restaurant on the Washington-Baltimore road, Chambers carried one of the rugs from Silverman's car to Hiss's, and Hiss drove away with it.

Hiss, on the other hand, testified that, in the winter or spring of 1936, Chambers came to Hiss with a rug which he said a wealthy patron had given him. Hiss took the rug as part-payment of Chambers's rent on the 28th Street apartment.

Professor Schapiro testified that, on December 23, 1936, with money given him by Chambers and at Chambers's request, he bought four Oriental rugs from the Massachusetts Importing Company for \$876.71. The government put into evidence a Massachusetts Importing Company shipping order. It shows that the company delivered the rugs to Schapiro's home on December 29, 1936. A few days later, Schapiro testified, he sent the rugs to a man named Silverman in Washington. Cross had no cross-examination.

Chambers's account of how he acquired the rugs is patently true. Professor Schapiro's word was not questioned; and where would Chambers have obtained \$876.71 in 1936 if not from Bykov? Equally clear is Hiss's receipt of a rug from Chambers. They disagree only on circumstances. I think it would take a very gullible jury to accept Hiss's version.

EIGHTH, Chambers's purchase of a car. On November 23, 1937, Chambers bought a Ford four-door sedan from the Schmidt Motor Company in Randallstown, Maryland, trading in his old car, a 1934 Ford sedan, and paying \$486.75. How did Chambers get the cash? According to Chambers, he talked with the Hisses:

I said that I wished to buy a car; that Colonel Bykov was opposed to my using a car, but that a car was very necessary in the work I was doing; and either Mr. Hiss or Mrs. Hiss then offered me [\$400].

If this is true, if Hiss did give Chambers \$400 in November 1937, then Hiss's assertion that he last saw Chambers in the spring of 1936 is false, and a jury might rationally go on to conclude that the rest of Hiss's testimony is also false.

Mr. and Mrs. Hiss had a joint savings account at the Riggs National Bank in Washington. The bank's records show a withdrawal of \$400 on November 19, 1937, four days before Chambers bought the car.

The Hisses shrugged it off as a coincidence. They had withdrawn the \$400 to buy furniture for their new house. But the government proved that the lease on the new house was not signed until December 2 at the earliest and that the Hisses had charge accounts at various department stores as well as a checking account, thereby making cash purchases unnecessary.

If the \$400 withdrawal was a coincidence, it goes beyond any I would ever expect a jury to believe.

NINTH, Hiss's transfer of a car. In 1935 and part of 1936, Hiss owned a 1929 Ford. According to Chambers, Hiss gave him the use of it. "I used it to drive around Washington and I once drove from Smithtown . . . to Washington in it." Chambers knew what had happened to the car. Hiss "proposed to turn the car over to the open Communist party [as distinguished from the underground apparatus] for the use of some poor organizer." Chambers talked with J. Peters about Hiss's plan, and told Hiss "that Peters had agreed, although reluctantly, to have it turned over to the open party." Later, Chambers said, Hiss reported "that he had turned the car over according to an arrangement made between him and Peters."

Before HUAC, Hiss testified that he "sold" the car to Chambers. At the trial, Hiss said that he threw it in with the 28th Street apartment he had

sublet to Chambers. Sometime in the early spring of 1936, Chambers took the car "for good," and Hiss never saw it again.

Here is what the documents show. The car's certificate of title bears an assignment of title filled out in Hiss's handwriting. The assignee is Cherner Motor Company (a large Ford agency in Washington), and Hiss's signature is verified by W. Marvin Smith, a notary public, on July 23, 1936. Smith was a lawyer in the Justice Department with Hiss.

The dealer's reassignment form on the certificate of title was executed on July 23, 1936, by Cherner Motor Company. William Rosen is the assignee. Rosen's signature appears on the purchaser's application for a new certificate of title.

Cherner's invoices for July 22, 23, and 24, 1936, run consecutively with none missing. There is no invoice for the Hiss-to-Cherner-to-Rosen transaction.

I don't see how a jury, presented with these documents, could disbelieve Chambers. As Chambers had said, Hiss arranged to give the car to a Communist party worker; and someone helpful to the Communists at the Cherner Motor Company handled the transfer without entering it on the company's books.

William Rosen was called as a government witness. Asked whether he had been a member of the Communist party in 1936 and whether he had any connection with Hiss's car, he declined to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.

TENTH, the papers—photographs Chambers had concealed in the pumpkin and pencil memoranda and typewritten copies disclosed at the Baltimore deposition.

The photographs were in two rolls of developed microfilm containing a total of 58 frames and constituting eight documents, five memoranda about negotiations for a trade agreement with Germany, and three incoming cables. Almost all show on their face that they were received in Sayre's office, and Hiss's initials appear on the cables. The latest is dated January 13, 1938. The government proved that the 58 frames had been exposed at the same time with a camera owned by Felix Inslerman, Chambers's chief photographer, on film manufactured by Kodak in 1937. Chambers said the source of the documents was Hiss; Hiss denied it; and no independent evidence pointed either way. But it was at least possible that Chambers had a source other than Hiss, for Wadleigh admitted turning over government papers to Chambers, and Chambers "without mentioning names . . . made it abundantly clear" to Wadleigh that Chambers "had other sources inside of the State Department," and thus the jury might well have found itself unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hiss rather than Wadleigh or someone else was the source of the microfilmed documents.

There were four pencil memoranda summariz-

ing State Department cables, each in Hiss's handwriting.* The earliest is dated January 28, 1938, and the latest March 11, 1938. Two of them are on "Office of the Assistant Secretary of State" letterheads with the printed legend torn off. The other two are on common scratch paper. All are creased as if they had been folded in half. None is crumpled. Chambers testified that these memoranda were made by Hiss when he was unable to take documents out of the office. Hiss testified that they were made for his own use in briefing Sayre and then either thrown away or filed with the cables they summarized. Again, there is no independent evidence to show that Hiss gave the memoranda to Chambers. Perhaps Chambers found them in a wastepaper basket. Perhaps someone stole them and gave them to Chambers. Perhaps Hiss prepared them for use in briefing Sayre, as he said, but then passed them on to Chambers, as Chambers said; and one wonders why, if they were thrown away, they are neatly folded rather than crumpled. On balance, though, I think a jury would decide that Chambers's story had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, the 43 typewritten papers, each a copy or a summary of a State Department document dated between January 5, 1938, and April 1, 1938. Chambers testified that they had been typed by the Hisses and given to him for transmittal to Bykov. The Hisses denied it. And so we have the question at the heart of the case: were these papers typed on the Hiss typewriter?

The FBI interviewed Hiss on December 4, 1948, a few days after Chambers produced the papers in Baltimore. This was Hiss's statement about the typewriter:

During the period from about June 1, 1936, to about January 1938, I resided with my family at 1245 30th Street, N.W., and subsequent thereto, until sometime in 1943, at 3415 Volta Place, N.W., both Washington, D. C. During the period from 1936 to sometime after 1938, we had a typewriter in our home in Washington. This was an old-fashioned machine, possibly an Underwood, but I am not at all certain regarding the make. Mrs. Hiss, who is not a typist, used this machine somewhat as an amateur typist, but I never recall having used it. Possibly samples of Mrs. Hiss's typing on this machine are in existence, but I have not located any to date, but will endeavor to do so. Mrs. Hiss disposed of this typewriter to either a secondhand typewriter concern or a secondhand dealer in Washington, D. C., sometime subsequent to 1938, exact date or place unknown. The whereabouts of this typewriter is presently unknown to me. Prior to this typewriter coming into the possession of my immediate family, it was the property of Mr. Thomas Fansler, Mrs. Hiss's father, who was in the insurance business in Philadel-

* The envelope Chambers retrieved from Nathan Levine also contained a memorandum in the handwriting of Harry Dexter White.

phia. Mr. Fansler lived the later years of his life on Walnut Street in Philadelphia, but is now deceased, having died in the early 1940's.

Hiss was mistaken about the typewriter's make. It was a Woodstock, not an Underwood.

Mrs. Hiss testified before the grand jury that she had given the typewriter to a junkman. She had not. She had given it to her maid, Mrs. Catlett, for use by the Catlett sons. If the Hisses had kept it through 1938, as Hiss said at first, it was in their possession in the early months of 1938, when according to Chambers, the documents were typed. The Hisses later corrected their testimony and said they gave the typewriter to Mrs. Catlett in December 1937.

In any event, the FBI had not found the Woodstock as of the time of the first trial. Even so, the government was able to prove that it was the machine on which the documents had been typed.

Every typewriter's type is, like a fingerprint, unique. Given a known sample and a questioned sample, an expert compares the two. If they are identical, the questioned sample was typed on the machine which typed the known sample. If they are different, the samples were typed on separate machines. The FBI found a 1937 report to the Bryn Mawr alumnae association concededly typed by Mrs. Hiss on the Woodstock. It was compared with the State Department documents, and they were identical. The FBI expert said so. Cross told the jury that the defense experts said so too.

Where was the Woodstock? It had passed from the Catletts to several other people. In early 1949, one of Hiss's lawyers, Edward C. McLean, tracked it down.* He produced it at the first trial and offered it as a defense exhibit. It has become notorious, but we see that it played almost no part in the proof. Nothing would have changed had the Woodstock never been found. It was by comparison with Mrs. Hiss's concededly authentic alumnae report, not by comparison with the machine McLean brought to court, that the authenticity of the State Department documents was established.

Chambers said that the documents were typed by the Hisses, and the experts agreed that they were typed on the Hisses' Woodstock. Hiss had no reason other than espionage to prepare them. Chambers could have had them from no hand but Hiss's. Evidence doesn't come any clearer than that, and this, from Cross's summation, was the defense explanation:

I say, well, how did Chambers know about that? How did he get it? Anybody? He did not do it himself, you can bet your life on that. He gets through confederates, anybody who can get through confederates and steal top-secret documents from the State Department would not

* McLean, like Murphy, became a federal judge in the Southern District of New York. They completed their careers as colleagues.

have much trouble locating a big office typewriter. Now I can suggest there might be several ways. I can suggest a way that he could have easily found out. Suppose someone had called up, or come over, when he knew the Hisses weren't there, and asked [the maid] saying that they were a typewriter repair man and had come to repair the Woodstock typewriter. What would she have said? "Why, they have given it to my boys." He wouldn't have much difficulty locating [the maid's] place, and with that open house, with the cellar there, I mean the closet; with all the people coming and going, all the people living there, and their friends, and the dances and all. How easy. Am I talking through my hat?

Murphy answers in his summation as follows:

Now, let us get back to the theory No. 103 as to who did it. This is No. 103. And how was it proved? Well, you start off with the fact that the Catletts had the typewriter, and here is a picture of their hall. You see how these two things follow. The Catletts had it. Here is the hall where they used to keep it. Here is the picture of the back entrance. You see all that space back there, people come in and out there all the time. Then there is the den, then there are the dancers.

Now, what probably happened, Mr. Cross testified, is that somebody, not Chambers—he is too smart, but one of his conspirators, one of his confederates—those are good names, "conspirators," "confederates"—he went up to the Volta Place house and asked innocent Clidi Catlett, "I am the repair man. Where is the machine?"

I can just see it now. It's terrific. You can have this guy coming with a Woodstock hat on, "Woodstock Repair," with a jumper, "Woodstock," ringing the bell—no, it isn't a bell, you have to pull that one, I think—and saying to Mrs. Catlett, "I am the repair man to fix the typewriter."

Then Clidi says, "Well, which one do you want? The Remington, the Royal, the L.C. Smith? Which one?"

"No. We want the Woodstock."

"Oh, that's over in my boy's house, over at P Street."

And then the next scene, it is the middle of one of these dances. And you see Chambers sneaking in at night, mingling with the dancers, and then typing, typing the stuff, holding the State Department document in one hand—

Oh, Mr. Cross, you've got to do better than that.

BEFORE he was sentenced, Hiss said to Judge Goddard, "In the future, the full facts of how Whittaker Chambers was able to carry out forgery by typewriter will be disclosed." This disclosure was attempted in 1952. Hiss made a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The main item of newly discovered evidence was "that the typewriter found

and produced by the defense in the belief that it was the original Hiss machine was in fact a carefully constructed substitute, which could only have been fabricated for the deliberate purpose of falsely incriminating Alger Hiss [by forgery of the typewritten documents]."

It took a technician employed by the defense one year to build a duplicate Woodstock, and the result was imperfect at that. Obviously, Chambers could not have built one himself. Defense counsel's single thought as to who might have done it was that Chambers knew "people who were skilled in doing the kind of thing the Communist party does." I don't think he meant that the Communists had framed Hiss, although Judge Goddard and Murphy took the remark to mean just that. I think he meant the federal government, and specifically the FBI, which surely is "skilled in doing the kind of thing the Communist party does." If I am correct, Hiss was claiming that the FBI had framed him. Apart from the question of motive, there are two powerful reasons not to believe it.

First, assume that the FBI made a counterfeit Woodstock. Then it was the very machine discovered by McLean and produced by the defense at the trial; that is to say, the FBI planted it for Hiss to find after using it to forge the documents which prove Hiss's guilt. Why? Not to show that Chambers's papers were typed on it: that was done by comparison with Mrs. Hiss's alumnae report. To leave the counterfeit Woodstock lying about for the defense to pick up and examine would serve only to expose the whole scheme to the risk of discovery—and for no reason. An FBI bright enough to forge typewritten documents is bright enough to destroy the instrument of forgery as soon as it has done its work.

Second, no FBI agent would fabricate a typewriter and forge documents without the approval of some higher-up. In the 1940's and 1950's, the

FBI had only one higher-up, J. Edgar Hoover. Assuming that Hoover was disposed to give his consent, he would not have shouldered the responsibility himself. Consummate bureaucrat that he was, Hoover needed someone still higher to whom to pass the buck should the imposture come to light. In view of Hoover's position and the enormity of the fraud, that could only be one person—President Truman. If Truman had authorized the forgery, his public position on the prosecution would have been either silence or approval. Yet from the beginning, Truman called the HUAC hearings "a red herring." At his first press conference after the disclosure of Chambers's possession of State Department documents and the indictment of Hiss, Truman was asked whether he still thought the case a red herring. He did.

THE conviction was returned on January 21, 1950. Judge Goddard sentenced Hiss to five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. In March 1951, Hiss went to jail. A year later, Judge Goddard denied Hiss's motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

This was no mere contest of oaths. Three things—the evidence of the rug, of Hiss's \$400 loan to Chambers, and of the transfer of Hiss's car to William Rosen—prove beyond any reasonable doubt that Chambers's account of their relationship, not Hiss's, was true. One thing—the evidence of the typed State Department papers—proves beyond any reasonable doubt that, when Hiss denied to the grand jury that he had ever given official documents to Chambers, he was lying. Twenty out of twenty-four jurors have been sure of his guilt, and they were right.

Israel's Rights and Arab Propaganda

Rose G. Lewis

IT is one of the ironies of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the popular slogan, "the right of all peoples to self-determination," has become a battle cry raised, precisely, against the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. Similarly, the word "refugees" now carries the automatic prefix Arab, and "national liberation" is seen as an Arab issue. Even the concept of homeland has taken on an Arab coloration.

In an ideological dispute, it has been said, the winning side can be recognized by the terms adopted for public discussion. From this point of view, it is clear that the Arabs have for a long time now been prevailing on a large and crucial sector of world opinion. As long as everybody keeps talking about the right of Arabs alone to self-determination, half the victory is theirs, no matter what is said.

Strangely enough, on this particular battlefield there has been virtually no Israeli counterattack. One hears little of self-determination and national liberation for the Jewish people—seldom, certainly, in those ringing and evocative terms. The security of a state recently established is not at all the same thing. In the fashionable public perception of this feverish decade, the life of a state appears an abstraction when compared with the rights of a people. Yet it is upon the demonstrably pale precept of the protection of the state that Zionists have chosen to take their rhetorical stand. And they continue, in particular, to ignore the right to self-determination in the Middle East of the indigenous Middle Eastern Jews who are today a majority of Jewish Israelis.

The matter is more than merely semantic and more than just public relations or propaganda. It goes to the heart of Zionist ideals and philosophy and reflects the nature of Jewish commitment to national independence in Israel. The words which are most often used, the principles and purposes which are most vigorously espoused, the moral and political and historical concepts and interpretations which clothe official pronouncements and publications and public utterances—these

paint the self-image as well as the face turned to the world. They tell a great deal about Israel and Zionism.

SINCE the Yom Kippur war, there has been a virtual abdication of Israeli moral suasion addressed to the world at large. In the face of a worldwide barrage of carefully targeted Arab argumentation, Israel has offered almost no effective self-defense or retaliation. Israeli statements, for the most part, express little more than simple stonewall resistance: Israel lives, Israel must live, here we are and on this ground we mean to stay. The Arabs, on the other hand, back up each attack and public statement with a heavy arsenal of moral, historical, and political postulates and justifications and pleadings for public sympathy and support.

Reasons are easy to find for the dearth of Israeli rhetoric. Clearly, Israel feels that events speak for themselves and that it should not be necessary to justify the country's self-defense. Perceiving itself caught in the cynicism of oil diplomacy and power politics, Israel puts scant reliance on the likelihood of disinterested international discussion. Above all, Israelis apparently despair of a world which they find to be either uncaring at best or, at worst, actively anti-Semitic.

All this is true—to a degree. But the very ease with which these thoughts come to the Jewish mind serves to obscure an additional and very important factor: the effect on world opinion of Arab preemption of the issue of self-determination and the degree to which this propaganda success has weakened the moral position of Israel. The most frequent and most effective attacks upon the independence of Israel are made in the name of national liberation and self-determination for the Palestinians. Under this banner, friends of the Palestinians insist that any just solution for their problem must assure them of majority status in any country they inhabit. It is held to be self-evident, moreover, that this is a Palestinian *right*—and almost no discussion of the Palestinian cause omits its invocation.

Friends of Israel, on the other hand, base their support on quite other considerations. A public-opinion poll after the October war found that a majority of Americans support Israel because it

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is anti-Communist and because it is a democratic country. Secretary Kissinger, asked to explain the U.S. interest in Israel's security, listed the reasons as: the emotional ties between the two countries, the democratic tradition of Israel, the fact that Israel is a "going concern," and the U.S. objection to "domination by force." New York *Times* editorialist William V. Shannon has written of America's sense of guilt at not opening its doors quickly or widely enough to survivors of the Holocaust and "thereby providing an alternative to the Zionist answer."

Any examination of editorial opinion, or any exchange of comment with the proverbial taxi driver, is likely to bring out some variation of these themes. *Time* magazine recently wrote: "Non-Jewish Americans harbor profound [pro-Israel] sentiments that have nothing to do with Jewish lobbying; a sense of something owed the Jewish people after the Nazi Holocaust; shared religious roots and democratic ideals; admiration for the pioneer spirit of the Israeli nation builders, so seemingly akin to America's own beginnings; empathy for the underdog. . . . Besides, there were the geopolitical cold-war realities of the 1950's. . . ." Israelis themselves most often assert Israel's right to existence as, simply and redundantly, that "Israel lives." For further justification, if they must, they will cite legal precedents or historic persecutions.

Notably missing from almost all pro-Israeli arguments and statements is any explicit or insistent or passionate defense of a self-evident Jewish right to national liberation and self-determination.

The point to be remarked here is that the friends of Israel do accurately reflect the basic lines of Zionist propaganda—just as the Arab apologists repeat the Arab line. Thus, for example, a recent American Jewish Committee pamphlet states the moral reasons for American support of Israel as Israel's "strong democratic commitment, its pioneering spirit, and its heroic citizenry," but gives preponderant weight to the pragmatic political purpose of "maintaining the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union." In another AJC pamphlet, a definition of Zionism speaks of the "deep attachment" of Jews to their homeland, of the need for a haven from European anti-Semitism, and of the Jewish "sense of peoplehood." In three paragraphs, the AJC definition of Zionism makes no mention of any Jewish right whatever, let alone the specific right to self-determination or national liberation.

Thus, also, the influential Near East Report of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, in its widely distributed *Myths and Facts*, 1974, leads off with a question about the state: what right, it asks, does Israel have to exist? It answers by citing the Bible, the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations, and the United Nations. Self-determination for the Jewish people is only finally mentioned much later, in the third paragraph of

a lengthy definition of Zionism, and then as the second of the purposes of a Jewish national home, the first being sanctuary.

Israeli officials, as well, have generally left the talk of self-determination to their Arab counterparts. Exceptions have been something of a surprise—such as, for example, when early last year the then Foreign Secretary Abba Eban was pressed by newsmen on the matter of self-determination for the Palestinians. Cornered, he remarked that the real question was not self-determination for a twenty-first Arab state, but self-determination for the one, single Jewish state. He did not dwell upon the point, however, but slipped quickly away onto more familiar ground.

And when, finally, an articulated and unmistakable demand for Jewish self-determination would seem to have been unavoidable with Yasir Arafat's appearance at the United Nations, the Zionists chose to exhort the world, rather, upon the facts of Arab terrorism.

HISTORIANS of the future, examining the record, will surely find very strange this want of Jewish self-assertion. Is it not, after all, the Jewish right to self-determination that the Israelis are defending? For centuries, Jews have suffered the relentless pressures of Muslim and Christian conformism. In the Middle East itself, they have endured thirteen centuries of discrimination and persecution to keep from being forced into the vast Arab melting pot. But today the world has legitimized, and indeed apotheosized, national and cultural particularism and separatism. Why then are the Jews still standing outside this mainstream?

Certainly such a self-defeating position is difficult to understand as a matter of strategy. It can perhaps, however, be explained as a matter of ideology. It would seem that, in this regard, Zionism has simply held fast to its early precepts and philosophy and has not moved with the times. It has stood aloof from the value changes which have swept current radical-socialist movements and has declined either to accept new ideological idols or even to use them to its own advantage.

What has happened today is that self-determination has come to stand for a compelling nationalism of exceptional predominance and priority. In general theory it may be associated with some more or less defined expectations of economic progress or individual liberty or political or social improvement. But in dogma and practice these are lesser considerations, and self-determination—meaning political power, pure and simple—is asserted to be the most fundamental and most imperative of all group goals.

This is an idea essentially alien to Zionism. Zionist nationalism has from the beginning been much less extreme and more pragmatic. True, the aim was Jewish liberation in the Jewish homeland, but even in theory the movement was based

more on necessity than on mystique. Centuries of persecution had demonstrated, it was thought, that the Jewish people could have no lasting expectation of physical safety or freedom or economic security without some measure of political independence. The Jews therefore "needed" their homeland. It is significant that the word "need" occurs far more often in Zionist literature than the word "right." The nationalism of the Zionist—for all its religious, historical, and emotional ties to the Land of Israel—was essentially a means to an end, and the end was seen to be the tangible welfare of the people.

Nor, in the beginning, did Zionism demand absolute national independence. It was most generally held that Jewish needs could—and probably should—be accommodated within some larger national or international or regional limitations.

Thus, to cite a few random examples: In an address at the organizing convention of the later predominant Labor party (Mapai) in 1931, one of its leading theoreticians, Berl Katznelson, spoke eloquently in favor of a bi-national state in Palestine and pointed out, ". . . nor did Herzl try to set down what the form of government would be in a Jewish state, and whether it would exist as a totally autonomous state or as an autonomous province in a greater governmental unit." The workers' movement, Katznelson continued, "no longer utilizes the term *state* which Herzl himself ceased using when he changed from abstract dreams to concrete political actions." In 1933, Eliezer Livneh, subsequently an influential member of the Knesset, wrote of "a Jewish Palestine within a greater Arab federation" as "probably the final goal of any serious Zionist foreign policy. Economic as well as political and strategic considerations speak in its favor." And David Ben-Gurion himself, at the 1931 Mapai convention, said that "there is [in Palestine] a political necessity and a moral justification for a superior international rule . . . that will protect all rights and interests that may possibly clash and encroach upon one another."

IF, HOWEVER, today's brand of passionate, extremist nationalism is foreign to historic Zionism, it is not new to the Arabs who long ago made it their weapon against the Jewish people. From the beginning, the Arab Palestinians insisted upon their own unique title to guaranteed political and economic predominance in the entire country. No Jewish political rights would be recognized which permitted any possibility of future challenge to continued Arab power and majority status. Thus Arab nationalism came early to be exclusive and uncompromising. It denied categorically the right of the Jews to effective self-determination and political equality and to the free development and growth of their own community.

The issue was pointed up early and clearly in

the Jewish and Arab responses to the Churchill-Samuels White Paper of 1922. That document, seeking a compromise with the Arabs, defined Jewish national liberation in the most minimal terms. The Jewish National Home, it stated explicitly, was not to be "a wholly Jewish Palestine"; the White Paper did not contemplate "the subordination of the Arabic population, language, or culture," nor did it seek "the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole." The Jewish National Home meant only "the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a center in which the Jewish people, as a whole, may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospects of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in *Palestine as of right, and not on sufferance*" (emphasis added).

The 1922 White Paper was approved by the Zionist Organization. But even so little went too far for the Arabs, and they rejected it.

Arab intransigence was based entirely on considerations of political power. The Arabs did not attempt to make their argument on grounds of the physical or material or social welfare of their people. Indeed, they could not. Zionist enterprise in Palestine was irrigating the desert, draining the swamps, rapidly improving the lives of Arabs as well as Jews. Palestine quickly achieved the highest standard of living in the Middle East, and tens of thousands of poor Arab immigrants flocked into the country from neighboring Arab lands.

But all this was held to be irrelevant. Arab leaders stated bluntly that they preferred that the country remain barren rather than be developed by a strong and self-reliant Jewish community. They quickly narrowed the issue and stand today, essentially, upon the same spot which they chose in 1920: that for them hegemony was the *sine qua non*, and for it they were prepared to forgo all thought of economic and social benefit and progress.

The Zionists could not believe that the Arab people truly endorsed what their leaders were saying. Surely these spokesmen were only the absentee landowners, protecting their continued exploitation of a docile peasantry. Surely these were only the words of corrupt petty bureaucrats, defending their positions and prerogatives. Surely the problem lay with British imperialists, dividing in order to rule. But surely, the Arab people would not long persist in policies so clearly contrary to their own self-interest. Zionist literature is full of the vision of oppressed Arab peasants who would soon, inevitably, join the Jewish workers to build a new socialist society of mutual benefit and prosperity.

THAT the Zionists were able so to mislead themselves was due, first of all, to a serious misreading of Arab-Jewish history. This is a history which is even today not very well known, and it was particularly far from the experience of European theorists. For several reasons—including, no doubt, wishful thinking—they helped to foster a myth of traditional tolerant and brotherly relations which distorts the realities of the centuries of Jewish life under Arab domination. The truth is that, for qualified permission to practice their religion, the Jews had had to pay the price of constant exploitation and submission. Within Arab countries (unless or until changed by European administrations) the Jewish people occupied a visibly inferior and oppressed-minority status which was enforced by religious as well as civil laws and was specifically encouraged by the Koran itself. Centuries of cultural conditioning had taught every Arab, whatever might be his own deprivation, to feel innately superior at least to the defenseless Jew. This is, of course, the other side of the coin of the much-noted Arab "pride."

The Zionists did not appreciate the depth and tenacity of Arab religious bigotry and hostility. Even in the 1930's, after the rapid spread of Nazi anti-Semitism among the Arabs had given clear evidence of the fertile soil in which it was planted, Zionists continued to look forward to a voluntary Arab change of heart and eventual cooperation and coexistence. Self-determination, therefore, remained a lesser goal in the rhetoric of Zionism, nor did it become so central and extreme a demand as to rule out the possibilities of political compromise. Arab intransigence, of course, ultimately had its effect upon Zionist actions—indeed, Israel's complete independence can be seen as substantially the result of Arab policies themselves. But somehow no proportionate change found its way into Zionist teachings and propaganda, where one finds little to reflect the historic record of Arab oppression of the Jewish people or any insistent priority on Jewish self-determination which could effectively challenge that of the Palestinians.

The record of the past, added to the events of this century, might have disposed a more realistic people to have reexamined their hypotheses. But the Zionists also had a dream. They were socialists and Jews, and they held a view of the world compounded of both socialist theory and messianic Judaism.

The socialist Zionists departed from orthodox Marxism in insisting upon their own religious and cultural particularity. They thus early excited the hostility of the Communists, to whom at that time both ethnicity and religion were everywhere dialectical heresies. Nonetheless, the Zionists did fundamentally believe that class and economic interests were the primary determinants of political action and that what all peoples most desired was economic betterment. And so they kept

instructively telling the world the tale of their kibbutzim and their crops, their schools and hospitals and the rise in the Arab as well as the Jewish standard of living. And when hundreds of thousands of Jews fled from Arab countries, Israel took them in with no attempt to exploit the potential of these other Middle Eastern refugees for political or propaganda purposes. The world, it appeared, had turned its face toward a future of material progress and international order. The rigidities and festering resentments of the Arabs, unproductive as their refugee camps, seemed medieval and irrelevant when set beside the irrigation of deserts and the drainage of swamps and the planting of vineyards and orchards and orange groves.

The Israelis believed that they were laboring on the side of the realities, and it has been primarily upon the economic and strategic self-interest of other nations that they have wished to rely. Like the United States, Israel made an aggressive national policy of the attempt to export its example and its know-how in programs of technical and educational assistance to underdeveloped countries. This was expected to win for Israel wide gratitude and support. Unfortunately, it turned out that self-interest alone made for undependable allies, as Israel was to learn later when that very incentive, indeed, led its erstwhile friends in new directions.

But it was not only diplomatic considerations which motivated Israel's foreign-aid programs. In its public posture, Israel has deeply wished to stand *not* for itself alone. A persistent leitmotif in Zionism is the theme that it is not enough for Israel to be "just" a country for the Jews. Israel must also be a light unto the nations. Ben-Gurion required that it be "a model for the redemption of the human race." Martin Buber sternly advised that it was up to the people whether Israel "will be the center of humanity or only a Jewish Albania." Hayim Greenberg, spokesman for the American Labor Zionists, stated that Zionism would deserve no support if it were "merely the expression of an egotistic nationalism."

This kind of rhetoric is, of course, quite different from the current prevailing fashion in national-liberation movements. It is interesting to note, incidentally, that the same sense of a unique Jewish mission and high ethical responsibility has also produced some of the most vigorous Jewish criticism of Israel. Arguments are frequently advanced that the Jews ought to be devoting themselves to more spiritual pursuits than the worldly and compromising job of running and defending a country of their own. Critics of this sort have ranged from Orthodox rabbis and religionists all the way to Philip Roth, who could only view the Jewish freedom fighter with contempt. "At long last," he wrote, "the Jew is no longer the spectator of the violence of our age, nor is he the victim of that violence; now he is a participant. Fine

then. Welcome aboard. . . ." Apparently there exists a significant strain of Jewish thinking which qualifies its allegiance to the principles of national liberation and self-determination, or is embarrassed by them.

In any event, Zionist statements of humanitarian responsibility and benevolent intentions in the Middle East only angered the Arabs. These declarations offended their ingrained religious and historical sense of the Jewish people as properly a subject minority dependent upon the "protection" of their Arab overlords. The inflated rhetoric smacked to them of elitism and imperialism. They were infuriated by the picture of Jews bringing civilization to the natives. Even if many Arabs did actually benefit from Israeli enterprises and jobs and public services, this was considered to be of no real consequence.

No matter how often or how explicitly this point was made, however, the Jews did not hear it. Even as late as 1967, after the Six-Day War, the Israelis seriously believed that plumbing and prosperity would win them friends in the occupied territories. And even Nahum Goldmann of the World Zionist Organization, this past winter, after taking the Zionists to task for the "original sin" of not having fully understood the "true significance" of the Arab problem, went on to urge that Israel try to make peace quickly and "become a partner of the Arabs in building up the Middle East. Arab financial power, coupled with Jewish ingenuity, resourcefulness, and international contacts, could make of the Middle East a paradise in a decade or two," he said.

Mr. Goldmann has an international reputation for devotion to the cause of understanding and compromise with the Arabs. Yet he, too, remains the prisoner of old delusions. A partnership is just what the Arabs have again and again rejected—and in particular and most categorically this sort of partnership, to which Jews were expected to bring the brains and the skills and Arabs the resources. The formula used to read a bit differently: originally, the Jewish contribution was also to have been financial and the Arab resources were mostly manpower. The offer was refused in the past, and is surely even less acceptable today.

That there is a wide gap in Arab-Israeli communication is obvious. Noticeably missing has been the elementary communication of direct confrontation and engagement on the bedrock issues. The Arabs will talk only of rights. The Israelis wish to discuss only needs and accomplishments and legalities. They talk past each other.

IN THE fall of 1957, in a widely-quoted speech before the United Nations, Golda Meir directed a typical Israeli appeal to the Arab people: "Would it not be better for all to build a future for the Middle East based on co-operation?" she asked. "Does hate for Israel and the aspiration for its destruction make one child

in your country happier? Does it convert one hovel into a house? Does culture thrive on the soil of hatred?"

Whatever its sincerity, Mrs. Meir's appeal was beside the point. It was no response whatever to what the Arabs were saying. To be sure, there was perhaps reason, in the early hopeful days of the UN, to believe that housing and culture and the happiness of children might be the predominant concerns of the nations of the world. The Israelis were not alone in their vision of the future. But soon public attention began perceptibly to shift and to swing around to the Arab view of the political priorities. There was a growing international acquiescence, at least, in the principle that another cause is really the most important of all: a cause named self-determination, whose culture does indeed thrive on the soil of hatred and violence.

Israel now faced a war of propaganda in which the field of battle had been chosen by her enemies. Still, she was not in a strategically untenable position, much as it might not have been to her taste. If the issue was to be the right to self-determination for *all* peoples, then the Jewish people might also credibly claim that right. What was required, however, was that the Arabs not be permitted to control the debate and that the concept of self-determination immediately and unmistakably be made to include the Jews.

No directed, concentrated offensive of this sort appears to have been attempted by Israeli diplomacy and Zionist information programs. There were skirmishes on the fringes of the battle. There was a continued busy emphasis upon facts and the correction of facts. But the vital center was left undefended. *Do the Jewish people have a right to self-determination in Israel?* The Jews simply did not wish to discuss the issue in the terms in which the rest of the world was in fact discussing it.

They preferred, in the first place, to insist that the matter had long ago been settled by the Balfour Declaration and by the United Nations, and they ignored the growing signs of popular erosion of these legal supports. Former Israeli premier Moshe Sharett, for example, after a tour of Asian countries in 1956, had reported on his visits with new nations who had little knowledge of the Bible or of ancient Jewish history and who still smarted from bruising experiences with British and other European imperialisms. Under no circumstances must Israel talk to them of the Balfour Declaration, Sharett had warned prophetically. Ten years later, some UN decisions had come to be viewed in much of the world with similar hostility. Yet Israeli publicists persisted in stressing the UN "creation" of the State.

Secondly, the Zionists chose to leave virtually undisturbed those big guns of Arab propaganda: that Israelis are all Europeans, that no significant numbers of Jews remained in Palestine and the Middle East after the Roman conquest of Jeru-

saalem, and that in any case Jews had always been well treated and secure in Arab countries until Zionism arrived to disturb the peace.

THAT these potent premises are widely believed today—and by Jews as well as non-Jews—is as much a result of Israeli silence as of Arab persuasion. This silence was dramatically illustrated in an exchange which took place at the UN Security Council meeting of October 21, 1973, during discussion of the cease-fire to end the October war. Jamil Baroody, representative of Saudi Arabia, used the occasion to deliver a lengthy attack upon Zionism and Israel. However verbose and rambling his oratory, Mr. Baroody's central thesis came through loud and clear: Israelis have no historic rights whatsoever in the Middle East. They are all foreigners and intruders. Arabs therefore have no responsibility to live with them as neighbors nor any obligation, certainly, to compensate for the persecution of their European past.

Israel's representative, Yosef Tekoah, answered with a ringing defense of Zionism as the Jewish people's liberation movement. But in recounting the long Jewish struggle against oppression, Mr. Tekoah spoke only of Europe: of Rome, of Spain, of Russia, of Germany. He did not mention the harassment and exploitation of the Jewish people in Palestine after the Arab conquest. He did not mention the pillage and persecution of Jewish communities in the Middle East during the centuries of Arab domination. He did not mention the families of Jewish refugees from Arab countries who are today a substantial majority of the Jews of Israel. He did not include a single instance of Arab oppression of the Jewish people, nor a single descriptive word about the vital post-Roman Jewish history in the Middle East. Mr. Tekoah simply let stand, unchallenged, Mr. Baroody's pivotal contentions—the same ones, as it happened, which were that week being widely circulated in Arab advertisements in newspapers like the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*.

In this strange Israeli silence there lies a curious double standard about the very meaning of the word oppression. For other nations, and even groups within nations, oppression has come to include any restriction of power, any limitation upon absolute self-determination and equality. All history is being reexamined from this point of view and redress is demanded for past transgressions of the new standards. When it comes to the Jews, however, oppression means the auto-da-fé and the gas oven, and the Jewish people are not thought to have been really oppressed unless they were being systematically slaughtered. For the

most part, Jews and Arabs seem to be agreed on this point.

Thus an old Zionist cannot be much aroused by the record of Arab persecutions before Zionism. "The Germans were worse," he says philosophically.

Thus the PLO is applauded for the perfect justice of its proposed "democratic secular state" in which Arabs will be assured of a permanently guaranteed majority over the Jews. But Arab Palestinians are held to suffer an unbearable loss of identity if they live in Arab Syria or Arab Jordan.

Thus we are never permitted to forget that the Israeli Arab, whatever the relative comfort or advantage of his life, is constantly tormented by the humiliation of belonging to a minority group. A young Arab student, for example, offers as proof of his oppression that, should he wish to go to the University of Tel-Aviv, he will perhaps have difficulty finding a nearby Arab family with whom to board. But Mrs. Abba Eban, in the *New Yorker*, tells us delightful stories of her carefree girlhood in Cairo (before the Jews were unfortunately driven out) when she was able to watch the colorful royal festivities from across the street and to scramble for handfuls of gold coins tossed by King Farouk.

If, then, self-determination is now an Arab word, it is in large part because the Jews have not made it theirs. What the Israelis and their supporters have patently *not* done is to establish in the public perception the Jewish right to self-determination in Israel—perhaps because they have not thought it a really important task. It is this hole at the center of Israel's public image which has so easily been filled with damaging charges of foreign aggression and imperialism.

One cannot, of course, say precisely what would have been the results of different policies on the part of Israeli spokesmen. Perhaps there would have been no effect upon the Arab world—although it is possible to suggest that insistence upon the post-biblical history of Middle Eastern Jewry and upon the Arabs' own historic responsibilities might somewhat have dented their self-righteousness and might somewhat have allayed their smarting sense of injustice. It is, however, very likely that there would have been some appreciable effect upon pro-Arab opinion elsewhere in the world. In any case, one must wonder how, vulnerable as it is and with such an obviously poor hand, Israel can afford not to play its every possible trump card.

The Israelis worked and created facts. The Arabs talked and created other facts. It is now clear that words can, after all, become facts as real and as powerful as vineyards and orange groves.

The West in Retreat

Walter Laqueur

INTELLECTUAL confusion, Auguste Comte once wrote, is at the bottom of every historical crisis; the crisis of American foreign policy is no exception. Seen in retrospect, the two or three years prior to 1974—the period of the Paris accords on Vietnam, China's admission to the UN, SALT, Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, the Nixon trips to Moscow and Peking—will be a source of bewilderment to future diplomatic historians. This was the climax of an era of illusions whose origins are traceable back to the 1960's. Disgusted with Vietnam, bored with global tensions, eager to return to domestic preoccupations, establishment and radical spokesmen alike announced a virtual moratorium on world conflicts. The global balance of power, military strength, and other such anachronisms were solemnly relegated to the dustbin of history. Mighty common enterprises were ushered in, with Europe, Japan, and China elevated to the rank of superpowers. Politicians congratulated each other on the creation of new structures of peace; political scientists, whose chosen kingdom is not of this world, preoccupied themselves with such recondite details of the putatively emerging world order as the neo-functional analysis of regional integration. It was an exhilarating period, reminiscent of the years after World War I when Woodrow Wilson excluded "autocratic governments from respectable society" and when Senator Borah and Secretary of State Kellogg outlawed war.

Rereading the speeches, the editorials, the policy statements of these years, the future historian will admire the confidence they exude, and give due credit to the inventiveness that went into the construction of guidelines for a new world order. But in the end he is likely to turn with relief to *Pravda* and the *Peking People's Daily*, not because Soviet and Chinese commentators in those days were more intelligent or less prejudiced, but because they at least were dealing with the real world, whereas so much that was said and written in the U.S. belonged to the realm of fantasy. Perhaps this was due to naiveté: the longing for peace

and understanding among nations is one of the more attractive features of the American character, and stands in stark contrast to the cynical attitude of Europeans who have long claimed that human nature nowhere shows itself in a worse light than in the relations among nations. In the present case American optimism affected even the judgment of many who, when it came to domestic affairs, could not be charged with excessive credulity. Americans harboring the gravest suspicions of the motives of their own leaders were only too eager to accept at face value professions of good will emanating from foreign statesmen, whose friendly intentions toward the U.S. were, to put it cautiously, not above suspicion.

Or perhaps it was not so much naiveté as an optical distortion, leading the viewer to discover false symmetries in the world—a pattern that runs like a red thread through the intellectual history of the whole postwar period. In 1947 Walter Lippmann argued, against George Kennan, that the American public would become frustrated with the policy of containment long before the Russians would; Lippmann was right, but he was wrong in thinking that the Russians for their part would not be able to maintain the Iron Curtain and that an emerging economic interdependence of Western and Eastern Europe would overcome military, political, and ideological boundaries. The false-symmetry syndrome has recently been revived in Stanley Hoffmann's argument that the two superpowers are coming to control less and less of world politics. Which is the other superpower he has in mind?

Sometimes such equations merely amounted to a rationalization of American weakness, as, for instance, in the vision articulated by George Ball and others of a new international system that would be safer and less burdensome to the U.S. Profound changes in international relations were indeed taking place in the early 70's, but there was no good reason, even at the time, to believe that they would lead to a safer world or reduce the American burden. The curious optimism of those years will no doubt remain a riddle for a long time, although surely one underlying factor was the preoccupation of many American foreign-policy experts with domestic affairs, a preoccupation that led to their attributing to the rest of the

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world motives, purposes, and modes of behavior similar to their own, and to their ignoring whatever did not fit the pattern. This has been an old established American custom. Many years ago Lord Bryce noted that America lived in a world of its own, safe from attack, safe from menace, hearing only from afar the warring cries of European races and faiths. The American vessel was not better built or more cunningly navigated than the ships which carried the fortunes of the great nations of Europe, "but for the present at least—it may not be always so—she sails on a summer sea."

Of late, as everyone knows, this vessel has moved into stormy waters, with the predictable consequence of seasickness and disorientation. Yesterday's vision of the world is in ruins; various "anachronisms," like the global balance of political struggle and military power, have emerged from oblivion. Some see in this no more than a temporary relapse; once the unhappy past is disposed of, once the Middle East crisis is resolved, the world will at long last be ready to move forward to the really important issues—the unfinished business of *détente*, the great transnational challenges, the building of a "just" and "stable" world order. Others, on the other hand, fear that recent setbacks mark the prelude to the demise of the West; they hear the horsemen of the apocalypse and see no promise anywhere for freedom and democracy, for the future of America and mankind. Neither cluster of attitudes will be of much use in coping with the dangers of the years to come.

I

IN A recent column, Joseph Kraft, newly returned from a South Sea isle, confidently asserted that "the fear of great new dangers seems highly exaggerated." He may be right with regard to major military conflicts—though even this, unfortunately, cannot be taken for granted—but for the rest he is quite wrong. To the extent (to take first things first) that the dependence of industrial societies on the import of foreign oil has somewhat lessened, it has done so only as the result of a decline in industrial production. It would have been unrealistic to expect a drastic change in this respect within a year or two of the OPEC embargo, but there should have been *some* effort to reduce future dependence; nothing of the sort has happened in America, and not very much in Europe and Japan. The oil-consuming nations have established mutual-aid agreements to meet mounting trade deficits, but such agreements make sense only on the expectation that the oil price will come down—which it won't. They do not touch the root of the problem: insolvent countries are being loaded with a debt burden they cannot possibly repay. In the meantime, comforting statistics are produced to show that the foreign-trade balance of the industrialized countries has improved in recent months; yet the

main reason for this is a general decline in imports, not a resurgence of good economic health.

It is true that the world economy has proved more shock-resistant than was feared a year ago, but there are limits to its elasticity: the credit pyramid cannot grow forever. Furthermore, the Euro-currency market remains a major danger zone and trade wars are just about now becoming an acute possibility. All Western countries try with varying success to cut down their oil bills and to boost exports, but since the overall deficit in the trade balance of the oil-consuming states stands at around \$60 billion, and since the OPEC countries cannot absorb their new wealth, the only way for any one country to improve its position is to export its problems to another. Unchecked, this process will lead to the imposition of trade restrictions and a serious decline in world trade with disastrous results for all. So far the threat has been averted, but it has far from passed. Most economies now expect an early upturn from the recession, but it may well be a partial recovery only. It will take a long time to reduce unemployment, and there is the danger a year or two hence of accelerated inflation as a result of massive wage demands and the rising price of raw materials.

The coming changes in the Soviet leadership introduce an element of uncertainty into world politics. Brezhnev would like to crown his achievements with a new strategic arms agreement, and a European summit conference. He would also like to hold a new Communist world conference to confirm Soviet leadership and to repudiate China. Such a meeting has to be carefully coordinated with the European summit, for among comrades the stress will be on political struggle and the inevitable downfall of non-Communist regimes, whereas at the summit conference peaceful coexistence will be emphasized.

It has been Soviet policy for some time now not to cause major upheavals in relations with the West, and this line may well be continued by the post-Brezhnev leadership (although certain Soviet initiatives, such as pressure on Finland and Berlin, do not fit into this picture). On arms, the Soviets now outspend the United States by 25 per cent; they do not seem to share the conviction of Western politicians and political scientists that military power no longer counts for anything or that it cannot be translated into political influence. Nor do the Soviet leaders believe that the global balance of power has somehow vanished; they repeat on every occasion that the balance is very much in force and is, moreover, slowly changing in their favor. To help history along, they will no doubt be applying a little pressure in various parts of the world as time goes on; the aim is neither attack nor conquest but simply hegemony, a *Pax Sovietica* in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia.

Western Europe is watching this process with its usual fatalism, which has puzzled and dismayed visiting Chinese dignitaries. But China too has

been showing signs of internal weakness. Chou En-lai recently predicted that in thirty or fifty years China will be among the most developed industrial countries; meanwhile, the Chinese economy is developing more slowly than expected. Professor Bianco, one of Europe's leading Sinologists, wrote on his recent return from Peking that the standard of living was not appreciably higher than it had been in 1937—a statement that caused a scandal in Maoist circles precisely because the author has been known as a friend. (The exchanges that ensued centered on the question of whether progressives should make statements that may give comfort to the “enemy”; the question of whether the statement was correct or not was taken to be irrelevant.) In the development of modern weapon systems, too, China seems to be lagging behind. The tug-of-war for the succession has been going on for years and unrest has been reported in various parts of the countryside. Neither the Communist party nor the army has entirely recovered from the purges of the last decade; one cannot rule out a period of anarchy following Mao's disappearance from the political scene—this, of course, is what the Russians are waiting for.

Owing to the Sino-Soviet conflict, Thailand, Burma, and Malaysia may end up retaining some independence, though their chances cannot be rated high in the long run. Japan in all probability will be driven by the logic of events into rearmament, a process that could be accelerated by what happens in Korea. In India, the turn toward dictatorship will probably be irreversible, and may very well represent the beginning of the disintegration of the country. The political future of Indonesia remains uncertain; of the new wealth, little trickles down, the ruling generals are both unpopular and ineffective, and their hold may be challenged soon. Australia remains a rich country, even though the present government has achieved the almost inconceivable—a serious economic crisis. In its foreign policy Australia is becoming increasingly oriented toward neutralism. Thanks to its fortunate geographic situation and its almost inexhaustible wealth, the margin for error is much wider in Australia than almost anywhere else; it will be hard to ruin the country altogether.

EUROPE remains the great prize in the global struggle, and the good news from Europe is that a breakdown has so far been prevented. Within the continent the outlook varies greatly from country to country. Germans exude confidence. Frenchmen maintain that the worst expectations do not always come to pass. In Britain there is a mood of near despair. The same goes for Italy, despite an economic upswing that was not thought possible a year ago: although living standards have declined and there is still a huge deficit in the national budget, inflation has been brought under control. There has been no improvement in the Italian political situation,

however; assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings on the part of both the extreme Left and the far Right have become a daily occurrence. Chaotic strikes go on all the time, and there is a deepening sense of a lack of purpose at the top. The old Christian Democratic leadership—Moro, Fanfani, Colombo, Rumor, and Andreotti—is held responsible for the chaos; its successors are uninspired machine politicians driven by personal ambition rather than firm beliefs or values. The Communists, who have in recent years successfully administered several provinces and many cities, feel confident that the day is not far when the “historical compromise”—a euphemism for a coalition between the Communists and the Christian Democrats—will at last materialize. Their spectacular gains in the recent regional and local elections have brought that day all the nearer.

The Italian Communist party is one of the least orthodox in Europe; in some respects, with its combination of revolutionary doctrine and reformist practice, it resembles the German Social Democrats before World War I. But there is one important difference: there is no certainty at all that today's Italian Communists have accepted democratic procedure. At a conference earlier this year the party opposed all outside interference in its internal affairs. In the next breath, it approved Communist policy in Portugal vis-à-vis the hapless Socialists. It is said that the Italian malaise has gone on for so long it may continue forever, but this is not really convincing. In the absence of a strong Center or democratic-socialist party there remains only one alternative to the disintegrating Christian Democrats. The results of the Italian election in June are an indication of things to come.

BRITAIN has voted to stay in Europe, a gesture of little political significance because the vote was about a customs union and standardization, not about political community. As Ronald Butt put it in the *London Times* on the eve of the elections:

Western Europe is all that is left of the greatest civilization the world has known. Half of Europe has already gone Communist. The remainder is a small promontory on the end of Asia, each nation being vulnerable to being picked off one by one. . . . I would say myself that to go into Europe is no great thing unless you can envisage it as leading to a genuine European defense and foreign policy which enables us to avoid being subject, in the end, to the domino theory which is already at work in Asia. . . .

Political power in Britain has passed from Parliament to the trade unions, or, to be precise, to a small minority within the trade unions.* Greater

* Union leaders in Britain are usually elected by 10 per cent of the membership; frequently the vote is less than 5 per cent. The extreme groups are fighting an attempt to introduce a more democratic system.

union participation in the political process would be an excellent thing if the unions were to show responsibility commensurate with their newly acquired power. But far from championing social justice, they fight like medieval guilds for the privileges of their members, showing little concern for the working class at large, let alone old-age pensioners and other underprivileged members of society. "The miners," said their president, one of the most moderate and sensible trade unionists, "are going to be at the top of the tree, and if that hurts somebody, I am sorry." Nor do they have any desire to cooperate in getting the country out of the present crisis. They oppose any attempt to make British industry (including the growing state sector) more productive and competitive in world markets. The Labour government does not feel strong enough to confront the destructive elements inside the unions; if the Conservatives were returned in the elections, with however great a majority, they would face pay demands they could not meet and strikes, official and unofficial, they could not break. In historical perspective one may list the various factors extenuating such industrial nihilism: the arrogance and short-sightedness of the ruling classes, the class-ridden nature of British society, the poor performance of British industrialists. But unless the present situation changes, there cannot be real recovery, and at the moment union leadership constitutes the greatest stumbling block to such a recovery.

With inflation running at more than 30 per cent and wage increases at 40 per cent, Britain faces economic disaster. Some believe that the Shah of Iran and the various Arab kings and sheiks will not permit the crumbling of the British political system. But this is to overrate the far-sightedness and the enlightened self-interest of the oil producers. The Shah has already expressed his conviction that the Western liberal system is doomed. The Saudis and Kuwaitis feel no obligation, moral or otherwise, to underwrite the economy of a country that wishes to live beyond its means. The Europeans would help Britain up to a point, but only if they were to receive guarantees of a sensible economic policy, and these, in the present circumstances, no British government could give.

THE French have shown greater initiative than the British in coping with economic problems. The present government has been the first since 1958 to dare stop credits in order to stabilize the economy—a move that has resulted in reducing the rate of inflation to less than 10 per cent. But there are now almost a million unemployed, industrial production has declined by 8 per cent, and consumption has decreased even more drastically. The problem of unemployment is particularly grave among the young. With rare unanimity the trade unions and CPNF (the head organization of French industry)

now demand a return to a policy of rapid growth, and it is not clear whether Giscard will be able to resist for long. So far his government has benefited from the split on the Left; the Communists, worried by increasing Socialist self-confidence and independence, have spent as much time attacking their allies as the government.

To a certain extent, Portugal has acted as a deterrent to a French popular front. But there is a fairly strong minority inside the French Socialist party which wants a united front at almost any price, and Mitterand himself, the party leader, is very much in favor of it. He has strongly criticized those European Socialists, especially the German and the Scandinavian, who have expressed misgivings about collaborating with the Communists. Mitterand knows that without Communist support he will never achieve power.

So far, Germany has weathered the political and economic storms better than any other European country. Inflation is down to an idyllic 5 per cent, there is a staggering trade surplus, and recent regional election results have shown growing support for the government. But the economy is stagnating and unemployment has reached the one million mark. Above all, Germany, with its traumatic memories of 1923, 1929, and 1933, is still the most vulnerable country psychologically. And Germans are, of course, perfectly aware that in the long run their prosperity depends on the well-being of others; if the rest of Europe should go down, Germany will not survive either.

In the smaller European countries the most worrisome aspect of the situation is not the economic crisis—though some of them, such as Denmark, Finland, and Greece, are in real trouble—but aimlessness, the extent to which they have been affected by the general European lack of will. The justification offered for this absence of will is that Europe does not need to join forces or make a greater defense effort since no one threatens it, or, alternatively, because such a move would provoke anger in Moscow (Giscard). Anyway, it is claimed, there is the American umbrella. Many Europeans, including those who admit that Europe would probably collapse if American protection were withdrawn, have managed to persuade themselves that withdrawal would be a greater disaster for America than for Europe. If the defeatists have their way, Europe will remain disunited, even less able to resist political pressure than at present.

Europe has not yet been Finlandized; the danger it faces is self-Finlandization. Fortunately, there are some factors that may delay and counteract this process. The usurpation of power in Portugal by a small minority of military men and Communists, together with the suppression of democratic rights, has been closely followed all over the continent. It is, above all, a tragedy for the Portuguese people. For the rest of Europe it has been a salutary lesson. Events in Portugal are

nowhere more closely watched than in neighboring Spain. The Spanish Communist party, Europe's most enlightened, has been rightly worried by the brazen dictatorial policies of its comrades in Lisbon, and has openly condemned them—not quite fairly, perhaps, since the Portuguese Communist course of action has been dictated up to a point by a fear of being outflanked by the wild men of the terrorist Left. Spanish Communism, too, will one day be exposed to these pressures. Events in Portugal have, moreover, acted as a spur to the non-Communist opposition groups inside Spain. They know now that unless they are well organized, political power will be seized after Franco's demise by a small minority of anti-democratic militants. Within a year or two we should know whether the lesson of Portugal has been learned.

On the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey (with an inflation rate of 25 and 30 per cent respectively) face, quite apart from the unsolved Cyprus conflict, serious domestic problems. The same goes for Egypt, which so far has not benefited from the oil bonanza; pan-Arab solidarity does not extend to revenue sharing. As for the oil-producing countries, it has been argued that with so much money around, a revolution seems almost unthinkable. The cheapest way to put an end to the guerrilla war in Dhofar, which has lasted for almost a decade, would be to pay a million dollars to every guerrilla operating in that remote part of the Arabian peninsula. But the war's continuation and the existence of terrorist organizations in Iran show only too clearly that while money can smooth troubled political waters, it also attracts trouble. With so many billions as a prize, political power has become irresistibly attractive. Thus it seems only a question of time until some Saudi army officers not belonging to the royal establishment conspire to overthrow the regime. There are, in addition, a great many ambitious and dissatisfied men among the foreign technicians and workers in the Persian Gulf mini-states—Palestinians, agents of the Iraqi Ba'ath and of Communist South Yemen. It is often forgotten that Saudi Arabia has only been in existence for a short time and may fall apart; prognostications of the future of Iran usually ignore the fact that the survival of the present regime rests on the life of one man who has many enemies.

In short, Middle East stability, Israel quite apart, is deceptive; economic strength does not necessarily translate into political and military power. What power the Middle East oil producers have acquired is basically destructive: they are certainly in a position to cause a great deal of harm to the industrialized nations and the undeveloped countries that lack oil (i.e., the majority of mankind). They cannot and will not make the contribution toward a more stable world order which has been the fond dream of Western foreign ministers and political commentators.

II

WHERE does America stand in all this, and which way will it turn? Isolationism in the United States is deeply rooted, but against it, one hopes, stands the recognition that America cannot escape its history, a history which does not point toward "fortress America." It is, no doubt, an encouraging sign that present-day isolationists are wary of the very label, and often go out of their way to avoid using it in speeches and writing. To be an isolationist is almost as bad as being a cold warrior. Thus Professor Richard A. Falk in last month's COMMENTARY symposium: "There is room for a new internationalism spearheaded by American leadership, but its character needs to be shaped by the new exigencies of shared economic, ecological, and cultural destiny throughout the entire globe"—in other words UNESCO, the fight against DDT and oil spills, the greening of America.

The case for anti-intervention in its extreme form is a familiar one: why quit our own to stand on foreign ground? America, it is said, has to choose between its traditional values on the one hand and an interventionist foreign policy on the other: the two cannot possibly be combined. And since all foreign policy is interventionist by definition, it should be confined to a minimum. Yet even the maintenance of an embassy is in some ways an act of intervention, and so is the distribution abroad of food among starving children. Few anti-interventionists will pursue their case to the logical end. On the other hand, arguments have been used of late which come very close to such a conclusion. As Earl Ravenal has put it, "We don't need a foreign-policy consensus. What we need is a foreign policy that does not require consensus" (*Foreign Policy*, Spring 1975). This is another way of asking for the abolition of foreign policy.

The most frequently heard argument *against* isolationism is not the most valid one, for on the economic level a policy of near-total withdrawal may in fact be feasible. U.S. foreign trade has quadrupled during the last ten years, from about \$25 to \$100 billion, but more than a third of this takes place within the American hemisphere, and what remains is no more than 5-6 per cent of the American GNP. Similarly, U.S. foreign assets abroad have almost doubled since 1965 and amount now to \$220 billion, but of this almost 40 per cent are in Canada and Latin America, and the remainder is less than 10 per cent of the GNP. The few strategic minerals such as manganese, cobalt, and chromium that have to be imported could somehow be acquired, or in the course of time be replaced. The American economy could exist without investments abroad.

The real problem facing isolationists arises on a level different from the economic. It is not that America cannot go home again, but that the kind of home she would find there would be insupportable. Can freedom and traditional American values

survive once the lights go out in the rest of the world? America's situation is no longer "detached and distant," "nature and a wide ocean" are no longer safe barriers in the age of ICBM's. In a famous editorial before World War II, the *New Republic* suggested that the parable of the Good Samaritan had no relation to modern international power politics. This argument has been used by conservatives for a long time; its adoption by liberals and radicals is of comparatively recent date. Indeed, it is not readily obvious why men and women of the Left should regard the isolated nation-state as a supreme value. With equal justice they might repudiate a citizenry's commitments to national and local politics; and social obligations in general. James Reston has recently characterized Secretary Kissinger's "globalism" as right in theory, but wrong in practice, yet surely what is theoretically valid must apply in practice too. A nation does not have the duty to commit suicide in pursuit of an abstract ideal, but it does have a duty to strike a balance between its commitments and its power.

In its extreme form, isolationism is very rare; moderately phrased under the lable of non-interventionism, it has gained wider currency. As such, it advances one argument which is difficult to refute. It was first made by ex-President Herbert Hoover, who has not yet been adopted as a patron saint by New Left historians. In a radio address concerning NATO in December 1950 he argued that the prime obligation to defend Western Europe rested upon the nations of Europe: "The test is whether they have the spiritual forces, the will and acceptance of unity among them by their own volition. America cannot create their spiritual forces. . . ." Hoover's remarks are even more to the point in 1975 than in 1950, when much of Europe was still in ruins. Portugal is mainly a European problem and so are Spain and Italy, Greece and Turkey. Europe is not too weak to deal with these problems; it lacks only the will. To a certain degree the American defense guarantee reiterated recently by President Ford inhibits the reassertion of this will. Sooner or later the vicious circle will have to be broken; as the problems facing Europe during the years to come will be largely political in nature, European leaders will have to get accustomed to coping with them without taking American leadership for granted. Portugal is one such case, the future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty another. Teaching Europe to walk without crutches will be a protracted and painful business, but one as essential as the provision of a defense umbrella. A practice should be established by means of which the American contribution to NATO should match the European defense effort. If the European defense effort decreases, the American contribution should be reduced. This is not an ideal solution, but it is the only one possible. At present Greece, Turkey, Spain, and other countries seem to believe that they are doing the

United States a favor by putting bases at its disposal and that these bases have nothing to do with their own defense. The sooner they are disabused of this error the better.

III

ONE of the consequences of the Vietnam debacle has been a questioning of the conduct of American foreign policy in general since 1945. A whole literature has emerged according to which the cold war was mainly (if not entirely) America's fault and according to which U.S. policy has always been motivated by aggressive and imperialistic designs, a crusade aimed at global supremacy. Truman and Kennedy are the villains of the piece, the principal "counter-revolutionaries." This literature has recently reached a culmination of sorts in the rehabilitation of the most eloquent advocate of fascism in America in the 1930's, Lawrence Dennis. In *Prophecy on the Right*, Ronald Radosh argues, not without a certain justice, that today's isolationist radicals have more in common with men like Dennis and John T. Flynn than with the "cold-war liberals": "They [Dennis and Flynn] have opened the way for the leftists of a future epoch."

Were this particular reaction to the trauma of Vietnam limited to revisionist historians and "concerned" political scientists, it would be a phenomenon of psychological interest but hardly of great political significance. But it has also been recorded in parts of the foreign-policy establishment. Scarcely ten years ago Roger Hilsman compared General Giap's *People's War, People's Army* to Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. In his most recent book, *The Crouching Future*, Hilsman states that the Soviet Union has turned away from power and "prestige" values, that the global balance of power is an irrelevancy, that Western Europe has in some respects become a superpower, and that U.S. forces should be almost entirely withdrawn from Europe. Ten years ago certain Vietnam superhawks—it would be invidious to hame names—had nothing but contempt for anyone who doubted that Vietnam could be helped, or who doubted the basic assumptions on which the decision to intervene in Vietnam was taken, or who doubted that, once involved, America would be able to sustain a war of this kind. Such doubts were, the hawks said, "Far Eastern Chamberlainism." Ten years later, some of them show every sign of being shell-shocked; quite a number have switched from one extreme position to another.

The disorientation has been reflected in the press, radio, and television. At a moment when the American media are more powerful than ever before, the level of news coverage and, even more palpably, of comment on international affairs, are worse than in past decades. Whatever their weaknesses and their bias, the columnists and some of the foreign correspondents of the 30's seem intel-

lectual giants in retrospect. Personalized diplomacy has reinforced the tendency toward a concentration on personalities and trivia, which has always been a weakness of American journalism. As suddenly as a "major story" breaks, it disappears. The bewildered reader or viewer must be at a loss to understand why an important event occurred and what happened once the shooting was over. The American media, even the best among them, are insufficient as a source of information on world affairs. And since the analysis and interpretation of events cannot rely on intuition but have to be grounded in a solid factual basis, debates over foreign policy and defense are frequently exercises in ignorance.

The origins of the present crisis in Britain, to cite but one example, could have been clearly described ten years ago, the time when "swinging London" was featured so prominently on the covers of the news magazines and in the pages of the dailies. The dangers facing the Portuguese revolution in 1974 should have been obvious almost from the morning after, but in the general rejoicing there was no inclination to notice. The causes as well as the manifestations of the current European malaise have been no secret to anyone willing to look beneath the veneer of prosperity and apparent stability. But the subject was not considered newsworthy by the American media. More recently, Vietnam has disappeared from the headlines, the once-great promise of détente is infrequently heard from, and swinging London has been replaced by booming Riyadh and buoyant Abu Dhabi. On the moods and idiosyncrasies of the Secretary of State there have been literally thousands of articles; on matters of substance, very little. Opinions have been voiced with the greatest confidence, but standards of elementary logic, of experience and competence, have all but disappeared. On world affairs, almost anything goes; in the eyes of the media one viewpoint seems as good as another. When, twenty-five years ago, I. F. Stone announced that it was South Korea that had attacked an unsuspecting and unprepared North, not the other way around, this was the voice of a professional dissenter trying to make himself heard. It may have been absurd but it certainly had entertainment value. During the past decade such "nonconformism" has become the new orthodoxy, a triumphant confirmation of Herbert Marcuse's thesis of the manipulating powers of the mass media. The same trend can be seen in the universities, where the theater and cinema of the absurd have their counterparts in surrealist historiography and dadaist political science.

BUT if the media bear a great deal of responsibility for the public confusion, they cannot be blamed for the disorientation affecting those who should and could have known better within the foreign-policy establishment. Until fairly recently, readers of the prestigious journals

specializing in world affairs were told that, while the state of the world was far from perfect, there was no particular reason to worry, except perhaps with regard to economic matters. The articles appearing in such journals were measured, urbane, and seemingly well-informed; they also had a tendency to be disproved within a very short time. The editor of one such journal returned from the Middle East in 1973 convinced there would be no war*; a year later the editor of another came back from Southeast Asia reporting that the "greatest chance of collapse in Vietnam" lay "on the economic side." Robert Hunter, a foreign-policy adviser to Senator Edward Kennedy, writing in *Foreign Policy*, announced that we were "moving to an era dominated by economic power" and that the "only real competition that the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to permit themselves later on this decade is in the economic realm." Paul Warnke, a leading defense expert, also writing in *Foreign Policy*, assured his readers that "we are militarily the most powerful nation the world has known," a statement that will cause some wry amusement to General Giap.

The flow of such articles has slowed down of late, but the end is not yet in sight. It is important to remember, though, that they represent not minor misjudgments, of the kind anyone commenting on world affairs is likely to commit, but misconceptions of the state of the world that are truly fundamental. The Leninist (or Maoist or Trotskyite) line on world affairs may be repugnant to one's taste, values, and priorities, but it is rooted in reality, it displays inner logic and consistency, and it ought to be taken seriously. Those who demand that U.S. policy be oriented toward the United Nations, or toward an illusory détente, or who maintain that military power is no longer of consequence, or that global political conflict is bound to lessen, have moved beyond politics to a world in which anything is possible, and anything can be said.

IV

THE illusions of yesterday are now giving way to an inevitable hangover—to be followed, one hopes, by the emergence of a new realistic consensus. But this will create only the

* Today, of course, foreign ministers, government officials, and political commentators are all agreed that a new round in the Arab-Israeli conflict may be expected within the next few weeks, and they have described this as the greatest danger facing mankind. While almost anything may happen in the Middle East, it should be perfectly clear that a new round is by no means in the cards for at least a while; that the conflict is, unfortunately, insoluble in the foreseeable future; and that if by a miracle it should be solved, it will be replaced almost immediately by a fierce inter-Arab struggle. The alarmist position now being taken over the Arab-Israeli conflict is a typical example of the preoccupation with the (seemingly) most immediate problems and of the inability to look ahead more than a week or a month at a time.

preconditions for recovery, it is no guarantee of success. The conduct of foreign policy in a democracy is a difficult enterprise in the best of times; Tocqueville in a famous passage noted the obstacles in a democracy to regulating the details of an important undertaking and persevering in a fixed design: a democracy "cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience." The dilemma has become even more acute since Tocqueville's day, for in the past foreign-policy making was conducted by a small elite whereas in recent decades it has been thoroughly democratized.

It is true that the secrets of American foreign policy have always been leaked, from the Jay Treaty with Great Britain onward, but this did not matter much when the wide ocean kindly separated America from the rest of the world; and other countries were not leakproof either. With the emergence of totalitarian dictatorships, the situation has changed. For the last three decades America has been at a constant disadvantage in its dealings with regimes which do not suffer from the conflicting pressures of public opinion, and as the global balance has shifted to the detriment of the free societies, the margin of error has very much narrowed. Ironically, it is precisely at this stage that largely as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, the demand is heard for even less secrecy, less authority, less concentration of power. In the recognition that it may be impossible to combine such "openness" with the successful management of foreign policy, some have candidly suggested that America turn inward and give up its foreign commitments. The idea is not new: in 1939 Bertrand Russell called on his countrymen not to fight Hitler, for, he maintained, they would do so only at the price of becoming fascists themselves. The British fought Hitler, and they did not become fascist. But the one new feature in the present constellation is that democratic regimes no longer face dictatorships from a position of greater strength, and whether in these circumstances they can hold their own is unfortunately an open question.

To survive in the contest democracies need, in addition to a realistic policy, broad popular support for their political objectives, and strong leadership. In America, for some considerable time now, the hands of the Executive have been tied, as Congress has undertaken to interfere in the foreign political process on the tactical level. It is not that members of Congress are less well-informed on world affairs than parliamentarians elsewhere; on the contrary. But foreign political decisions, except those of a general nature, cannot be made and executed by parliaments. Domestic problems, however grave, do not always demand immediate action; there is usually ample time for consultation and debate, and sometimes they go away without any action whatsoever. In the area of foreign affairs and national security, crises tend to

break suddenly, and any failure to deal with them promptly may have the gravest consequences.

The present stalemate between Congress and the Executive cannot possibly continue—it is an invitation to disaster. One can think of various ways of bringing about more effective coordination and consultation: Senator Humphrey has for years proposed the establishment of an overall National Security Committee in Congress on which the chairmen of the most important committees might serve. Or there could be a return to the original, pre-1947 concept of the National Security Council, in which leading members of the two parties were to have been included. In due time a closer working relationship is bound to emerge between Congress and the Executive; one hopes it will not take additional major setbacks to expedite the process.

THE aim of American foreign policy in the difficult years to come ought to be what it should have been all along: striking a balance between the nation's objectives and its power. That America is not omnipotent and cannot possibly extirpate evil everywhere was known even to the late John Foster Dulles, who said so more than once. Well-known too are the facts that the dangers facing America and its allies are not only military in character, that the Communist bloc is not a monolith, that challenges facing the free societies do not all have to do with Communism, that cooperation with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Worlds is preferable to confrontation. These truisms are only of limited help, however; the struggle for political power in Europe and elsewhere will not be played according to democratic ground rules.

Sooner or later America will be asked to come to the help of democratic regimes in trouble: this, after all, is what alliances are about. Many do not like the idea of any sort of active response: why not allow the forces of self-determination to work out their own destiny? The case for extreme laissez-faire liberalism in international politics opens intriguing perspectives if applied to Portugal today and other European countries tomorrow. It will be interesting to watch—from a distance—the forces of self-determination at work once Colonel Qaddafi or President Idi Amin has his nuclear arsenal. Others argue that the U.S. should assist only those countries that can help themselves. This is a sensible rule, but countries capable of helping themselves will for the most part not need American assistance in the first place. Furthermore, such countries will frequently find themselves facing internal and external threats at the same time.

There still persists in politics that curiously naive belief that only corrupt and ineffective governments have reason to fear the future. The truth is that "corrupt" and "ineffective" are not synonyms; a great many corrupt regimes are quite effective, and quite a few "ineffective" regimes

have perished not because they were evil, but on the contrary, because they were less ruthless than their opponents. It is argued that Europe is not Vietnam, which could not be helped in any case because it lacked internal cohesion. True enough, but as Pierre Hassner has rightly noted, Southern Europe today, torn by divergent social and nationalist forces, in fact looks more like the Third World than like the conventional image of Europe. And if Southern Europe today, Western Europe tomorrow. Senator Kennedy, in a recent *Newsweek* interview, commenting on the situation in Portugal, asserted that basically each people has to make its own decisions. Unfortunately, as the case of Portugal has shown, the "people" may not be in a position to make those decisions. What happens then?

According to the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet Union is entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of a country within its sphere of influence, even if this should be against the wish of the great majority of the population. What should America do if an anti-democratic minority seizes power at a time of crisis? Should it let the forces of self-determination assert themselves or should there be a demonstration of solidarity? Hassner maintains that nothing can be done—domestic evolution has to be left to domestic forces. Yet at the same time he stresses the need for an American military counterweight. Counter to what? In Western Europe the new "domestic forces" may no longer be interested in an alliance with America, in fact they may actively oppose it. Alliance would then mean a unilateral offer of protection, and Senator

Mansfield would not be alone in doubting the wisdom of such an enterprise.

ADVERSITY, Francis Bacon observed, is not without its own comfort and hope. The present crisis has already had a sobering effect—in newspapers and periodicals, in Congressional votes and other public forums. A real crisis disposes of pseudo-problems just as a serious disease often does away with hypochondria or a strong wind blows away the cobwebs. Soon it may no longer be necessary to explain that the problem of the West is not the loss of imperial status or of imperial prerogatives, nor even the nationalization of the sardine industry by Portuguese army officers. With the West in retreat, the issue at stake is not the arrogance of power, but the defeatism generated by impotence.

The survival of free societies, including America, is no longer a sure thing. The world is moving from an equilibrium of sorts to a state of anarchy, and in an age of nuclear proliferation it is likely that such a process will lead sooner or later to disaster. These are not apocalyptic visions; unless present trends in world politics are checked and reversed, they are probabilities. The party, in short, is over, though some of the guests may be a little slow in accepting the lateness of the hour. While America lived in a world of her own and was safe from menace it could indulge in a great many luxuries, ranging all the way from complacency to hysteria. Those happy days are gone forever.

Notes on the Constitution

Alexander M. Bickel

I

Two diverging traditions in the mainstream of Western political thought—one “liberal,” the other “conservative”—have competed, and still compete, for control of the democratic process and of the American constitutional system; both have determined the direction of our judicial policy at one time or another.

One of these, the contractarian tradition, began with the moderate common sense of John Locke. It was pursued by Rousseau, and it long ago captured, and substantially retains possession of, the label liberal, although I would contest its title to it. The other tradition can, for lack of a better term, be called Whig in the English 18th-century sense. It is usually called conservative, and I would associate it chiefly with Edmund Burke. This is my own model.

These two traditions—contractarian and Whig—converge in their attitudes toward revolutionary activity. Both, for example, are hostile to any civil disobedience designed to redress grievances that is premised on the iniquity or inutility of the political system—that attacks the entire system rather than flaws within it. But except for this significant but delusive convergence, the two traditions tend to go separate ways.

The liberal contractarian model rests on a vision of individual rights that have a clearly defined, independent existence predating society and are derived from nature and from a natural, if imagined, contract. Society must bend to these rights. As John Rawls, the most recent philosopher of this tradition, says, these rights are lexically prior. They condition everything, and society operates within limits they set. Deduced from premises that cannot be questioned closely, they must themselves be deduced by pure reason.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, who died in November 1974, was Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School, and one of the most eminent authorities on constitutional law of this age. His books included *The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress*, *The Least Dangerous Branch*, and *Politics and the Warren Court*; he was also a frequent contributor of essays on political and social issues to this and other magazines. The present article, drawn from his William C. Devane lectures at Yale in 1973, will appear in somewhat different form in a posthumous volume, *The Morality of Consent*, to be published in September by Yale University Press.

The Whig model, on the other hand, begins not with theoretical rights but with a real society, whose origins in the historical mists it acknowledges to be mysterious. The Whig model assesses human nature as it is seen to be. It judges how readily and how far men can be moved by means other than violent—that is to say, how far they can be moved by government. The values of such a society evolve, but as of any particular moment they are taken as given. Limits are set by culture, by time- and place-bound conditions, and within these limits the task of government informed by the present state of values is to make a peaceable, good, and improving society. That, and not anything that existed prior to society itself and that now exists independently of society, is what men have a right to. The Whig model obviously is flexible, pragmatic, slow-moving, highly political. It partakes, in substantial measure, of the relativism that pervades Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's theory of the First Amendment, although not to its ultimate logical exaggeration. Lacking a catechism of shared values, such as religious societies may cherish, it has no choice but relativism. The alternative is the tyranny of some of us over the others.

Without carrying matters to a logical extreme, indeed without pretense to intellectual valor, and without sanguine spirit, the Whig model rests on a mature skepticism. It places enormous reliance on the political marketplace, which may in some measure be, as Holmes was pleased to say, a marketplace of ideas, but one where ideas and the vote are not the only bargaining units. It is a market that is in continuous, not only quadrennial or biennial, session. As was true even for Holmes, the Whig system is not altogether value-free. The unexamined life, said Socrates, is not worth living. Nor is it bearable. To acknowledge no values at all is to deny a difference between ourselves and other particles that tumble in space. The irreducible value, though not the exclusive one, is the idea of law. Law is more than just another opinion, not because it embodies all right values, or because the values it does embody tend from time to time to reflect those of a majority or plurality, but because it is the value of values. Law is the princi-

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pal institution through which a society can assert its values.

The contractarian model, in contrast, is committed not to law alone, but to a parochial faith in a closely calibrated scale of values. It is moral, principled, legalistic, ultimately authoritarian. It is weak on pragmatism, strong on theory. For it, law is not so much a process, and certainly not a process in continual flux, as it is a body of rules binding all, rules that can be changed only by the same formal method by which they were enacted. The relationship between the individual and government is defined by law, as is the entire public life of the society and, indeed, the society itself. Law has its origins in a contract, an imagined legal transaction. The concept of citizenship is, therefore, central, defining the parties to the original contract and the membership of the society.

This concept of contract was basic to Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney, who wrote the decision of the Supreme Court in the *Dred Scott* case and who was a liberal. It was basic to the Earl Warren Court, which used virtually the same language Taney had used. The repetition was unwitting, but not accidental. For in the contractarian model, citizenship is the relationship between some individuals and the state. The United States would correspond much more closely to the contractarian model today if its constitutional development had taken place under the privileges-and-immunities-of-citizens clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, instead of, as it did, under the due-process and equal-protection clauses. There would have been a more theoretical evolution of abstract rights, tending to the absolute and presumed to have an independent prior existence, rather than the pragmatic development that did occur. Words and concepts, such as those of due process and equal protection, are only words and concepts; to be sure, but they breed attitudes, they tend toward a mind-set, they influence future thought and action.

IN THE political process, majoritarianism is everything for the liberal contractarian. The vote is all important, the franchise must be universally available, absolute equality of the vote and equality of the size of constituencies are essential. Speech must be wholly untrammelled, for it is the engine of the majoritarian political process. A bright line is drawn between speech and conduct, because conduct is not politically significant. It has no part in the formation of law, which is entirely legislative and litigious and depends on speech alone. It is also no accident, then, that the Warren Court loosened those procedural and jurisdictional rules which require concreteness, actuality, and immediacy in the clash between state law and a supposed higher federal law, before permitting litigation of the validity of state law itself. In the political process of self-help that violates the local law in order to

invoke the higher authority (a process invited by the rules that were relaxed by the Warren Court), conduct rather than mere speech is critical. The Warren Court permitted litigation at earlier stages, thus disinviting what the rules have a tendency to invite, disobedience of local law. Do not engage in self-help, the Warren Court was saying: litigate at the earliest possible opportunity. And, otherwise, vote.

Majoritarianism, like the market theory of the First Amendment, presents a dilemma and a paradox in contractarian thought. To use the economist's term, it presents a problem of market definition. A realistic majoritarianism makes sense only in the smallest kind of city-state constituency. The town meeting is the paradigm. James Madison thought that in a small constituency real and coherent and continuous majorities are possible, and that they are dangerous because they are likely to tyrannize the minority. For this reason he thought well of the Union, which enlarged the American constituencies to national size, thus making majorities less coherent. For contractarian theory, this enlargement of the constituency is necessary if reliance is to be placed on majoritarian decisions. After all, what kind of a marketplace of ideas is it if it is restricted to a town meeting in Hamden, Connecticut? Such a small marketplace is unlikely to ventilate all ideas and to make a choice that deserves to be relied on as true or valuable, or that deserves to be enforced. The truth that a handful of people find in their own small marketplace may be their truth; a claim of universal validity for it will be difficult to make, however. And as the constituency is enlarged, majoritarianism steadily loses all reality as a policy-making mechanism. It becomes, as Madison foresaw, one mechanism in the complex system Professor Robert Dahl has described as rule by collections of minorities from time to time.

The First Amendment presents a similar dilemma. As audiences grow into mass audiences, it is more and more difficult to assume that they can be reasoned with, and to assume that in the marketplace of ideas truth will drive out error and good counsel prevail over bad. It is the paradox of liberal contractarian moralism that society must bend to a catechism of principles, hence a moralism not a little infected with authoritarianism. Yet among its principles are egalitarianism, popular sovereignty, and free speech, which can produce outcomes contrary to the authoritarianism the catechism implies. Rousseau resolved this paradox by resort to the notion of a general will, a fundamentally anti-democratic notion. Even so, the approving, indeed enchanted, historian of the Enlightenment, Peter Gay, must allow that Rousseau's ideas, while fine as criticism, "are at best unrealistic and at worst pernicious" as a constructive program. Rousseau, Professor Gay continues, "tells us that freedom and equality, far from being incompati-

ble, are indispensable to each other; that the political public must be absolutely general; and that institutional forms are less important than the moral and social foundations of citizenship. But Rousseau is not the philosopher of the democratic state, which rests on the very tensions that Rousseau wants to abolish."

When the aims of the democratic movement, as Rousseau conceived them, conflicted with majoritarianism and the democratic state, Rousseau escaped, or at least his followers did, into authoritarianism and the anti-democratic state. In our system the liberal contractarian finds his escape in the Constitution, which, speaking through the Supreme Court, limits majority rule. The liberal contractarian sought to end the Vietnam war by urging that the Court declare the war itself unconstitutional. This effort failed, not because the war was not unconstitutional—in my view, President Johnson did exceed his constitutional authority in extending the war—but rather because, as a practical matter, resort to political rather than judicial government seemed the better remedy. The political decision to commit the nation to full-scale war was rejected politically, and the consequence was a strengthening of the process of consent.

In the liberal contractarian view, the limits on majority rule through appeal to the Constitution tend to be absolute, timeless, in response to the resistance of a majority, or even a minority. Most of life is seen in moral rather than prudential terms. None of the pragmatic skepticism so salient in the Whig model infects the Constitution of the contractarian. This was Justice Hugo Black's Constitution, a storehouse of principles, inflexible and numerous. Hugo Black was himself a man of fiercely held principles. He believed in law—pervasive, positive, virtually all-encompassing law—which secured and defined the rights of the citizen and enclosed and regulated his life. He could find no right of privacy in the Constitution at all, and, perfectly consistently, could not accommodate himself or his legal universe to extra-legal political and social action. His vision was of a legalitarian society. He was a judicial activist, quick to regulate what seemed disordered and unruly. He was indeed an imperialist of law, judicial and majoritarian law both, for like Taney, he was also a populist who resolved the tension between legalitarianism and populism by force of will.

Justice Black was, in everything but blood, and for all we know in that, too, a direct lineal descendant of Andrew Jackson, another populist and a great majoritarian democratizer, but who wrote in a letter in 1821: "I have an opinion of my own on all subjects, and when that opinion is formed I pursue it *publicly* regardless of who goes with me." Black could have said as much. Nothing is easier for strong-minded, passionate men, the true believers, who are given, in a phrase of Richard Hofstadter, to "self-assertive subjectivism"—nothing is easier for such men than to attribute their

passionate beliefs to a monolithic abstraction called the People or the Constitution. The Warren Court in its heyday was Hugo Black writ large.

II

SINCE few principles are inscribed sharply in the Constitution itself, the Supreme Court, speaking in the name of the Constitution, fills, in part, the need for "middle-distance" principles of the kind advocated by Edmund Burke in the 18th century. It proffers, with some important exceptions, a series of admonitions, an 18th-century checklist of subjects; it does this cautiously and with some skepticism. It recognizes that principles are necessary, have evolved, and should continue to evolve in the light of history and changing circumstance. That—and not Hugo Black's—is the Constitution as the Framers wrote it. And that is what it must be in a secular democratic society, where the chief reliance for policy-making is placed in the political process.

The Constitution, said Justice Holmes in a famous dissent in 1905, "is made for people of fundamentally differing views." Few definite, comprehensive answers on matters of social and economic policy can be deduced from it. The judges, themselves abstracted from, removed from political institutions by several orders of magnitude, ought never to impose an answer on the society merely because it seems prudent and wise to them personally, or because they believe that an answer—always provisional—arrived at by the political institutions is foolish. The Court's first obligation is to move cautiously, straining for decisions in small compass, more hesitant to deny principles held by some segments of the society than ready to affirm comprehensive ones for all, mindful of the dominant role the political institutions are allowed, and always anxious first to invent compromises and accommodations before declaring firm and unambiguous principles.

Yet in the end, and even if infrequently, we do expect the Court to give us principle, the limits of which can be sensed but not defined and are communicated more as cautions than as rules. The professional explication of principle is disciplined, imposing standards of analytical candor, rigor, and clarity. The Court is to reason, not feel, to explain and justify principles it pronounces to the last possible rational decimal point. It may not itself generate values, out of the stomach, but must seek to relate them—at least analogically—to judgments of history and moral philosophy. We tend to think of the Court as deciding, but more often than not it merely ratifies or, what is even less, does *not* disapprove, or less still, decides not to decide. And even when it does take it upon itself to strike a balance of values, it does so with an ear to the promptings of the past and an eye strained to a vision of the future much more than with close regard to the present. Burke's description of an ev-

olution meets the case: to produce nothing wholly new and retain nothing wholly obsolete. The function is canalized by the adversary process, which limits the occasions of judgment and tends to structure issues and narrow their scope to manageable proportions.

In 1905, when Holmes wrote the *Lochner* dissent, the Justices were grinding out annual answers to social and economic questions on the basis of personal convictions of what was wise—derived, as it happens, from the laissez-faire philosophy of Herbert Spencer. That would not do, Holmes told them, and it did not, although it took thirty years for a majority of the Justices to see it, and Holmes was gone by then. None has re-read Herbert Spencer into the Constitution since, but in the 1960's a majority of the Justices, under Earl Warren, again began to dictate answers to social and sometimes economic problems. The problems were different—not regulation of economic enterprise, not labor relations, but the structure of politics, educational policy, the morals and mores of the society. And the answers were differently derived, not from Spencer's Social Statics, but from fashionable notions of progress. Again, it may take time before the realization comes that this will not do.

ON January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court, paying formal tribute to Holmes's 1905 dissent but violating its spirit, undertook to settle the abortion issue. In place of the various state abortion statutes in controversy and in flux, the Supreme Court prescribed a virtually uniform statute of its own. During the first three months of pregnancy, the Court decreed, a woman and her physician may decide on an abortion quite free of any interference by the state, except as the state requires the physician to be licensed; during the second three months the state may impose health regulations, but not forbid abortion; during the last three months, the state may if it chooses forbid as well as regulate. That may be a wise model statute, although there is considerable question why the Court foreclosed state regulation of the places where the abortion is to be performed. The state regulates and licenses restaurants and pool halls and Turkish baths and God knows what else in order to protect the public; why may it not similarly regulate and license abortion clinics, or doctors' offices where abortions are to be performed?

But if the Court's model statute is generally intelligent, what is the justification for its imposition? If this statute, why not one on proper grounds of divorce, or on adoption of children? Medical evidence, the Court tells us now, shows that abortions during the first three months of pregnancy present no great risk. Well and good. It is also clear that the fetus is not a life in being at the early stages of pregnancy, is not entitled to constitutional protection, and the Constitution

cannot be construed to forbid abortion. Well and good again. But the fetus is a potential life, and the Court acknowledges that society has a legitimate interest in it. So has the individual—the mother, and one would suppose also the father; an interest that may be characterized as a claim to personal privacy, which in some contexts the Constitution has been found to protect. The individual's interest, here, overrides society's interest in the first three months and, subject only to health regulations, also in the second; in the third trimester, society is preeminent.

One is left to ask, why? The Court never said. It refused the discipline to which its function is properly subject. It simply asserted the result it reached. That is all the Court could do because moral philosophy, logic, reason, or other materials of law can give no answer. If medical considerations only were involved, a satisfactory rational answer might be arrived at. But, as the Court acknowledged, they are not. Should not the question then have been left to the political process, which in state after state can achieve not one but many accommodations, adjusting them from time to time as attitudes change? It is astonishing that only two dissented from the Court's decision, although Justice Potter Stewart noted in his agreement, presumably with some discomfort, that the decision joined the long line of earlier cases imposing judicially-made social policy to which Holmes had objected. The dissenters were Justices Byron White and William Rehnquist. The Court's decision was an "extravagant exercise" of judicial power, said Justice White; it was a legislative rather than judicial action, suggested Justice Rehnquist. So it was, and if the Court's guess on the probable and desirable direction of progress is wrong, that guess will nevertheless have been imposed on all fifty states.

Normal legislation, enacted by legislatures, not judges, is happily less rigid and less presumptuous in claims to universality and permanence. The claim to universality and premanence is illusory in any case, for the ongoing political process which follows upon the declaration of law is another discipline the Court is subject to. Yet the Court is not excused in transgressing all limits, in refusing its own prior discipline, for in its initial process of law formation the Court is not under the discipline of the political process. Neither the Court nor its principles directly originate there. The discipline is subsequent.

Such is the Court's function under the Constitution of open texture, as it is aptly called. There is another Constitution as well; I will call it the manifest Constitution; it is the Constitution of structure and process, not of due process or equal protection, and certainly not of metaphysical privileges and immunities. More theory has to be poured into it than can be extracted; it is the Constitution of the mechanics of institutional arrangements and of the political process, of power allocation.

tion and the division of powers, and the historically defined hard core of procedural provisions, found chiefly in the Bill of Rights. These hard-core provisions, as Felix Frankfurter once wrote, have a relative "definiteness of terms" and "definiteness of history," derived from the specific grievances the Framers meant to redress. In establishing the power of judicial review in 1803, in *Marbury v. Madison*, vesting the Supreme Court with value-definition exercised in the name of the Constitution, John Marshall spoke of the Constitution as law, and reasoned that when it is properly invoked before them in a case, judges must enforce it. He spoke as if most of it were manifest, and suggested later that where it is open-textured it confers little if any power on judges.

Matters have turned out quite the other way around. The judges have little to do with the manifest Constitution; they chiefly exercise power by invoking its open texture. But Marshall was right in his view that the manifest Constitution is law, and a special kind of law at that, imposing a duty to obey of the sort that does not definitely attach, except broadly, in the aggregate, to other general law in our system, and imposing it most particularly on all officers of government, state and federal, who by Article VI are oath-bound to support the Constitution.

THERE is a moral duty, and there ought to be, for those to whom it is applicable—most often, officers of government—to obey the manifest Constitution, unless and until it is altered by the amendment process it itself pro-

vides for, a duty analogous to the duty to obey final judicial decrees. No President may decide to stay in office for a term of six years rather than four, or, since the Twenty-second Amendment, to run for a third term. There is an absolute duty to obey; to disobey is to deny the idea of constitutionalism, that special kind of law which establishes a set of preexisting rules within which society works out all its other rules from time to time. To deny this idea is in the most fundamental sense to deny the idea of law itself.

The liberal contractarian tradition, as Justice Black represented it, posits a duty to obey judicial decrees, and beyond that a duty to obey the manifest Constitution; and a further duty to obey the general law the Court makes in the open texture. And yet the manifest Constitution presents problems, just as popular sovereignty does in its way. For the contractarian liberal is a moralist, and the moralist will find it difficult to sacrifice his aims in favor of structure and process, to sacrifice substance for form. Yet process and form, which is the embodiment of process, are the essence of the theory and practice of constitutionalism.

I have shared, and do share, the tendency of the liberal imagination to respect the moral claims of justice against the status quo. Yet I insist more strongly, even passionately, quite as if I were talking about justice, on a politics of the computing principle, which Burke urged upon us. It seems to me to make everything else possible. Without it, in the stark universe of imperatives, in the politics of ideal promises and inevitable betrayals, justice is not merely imperfect, as under the computing principle, but soon becomes injustice.

Manners & the Jewish Intellectual

Robert Alter

JEWISH historical experience involves such an abundance of anomalies that when it has not elicited resentment or suspicion it has repeatedly teased observers into thought, or at least conjecture. One of the most provocative of these anomalies is the disproportionate role modern Jews have played in creating radically new conceptual systems for political thought, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and the natural sciences as well. All sorts of explanations have been proposed for this unseemly prominence of Jews among the pioneers of modern thought. Most frequently it is asserted—with a special eye to Marx and perhaps to Trotsky—that these various analytic achievements are modern expressions of classic Jewish messianism, the age-old prophetic impulse manifesting itself in “redemptive” systems of powerfully unitary thought, sometimes geared for political implementation, in which there is no longer any ultimate distinction between Gentile and Jew, rich and poor, perhaps not even between civilized and primitive. A special variant of the messianic construction is George Steiner’s notion that the Jews of modernity preserve a special vocation for universalism through their continued attachment to vulnerable homelessness: by resisting the blandishments of nationalism, the narcotic aromas of geographical hearth and home, the Jewish protagonists of that radical modern intellectual activity radiating out of *Mittel Europa* managed to see sharply for all mankind.

On a less lofty level, Ernest van den Haag, a sympathetic outside observer, has actually proposed a genetic explanation. If Jews, he argues, at least according to the statistical measures of highest achievement, seem to be smarter than other people, this is for good historical reasons: medieval Christian society tended to channel its best minds into the clergy, where one was enjoined to remain celibate and so, inevitably, childless, while the intellectually impoverished masses of the laity went on breeding like rabbits. Traditional Jewish society, on the contrary, repeatedly rewarded male intellectual achievement with socially advantageous marriages, so that the best minds were in materially favored circumstances to reproduce themselves and thus constantly enrich the intellectual resources of the national genetic pool.

With a more minutely informed sense of the complex historical issues than is evinced by any of these proposed explanations, J. L. Talmon, in *Israel Among the Nations*, combines the messianic view with a sociological one. The immediate object of his analysis is the prominence of Jews in the vanguard of 19th-century European socialism, but the succinctly comprehensive terms in which he defines the post-Emancipation ambience have obvious relevance to other kinds of intellectual endeavor by Jews, and are worth keeping in mind as a general frame of reference for this whole problem:

No other group, not even the uprooted villagers who flocked into the rapidly growing industrial centers, underwent a more thorough break with their former mode of existence than Jews, almost suddenly cut off from their ancestral faith, unique style of life, communal cohesion and isolation, and pariah status. Nothing existing could any longer be taken for granted. Everything seemed provisional, a preparation for the real thing to come. Ready as it were to absorb all these complex feelings of malaise, expectation, hope, and zeal was the ancient messianic disposition.

Now John Murray Cuddihy, in *The Ordeal of Civility*,* proposes a strenuous revision of all prevalent understandings about why and how Jews have contributed to the modern intellectual enterprise. In a sense, Cuddihy’s view is that of the passage from Talmon without the last two sentences, but he pursues the large implications of his sociological argument inexorably and, on occasion, with a weird inventiveness, and the articulations of his position deserve some attention. In any case, Cuddihy raises troubling questions about the tenor and direction of modern Jewish intellectual achievement which cannot be lightly dismissed, and his book clearly has been taken seriously in some circles, as its nomination for a National Book Award would suggest.

The Ordeal of Civility is essentially a study of European Jewish intellectuals in the long, socially ambiguous aftermath of Emancipation that

* *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity*, Basic Books, 272 pp., \$11.95.

continued, as Cuddihy sees it, throughout the 19th century and down into our own. The book attempts to define virtually all intellectual activity by modernizing Jews, however varied the conceptual vocabularies developed or the objects for which they were developed, as expressions of the same underlying historical mechanism. That mechanism, in broadest terms, is the effort on the part of emancipating Jews to mitigate an abiding sense of their own freakishness in the alien new society by articulating a vision of reality that would somehow justify their strangeness—perhaps most often, by projecting it on society at large or mankind in general. Cuddihy argues that this mechanism operates with equal force in explicitly Jewish movements like Zionism, Reform Judaism, the Hebrew Enlightenment, and in the thought of seemingly “non-Jewish” Jews like Marx, Freud, and Lévi-Strauss.

After briefly laying down the premises of historical sociology that lead him to this view of modern Jewry (and ex-Jewry), Cuddihy goes on to a detailed examination of Freudian theory—with special emphasis on *The Interpretation of Dreams*—as a product of Freud’s supposedly transitional location between an old Jewish society recalled with mingled nostalgia and shame and a new Gentile society in which as a Jew he somehow could never fully take root. Much briefer sections of the book then endeavor to explain the systems of Marx and Lévi-Strauss in similar terms, with brief passing references to a variety of other modern Jewish intellectuals from Durkheim to Hannah Arendt. The concluding third of the book recapitulates the argument by applying its paradigm for modern Jewish social history—the details of which I shall consider presently—to some contemporary American situations involving Jews and Irish, Jews and blacks, and American Jews of German extraction vis-à-vis those of East European origin.

LET me begin with what seems soundest in *The Ordeal of Civility*. Impelled by an inexhaustible scholarly fascination with the Jews, Cuddihy has worked up his historical subject with impressive thoroughness, at least to the limits of what is available in English. If he has an irksome propensity to flaunt his expertise by constantly dropping Yiddish and Hebrew terms, it must be conceded that he makes only occasional and minor slips in usage, and he has a firm grip on most of the facts, even some relatively obscure ones, of recent Jewish history. Interpretation of the facts, of course, is another matter, but the one central aspect of modern Jewish experience that Cuddihy understands keenly is its prolonged malaise of social self-consciousness.

Jewish intellectuals after the so-called Emancipation, suddenly discovering themselves in that unfamiliar realm where “nothing existing could any longer be taken for granted,” tend to be

painfully nervous about themselves, how they will appear in Gentile eyes, to what extent their behavior will be associated with the obscurantism of their forebears or the vulgarities of the new Jewish bourgeoisie. *The Ordeal of Civility* is on surest ground when it applies this predicament to primarily sociological situations, as in its description of the clash between Abbie Hoffman and Judge Julius Hoffman, in the famous Chicago trial of a few years ago, as a kind of Jewish sociodrama. Cuddihy is also quite right in stressing the ideological character of modern Jewish existence, and in seeing these new Jewish ideologies as varying attempts to heal the breach of divided consciousness by a programmatic redefinition of Jewishness in universalist, or at least European, terms, though one must surely question his tendency to assume that all forms of social thought by modern Jews are implicitly ideological. In any case, he is finely attuned to the apologetic strain that unfortunately has played such a prominent role in modern Jewish consciousness, and the one valuable insight of his book is his sense of the double message of Jewish ideologies, simultaneously directed to the resented or rejected group of origin and to the larger Gentile society, a society consciously admired but often even more resented, for different reasons. A passage at the very beginning of Cuddihy’s study nicely defines these ambiguous contexts of communication, though I shall later argue against his unqualified inclusion as Jewish ideologies of systems of thought that are not explicit programs for collective Jewish existence:

The ideologies of the post-Emancipation era—Marxism, Freudianism, *Haskalah*, Reform Judaism—have a double audience: on the one hand, they have “designs” on their Jewish audience, which they wish to change, enlighten, or reform; but, on the other hand, they constitute an elaborate effort at apologetics, addressed to the “Gentile of good will” and designed to reinterpret, excuse, or explain to him the otherwise questionable public “look” of emancipating Jewry: secular Jewish intellectual ideologies are exercises in anti-defamation, addresses in defense of Jewry to the cultured among its despisers.

Emancipating Jewry, in Cuddihy’s view, is bound to have a questionable public look because the public sphere of modern Western society is governed by a system of civility basically alien to the Jews of the ghettos and the *shtetlach*. Cuddihy considers civility the hallmark of modernization. As Europe moved from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, from organic communities to merely functionally connected societies of strangers in the new urban, industrializing centers, a code of civility was developed that made it possible to deal with strangers routinely, lubricating the innumerable friction points of the social machine in the absence of organic bonds among people. Cuddihy recognizes that the pangs of

transition from the old social order to the new were part of a general pattern of European history in the 18th and 19th centuries—he cites the archetypal figure of the Young Man from the Provinces in the European novel of this period as an illustration—but he plausibly argues that the transition was more sudden, more acute, for Jews than for others. Indeed, he might have pointed out more clearly than he does that for Jews the process of transition could never be complete because Gentile society never entirely accepted them—Balzac's ex-provincial Rastignac could make himself a perfect Parisian, but about Proust's Swann, however accomplished a denizen of the polite world he may be, there lingers a suspicion of otherness.

Cuddihy's general thesis, then, is that the Jews, in their sudden eruption from the coarse, noisy, affectionate *Gemeinschaft* of their little villages in the Pale of Settlement and the Central European hinterlands, encountered an elaborate etiquette they could not easily assimilate, and as a result the exposure or undermining of civility became a major impulse of Jewish thought. Thus Marx would discover crude profit motives behind the most complex social arrangements, Freud would find profoundly asocial drives to instinctual gratification beneath all masks of civility, and, most recently, Lévi-Strauss would translate the primal social opposition between Jew and Christian into a universal system of binary oppositions between nature and culture, raw and cooked, night and day, and celebrate savage thought at the expense of the European code of civility.

TO BEGIN with, there is something partly askew in Cuddihy's perception of the Jewish social backgrounds of Emancipation, and this in turn leads to considerable distortion when he comes to discuss the thinkers whose parents or grandparents came out of the distinctive milieus of Jewry on the threshold of modernization. At first, he draws the proper distinction between ghetto and *shtetl*, but as he proceeds, for the clear convenience of his own argument, he speaks more and more as though the *shtetl* were the universal social unit for pre-modern Jews. The term ghetto itself, though this is hardly Cuddihy's fault, is a little misleading, since it immediately conjures up images of sequestration within walls, while in many large European towns and cities there was simply a Jewish quarter, or, in some Central and Eastern European cases, the general population was itself predominantly Jewish. As far as demographic patterns can be reconstructed, it would seem that the majority of pre-Emancipation Jews in Europe lived in urban areas, not in little villages. Thus the kingdom of Poland, whose Jewish community had the highest percentage in the world of rural Jews, lists over two-thirds of the total Jewish population in the census of 1764 as at least nominally

urban. By the census of 1790, the Jews of the kingdom, though only about 9 per cent of the general Polish population of nine million, outnumbered Christians in total urban population.

Now, if one tries to think concretely on the basis of the documentation we have about the actual life-patterns of these 18th-century urban Jews, it becomes evident that they had self-governing institutions, social hierarchies, clear class divisions, and a prescriptive code of behavior adjusted to rank and occasion. (The separation between public and private demeanor, one might note, is supposed to be a distinguishing criterion of *Gesellschaft*.) Perhaps we have all heard too many anecdotes about Rothschild and the *schmorrer*, but in point of fact an ordinary Jewish poor man would, say, no more dream of addressing a prosperous householder without the honorific *reb* than a Parisian drayman would think of addressing a proper bourgeois without the *monsieur*. The point, then, is not that the very idea of civility was alien to early modern Jews, as Cuddihy repeatedly insists, but that many of them had grown up with a code of civility different in its particulars from the one prevailing in Gentile society.

Cuddihy, by virtually equating pre-modern Jewish existence with the *shtetl*, is able to exaggerate the admittedly sharp transition of Emancipation and thus to set the stage for his presentation of modern Jewish thought as a ferocious assault on the whole system of civility. Traditional Jewish culture, we are asked to believe, was "tribal rather than civil." I should hate to think that social scientists use terms of classification even more carelessly than do literary critics, but it is certainly hard to imagine a meaningful sense in which Jewish culture could be called tribal any time during the last two thousand years, *shtetlach* included. Altogether, behind the sociologically descriptive language with which Cuddihy tries to characterize the *shtetl* one detects a sharp ambivalence in his actual feelings about pre-modern Jewish life. On the one hand, he repeatedly echoes the title and the rather simplified substance of Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog's *Life Is with People*, celebrating the proverbial "warmth" of *shtetl* life, all that teeming, endearingly untidy humanity happily innocent of the cleavages and pretenses of polite societies. On the other hand, he continually speaks of the *shtetl* as the antithesis of civilization in all senses of the word: it is the Jew's memories of the *shtetl* that tie him to a world of raw, primitive feeling, of lack of restraint in every public sphere, a world without social or aesthetic differentiation. The peculiar polarity of Cuddihy's ostensibly descriptive terms explains a good deal, I think, of the extremeness of his views on the nature of Jewish intellectual achievement.

The attitudinal warp of Cuddihy's thinking (to which I shall return) is reinforced by its conceptual woof, which is strung out with the crudest

thread of sociological reductionism imaginable. Again and again, he willfully, extravagantly confuses the edge of social malaise in modern Jewish consciousness with the center of intellectual perception. One would of course not want to deny a connection between social situation and intellectual activity, but Cuddihy requires a relation of total causality. The cognitive structures erected by Marx, Durkheim, Freud, Lévi-Strauss, and others, which we like to think have contributed to our understanding of man and history, are in his view merely camouflaged reactions to the disturbing social situation of Jews after the Emancipation. The "recoil from the vulgarity of their own Jewish community" is, quite simply, "the covert root of the social and literary creativity of Diaspora intellectuals." Everything in the thought of these intellectuals can be translated back into the primary language of social disturbance out of which the thinking is projected as a kind of complex code. Cuddihy, then, quickly disposes of dialectical materialism: "The *Ostjude* [that is, from the German point of view, the crude East European Jew] becomes for Marx his *Unterbau*, his substructure. All the rest is 'propriety' (i.e., bourgeois social and legal 'formalism')." Psychoanalysis is just as easily explained: "In Freud's 'science,' the social troubles of a modernizing Jewry receive a self-enhancing cognitive gloss: social malaise becomes a medical symptom, offenses become defenses, *kvetches* become hysterical complaints, *tsuris* becomes [sic] basic anxiety, social shame becomes moral guilt. . . ; to be badly behaved is to be mentally ill." And, as we have already noted, the system of basic polarities of structural anthropology is imagined as an elaborate mask for the primary opposition between uncouth *shtetl* Jew and civil Gentile.

Cuddihy's habit of running all products of thought and art through his sociological meat-grinder leads him at times to truly comic misconceptions. Thus, he believes that Joyce created the stream of consciousness as "a technique of deliberate vulgarity" in order to assault the oppressive civility of the Protestant bourgeois novel on behalf of the *gemeinschaftliche* Irish. "Joyce and his Dubliners, like Freud and his *shtetl* Jews, coming 'from behind' in the 19th century, had to make 'a wilderness in the clearing' of bourgeois-Christian respectability so that their Irish and Jews could breathe." The syntactical confusion of the last clause reflects a real inability to make distinctions in the attempt to see connections, and the writer seems oblivious to the aesthetic fanaticism with which Joyce cultivated an elitist art-novel, to the literary sources of Joyce's technique, to the Irish writer's actual relationship to his native community and to European culture.

THE subtitle of this book makes larger claims for its scope than the actual contents warrant. Half the length of the book is

devoted to Freud. There are about thirty pages on Marx, mostly concerned with his early essay on censorship and his article, "On the Jewish Question," and no serious engagement with the complexities of Marx's theory of history is attempted. There are only ten, vague pages on Lévi-Strauss. The final third of the book is stitched together from topical bits and pieces that reiterate the general argument but scarcely amplify it. (Ominously, toward the end the author informs us in a footnote that this volume is only a "fragment" of an encyclopedic work in progress that will deal with "Kafka, Wittengstein, Hannah Arendt, and others.") *The Ordeal of Civility*, then, is really an essay on Freud and the modern Jewish condition, and it is as such that its validity must be assessed.

It has long been known that Freud was deeply divided in his feelings about his own Jewishness.* He was, of course, a member of the Vienna Lodge of the B'nai B'rith, to whom he publicly affirmed his sense of Jewish solidarity and the Jewish source of his sense of intellectual freedom in a famous 1926 letter. He also agreed to serve as a trustee of the Hebrew University, despite his decided lack of sympathy with the Zionist cause. On the other hand, he was acutely sensitive to what he liked to imagine as the failure of the Christian world to recognize his achievement adequately, and he was very apprehensive that psychoanalysis might be thought of as a "Jewish science" (hence, for example, his particular distress over the defection of Jung). His animus against the theological assumptions of Jewish tradition emerged clearly in the book that preoccupied him during the last years, *Moses and Monotheism*, in which he stood historical logic on its head in order to make Moses (with whom he obviously identified) an Egyptian and to imagine Moses the victim of a primal-horde murder by the Jews.

In Cuddihy's version, Freud's strong ambivalence about Jewish identity is set into a somewhat unreal historical perspective by the insistence on his personal connection with the *shtetl*, on the supposed fact that "Freud came out of the Jewish Middle Ages." Freud was born in Moravian Freiberg, a Catholic town of 5,000 in which there were about 100 Jews (hardly a *shtetl*!), the son of an already Germanized Jewish textile merchant who had abandoned the religious observance of his own father. The future founder of psychoanalysis was four when the family moved to Vienna, the cosmopolitan center in which he grew up and spent almost all of his subsequent life. On these facts alone, not to speak of the relaxed way Freud

* Two new, opposing statements on Freud's ambivalence as a Jew, neither of them remarkably satisfactory, by Léon Vogel and Robert Gordis, appear in the Spring 1975 issue of *Judaism*. See also the essay by Phillip Isenberg and Stanley Rothman, "Freud and Jewish Marginality," in the December 1974 *Encounter*.

alludes to traditional Jewish life and practices in the anecdotal material from it that he occasionally draws on, it is hard to see how he could have been obsessed with the uncouth *shtetl* Jew, before all other intellectual or emotional considerations, as Cuddihy repeatedly claims.

In the relentless perspective of *The Ordeal of Civility*, however, Freud's great turn-of-the-century work, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, is not to be thought of as a pioneering exploration of the dynamics of the unconscious and its relation to consciousness, but rather as a veiled document of Jewish Emancipation. What is really behind Freud's pretended penetration into the murky realm of primordial desires and the weird mechanics of dream censorship is simply this: "As the unruly wish can fulfill itself only in the form of a disguised dream, so the *Ostjude* is not admissible into the civil society of the Gentile unless he submits to social censorship, disguising his unruly importunity in socially acceptable ways." Given such an assertion, it is easy enough to imagine how Cuddihy accounts for all the major positions of Freudian theory and practice. The "id" is nothing more than a psychologized, internalized version of the "Yid," the crude *shtetl* Jew thrust against the restrictions of Christian civility (it is characteristic of Cuddihy that he should repeatedly stress this execrable pun, in defiance of the obvious fact that for Freud the id was *das Es*, and so had no rhyming association with Yid). The Oedipus complex itself is only an ostensibly psychological "defense" against deep social shame in Freud: when he was twelve or so, he was shocked by a story his father told him of once having meekly submitted to public humiliation by a Christian; in the Oedipus story, a young man is insulted in a public place, a crossroads, by a stranger (it is his father) and promptly responds by killing the man and his whole entourage. Thus Freud focuses hostility toward his father caused by his father's social cowardice and at the same time translates Jewish social shame into universal guilt. The psychoanalytic situation, finally, was invented chiefly to serve as a social situation in which the restraints of civility could be cast off, "in which Viennese Jewry—and other 'honorary Jews'—could legitimately desubliminate (de-Westernize) and regress to their premodern 'ids.'" The general rule is that "Freud and his descendants habitually extrapolate from the Eastern European Jewish case to 'man in general,'" a sweeping conclusion that ultimately questions the intrinsic validity of any system of thought conceived by a Jew in the past century and a half.

THE reception that *The Ordeal of Civility* seems to have found in some quarters is particularly distressing because a little reflection will suggest that the book is not merely misguided—it is an extended exercise in intellectual demagoguery. Everything Cuddihy

says is based on the entirely unexamined assumption that social factors are invariably the primary ones, and that thinking can therefore always be confidently construed as a "translation" of social concerns. But by this point in intellectual history, it seems evident enough that the first formative contexts of every individual life are not differentiated social systems but the immediate relation of the child with parents and siblings—one does not have to be a "Freudian," and Freud himself hardly needed to be a Jew, to make this observation—and on these grounds alone one wonders why social considerations should have such a priori primacy.

The general shoddiness of Cuddihy's method of reasoning is vividly illustrated by his interpretation of the analytic situation as a special social contrivance to escape temporarily from Gentile civility. Assuming psychoanalysis to be a device to fulfill specific Jewish social needs, he must casually dismiss all Gentile analysts as "honorary Jews," and then he can go on to claim that the so-called "desublimation" of the analytic process was merely a strategy for escaping back to the inner ease of the pre-Emancipation Jewish self.

What makes this—and, indeed, the whole argument on Freud—utter nonsense is the obvious fact that the supposed *Gemeinschaft* of the *shtetl* was a society with an extraordinarily elaborate system of repressions, un-Western being anything but unsublimated. In fact, civil society, which divides public and private behavior, allows for certain releases from sexual prohibition that organic communities do not: the proper Viennese or Parisian banker or lawyer could practice public probity and private permissiveness, maintaining the civil appearances of a *mariage de convenance* while keeping a compliant mistress on one side for the gratification of his polymorphous fancy. The more one examines the equation between id and premodern Jew, the more it seems devoid of historical meaning, nothing more than a dubious rhetorical stratagem. Correspondingly, one is more and more puzzled about why Cuddihy should have such difficulty imagining how Freud, as a member of Austrian and European society, could have observed the obtrusive mechanisms of repression operating all around him, in Christian and Jew, and arrived at his conclusions, without special reference to the world of his grandfather's culture.

When Freud initiated a whole revolution in thought with the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams*—and it is, I would contend, a revolution through which we are still living, even if some of what he said now seems wildly wrong—was he impelled by distinctively Jewish motives, directed by any specifically Jewish assumptions? Certainly not on the basis of the material he discusses, or the view of the psyche and its relation to society that emerges from the discussions. It may be, as Freud himself later claimed, that he

could exercise a certain freedom of critical inquiry into first principles as a post-traditional member of the people that in a sense came to European society from without. Many others have emphasized basically the same idea in insisting on the marginality of the European Jewish intellectual as the source of his fresh critical perspective on things, and there must surely be some validity in the notion, though its very generality keeps the argument from advancing very far. My own suspicion is that the most Jewish feature of *The Interpretation of Dreams* is its method, which is, of course, tireless exegesis.

Clearly, one does not want to make a "talmudic mind" out of Freud, any more than one should assent to the fanciful commentators who have sought to make him a kabbalist. What I am proposing is that in the background of certain highly acculturated European Jews, like Freud, Kafka, and Walter Benjamin, some of the fundamental Jewish categories for organizing or approaching experience—revelation, law, exegesis, tradition—remained available as general ideas, even sometimes exerted a force of historical momentum, pushing toward their application in post-traditional contexts.

Freud, one might observe, does not merely interpret dreams but establishes texts for the dreams which can then be expounded, and argues for the psychological authority of the minute verbal formulations of the texts. The structure of meaning in dreams as he sees it is strikingly analogous to the structure of meaning in the written revelation as Jewish tradition conceived it. Under scrutiny, everything turns out to be ramified interconnection, every statement links with every other. Meaning is ubiquitous, equally crucial at all points; nothing in the text is trivial, and perhaps least what may seem so. Meaning, in fact, is always multiple (Freud's "overdetermination" and the Torah's Seventy Facets), being virtually inexhaustible in the case of dream-texts, literally inexhaustible in the text of the Law. There is a prior guarantee of the validity of exegesis—in the case of tradition, because Divinity chooses to make aspects of its infinite meanings accessible to man; in dream interpretation, because the process of free association is bound to have meaningful connections, however unexpected, with the unconscious. In both systems, the primary materials of knowledge belong to a formative period in the past, and dreams, like the concatenation of Jewish tradition, impel us toward a future which, ideally, would be a perfect reenactment of the past.

For an illuminating account of Freud's methodological assumptions in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, one might usefully consult Gershom Scholem's remarkable essay, "Tradition and Commentary as Religious Categories in Judaism," in *The Messianic Idea*. Much of what Scholem says about the operation of traditional exegesis could

be applied directly to Freud with hardly an adjustment of terms. Thus: "The meaning of revelation unfolds in historical time—but only because everything that can come to be known has already been deposited in a timeless substratum." Or, again, a description of the operation of exegesis on the material of this substratum which exactly parallels Freud's characterization of what dreamwork does with unconscious material: "What had originally been believed to be consistent, unified, and self-enclosed now becomes diversified, multifold, and full of contradictions." *The Interpretation of Dreams* bears an epigraph from Virgil—*Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo*, "If I cannot bend the Higher Powers, I shall move the Infernal Regions"—and one is tempted to read it in a different sense from the one Freud intended, as a comment on his own work as exegete: if I cannot believe in interpreting a Revelation from above, I will become master of the revelation from below, using the same assumptions of endless commentary.

ALL this is, necessarily, conjectural. The clearest thing about *The Interpretation of Dreams* is that it is one of the great modern documents of radical critique and self-discovery. The commitment to a hazardous pursuit of self-knowledge is a general bias of Western culture (there is nothing quite like it in Jewish tradition) that begins, at least programmatically, with Socrates, emerges signally in Augustine, Montaigne (of whom Freud is at times surprisingly reminiscent), and Rousseau. It is with these Western and modern contexts in mind that I should like to mention the most suspect assertion Cuddihy makes about Freud and the other Jewish thinkers he discusses: that the motive force of their intellectual effort was *ressentiment*, "the vindictive objectivity of the marginal non-member," and that therefore their thought was a punitive assault on Christian civil society. In the case of Freud, we are asked to believe, this vindictiveness chiefly expresses itself in the notion that, above all else, the truth must be shocking—hence Freud's polemical emphasis on sexuality.

Now surely one of the hallmarks of the whole adversary culture of intellectual modernism has been a general sense that the truth must be shocking, that all conceptual and imaginative means must be marshaled to destroy the "specious good" of bourgeois society (the phrase is from Lionel Trilling's *Beyond Culture*, which provides an admirable overview of modernism as an activity of radical moral critique). In dropping so many Jewish names, Cuddihy seems to have forgotten about Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Baudelaire, Conrad, Mann, Lawrence, or about the Diderot of *Rameau's Nephew*, who, without the benefit of *shtetl* ancestry, had his protagonist assert that it was every man's secret wish to kill his father and sleep with his own mother. The broad intel-

lectual movement of modernism, with its various explorations of prohibited sexuality, violence, scatology, drugs, its anti-Christian, neo-pagan, and anti-rationalist voices, must seem profoundly subversive from the standpoint of any established Western social order. Cuddihy's sleight-of-hand trick is to focus on a few seminal social thinkers of Jewish origin within this much larger movement and so to give the impression that the subversiveness of modernism was foisted on intellectuals everywhere by the Jews, who repeatedly argued out of the resentment of their own special social predicament as though they were describing man in general. I do not presume to know Cuddihy's motives, which may well be associated with a kind of uneasy admiration of Jewish intellectuality. But whatever his conscious intentions, the clear tendency of his historical exposition is to represent Jewish social thought as inherently meretricious, disruptive, vindictive, twisting and

breaking the civil body of Christian society on the Procrustean bed of Jewish social distress.

It is, of course, quite plausible that the work of every innovative thinker is given impetus, direction, and covert emphasis by his social background; but the reduction of thought to a pure reflex of social interests ultimately implies a reactionary anti-intellectualism—for it denies the possibility of a real intellectual community freed from the bias of creed, race, and class. *The Ordeal of Civility*, in the very effort to advance the discussion of Jewish intellectuality, turns it back in the end to a point where the author himself might not have wanted it to go. The contexts of thought surely have their importance, but when a tendentious stress on context flattens and distorts the complexities of the texts themselves, the supposed intellectual historian subverts his own subject by wilfully ignoring the force of original intellect at work.

Looking Back at "The Waste Land"

Jack Richardson

IN his preface to the publication of a facsimile and transcript of the original drafts of *The Waste Land*,* Ezra Pound described the manuscript's history of disappearance and secret acquisition as "pure Henry James." To those who thought of T. S. Eliot's poem as a sacred text, however, such an image of purloined letters and literary intrigue must have seemed inadequate to the occasion, as if the discovery of the original Decalogue tablets—with deleted Commandments and lapidary criticisms by Moses—were to be considered merely as a piece of archaeological good fortune. Certainly for the generation of which I'm a member, and which inherited *The Waste Land* after its new conventions had overcome almost all serious critical resistance, the poem had the quality of a holy utterance, a mystical exhalation of language meant to be divined and glossed by those who aspired to that fastidious despair which, in the early 50's, was an indubitable mark of cultural grace. The notion that such a touchstone of modernism was ever in a rough, working stage, or that Pound had earned the epithet "*il miglior fabbro*" from Eliot by scarring the Ur-Manuscript with long lines of excision and waggish comments on the nature of the poem's prosody, would have seemed incredible to those young men and women who carried everywhere their tarot packs and shorter *Golden Bough*.

Of course, this is not to say that the postwar Waste Landers believed good poetry was the result of rushes of high feeling, or that a

poem is traduced by post-inspirational tidying. They belonged, after all, to the age of the New Criticism, the era of carefully constructed ambiguities and precise objective correlatives. The wry, *sotto voce* style was in vogue, and, constrained by an ironic classicism, the poetic vision abandoned its shimmerings and intimations of private worlds and became subtle and subdued expression, the goal of which occasionally seemed to be an exquisitely-crafted reticence.

The poet, it was everywhere said, was a maker, a highly conscious artificer who worked steadily and soberly to perfect the details of his art. Patient, unromantic labor rather than random creative spasms was thought the proper matrix of poetry, and such lines as Coleridge's

Whene'er the mist, which stands
'twixt God and thee
Defecates to a pure transparency

epitomized the grotesque result of trusting in the sort of revelatory moment they praised. In those years of nuance and qualified emotion, the young poet's greatest concern was to keep from being beguiled into making a fool of himself, and whenever he felt a luminous defecation coming on, he generally restored himself with large doses of doctoral research.

And yet, underneath these modest and meticulous poetics lay assumptions about art that were curiously religious, and that fostered theories of poetry as a liturgy for the elect. Indeed, the wilful resistance to easy understanding became the modern poet's obligation of faith, the way through which he protected his art from vulgar and sentimental exegeses—which is

to say from secularization. "Wilful" and "easy" are the important words, since the first distinguishes the hermetic from the vague, the secret of poetic ritual from the haziness of private afflatus; while the second implies that appreciation of a poem demands devotional labor as well as a sympathetic imagination.

The Waste Land was, of course, the manifesto of this poetic attitude, a masterpiece of complex, designed language that transpired, so its votaries insisted, a precise image of the world for those prepared to earn initiation into its secrets. Such an achievement was hard to think of in terms of plan and accident, or as an outgrowth of personal experience and editorial afterthought. To those who knew the identity of the Fisher King and the location of the Chapel Perilous, *The Waste Land* was an articulated *Zeitgeist* whose origins must have transcended ordinary poetic principles.

My own feelings about the poem were not so strong as those I've been describing. Nevertheless, it is a poem that is peculiarly connected with my youth, especially with those moments of affectation and callow superiority in which a young man musters up courage to take reading and writing seriously. I certainly don't mean that *The Waste Land* is a poem one outgrows, but it does give off an effluence of cultural estrangement that easily attracts the young literary sensibility. I may not have been so certain as some of my university friends that *The Waste Land* was civilization's official epitaph, but if a choice had to be made between Eliot's shored fragments and, say, the doughty affirmations of an Archibald MacLeish, then I pledged myself to fragments.

Having decided that *The Waste Land* was worth close study meant that the student, despite the efforts

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of critics and scholars before him, was very much on his own. The two teachers I remember who included the poem in their classes on modern poetry offer good examples of the way *The Waste Land* was then treated by pedagogy. The first of these official literary guides, a prim, authoritarian gentleman who presided over the Upper School English Department of a New York prep school, and who had been inveigled by me and a few other premature aesthetes into placing *The Waste Land* on the reading list for seniors, chose the direct, pride-saving way of meeting the problem. "Gentlemen," he said, disdainfully sliding a copy of Eliot's collected works beneath a pile of papers on his desk, "*The Waste Land* is not a poem, it is a palimpsest." And while a student was sent to the class dictionary to look up the meaning and spelling of "palimpsest," he and the rest of the senior English class went on to Robert Frost.

Such resolute dismissal was perhaps preferable to the method of the young university instructor who had put his trust in Eliot's footnotes and believed the poem would turn limpid if one actually went and listened to a hermit thrush in Quebec or the ballad of Mrs. Porter in a Sydney pub. Lost in cross references, he went on happily displaying disconnected knowledge until someone would ask him just who was speaking at a particular moment in the poem, or why, as the poet maintained, the collocation of St. Augustine's *Confessions* and Buddha's Fire Sermon was no accident. Faced with having to deal with the substance of *The Waste Land* rather than with its direct and indirect quotations, the instructor was soon talking about the musical varieties of the poem's language, and how it was more important that poetry be something than that it merely mean something.

OF COURSE, there were a number of perceptive studies of the poem's structure, yet it seemed they helped little when one confronted *The Waste Land* in a private reading and tried to move from line to line without losing the sense of necessary sequence by which a true

poem defines itself. Finally there came the moment when it was evident that the poem must be taken on retreat, that it must become for a time the object of intense and exclusive meditation. I'm sure that others whose affection for the poem led to such spans of isolated study must remember, as I do, the circumstances of the seclusion, for one approached this time of confinement with the 444 lines of macaronic verse as though it would contain a dramatic resolution of a long lover's quarrel.

By the time I was ready for such resolution, five years had gone by since I'd first read *The Waste Land* and discovered that, except for the Latin of the epigraph, I understood nothing else about the specifics of the poem. In the years since that initial reading, the acquisition of the usual prerequisites for a degree in the Humanities had provided me with the knowledge of the special lore Eliot obliquely and directly refers to in his poem. Now I could translate not only the Latin of the opening quotation, but the Sibyl's Greek reply as well, and I knew that the speaker was Trimalchio, one of Rome's *nouveaux riches* that Petronius made sport of in his *Satyricon*. That the ancient Sibyl should be longing for death in a cage, while Trimalchio tells like a boastful tourist of having seen the sight with his own eyes, seemed in those early days of postwar package tours through the ruins of Europe a very apposite opening image.

The work's first section, "The Burial of the Dead," the most elliptical and complicated of its five parts, was now like a familiar dream to me. The poem's being stirred to life by a cruel spring; the wistful memories of an exiled aristocrat—but was it she or her companion in the Hofgarten who claimed to be a pure German from Lithuania?; the first description of a landscape gone sere, of earth protected by no rituals of fertility, abandoned by the gods and inherited by a disconsolate son of man.

So far it was a consistent and manifest bleakness. But suddenly a throb of joy, the song of a young sailor thinking of his love, followed by a young girl's recollection

of a token of love. I remember wishing as I reached this part of the poem, my mind already straining to hold, like Tiresias, all its images clearly in view, that Eliot would not return so soon to his theme of sexual failure, that a little more time could be spent in the hyacinth garden before the lover fell into post-coital silence and the sailor's sea spread out in emptiness. At twenty-two, I was already beginning to realize that continuous despair demanded a supply of negative energy I no longer had, and that I was becoming more and more susceptible to bouts of good feeling about the world.

At least the session with Madame Sosostriis that followed promised a small respite of humor in its depiction of the fate to which the old symbols of faith and regeneration had come in the modern world, and I always considered Eliot's coy footnote about how he had reshuffled the tarot pack to his own purpose and how the "crowd of people" mentioned by the clairvoyant would appear again in the poem—the reappearance occurs exactly six lines later—to be an amusing preparation for the section's last line which snarls at the reader the insult borrowed from Baudelaire. But what was it that Stetson had buried? A poem? And who was The Dog whose fealty to man would prompt him to dig it up again? Was he a Cynic? The Domesticated Rational Mind? A literary critic? Was he me, spending a good part of a Christmas vacation paying a final homage to *The Waste Land*?

Although there were a few such lacunae in my understanding of the opening section, I felt I'd at last digested the imagery and language with which the poem sets forth its themes of impotence, sterility, and the despiritualization of the world. If I was not truly the poet's *semblable* and *frère*, I was nevertheless no stranger to the motifs of his suffering, and I granted him his shifts of attitude and vocal mode, since I finally perceived that they were his necessary economy, the one way of dramatically introducing the poem's narrative civilities. If the reader needed the comfort of logical bridges and signposts of coherence,

he had more time than did a poem to construct them.

THE next section, "The Game of Chess," had always been my favorite, in part because it had proven the easiest to grasp in its entirety, but more importantly because of the evocative parodies of high and low verse through which Eliot managed to demonstrate the magnificence of language while displaying its current degradations. The rich images and sensual rhythms which set the stage for the neurasthenic lady's desperate demands for some sort of consoling response from her husband, had seemed, before I'd learned how to imagine a queen's barge dissolving into a rococo boudoir, to be straightforward, beautiful verse. Even when their sardonic intent was known, it was hard not to succumb to the loveliness of the mockery and to drift off for longer and longer moments among the room's glowing candelabras, jewels, cupidons, and vials of ivory and colored glass.

But one is soon shocked out of this empty elegance by a babbling lower-class voice and the famous monologue follows that reveals the working-class marriage—I always paused in the middle of the woman's account of her sexual advice to her friend to recall the sailor's *Irish Kind* and wondered if she, like Lil, would need a new set of teeth to spice up their reunion—to be a crude calculation, a dissembling of love for the sake of safety and appearances. It was enjoyable to see the lower classes depicted as being no more capable of honest passion than their betters, or at least it was then, for D. H. Lawrence was also in style, and many people were being beguiled by the notion that manual labor and a mind unaffected by literacy were the conditions in which sensuality became robust. Of more significance, however, was the success Eliot had here, and nowhere else in the poem, in achieving just the right pitch for a poetry of common speech. Since the first appearance of *The Waste Land*, this achievement has been imitated by hundreds of poets who thought they had found in it the key to a modern and original idiom. But like Eliot

himself in his many other attempts at heightening imitations of ordinary speech into verse, his followers usually failed to create anything but a lifeless jargon that was an injustice to both its high and low origins.

IF JUDGED by the number of lines quoted by young men and women while courting each other's minds and bodies in the days before sexual liberation did away with the need for such elaborate cajolery and cozenage, "The Fire Sermon" was the most popular section of *The Waste Land*. The reluctant, romantic girl was told by the suitor whose sophomore year had drained him of all illusions that the "nymphs are departed," and that behind their backs at that very moment was "the rattle of the bones, and chuckle spread from ear to ear." After this, she sadly accepted the refuge of his bachelor bed. A solid A student of economics would arrive to spend the weekend with the girl (an English major, of course) he planned to marry if his fellowship came through, and would be inexplicably called "Sweeney" when he began his preliminary fondlings. If asked for an explanation of her coldness and the wrong name she kept addressing him by, he might receive a terrifying response of "twits," "jugs," and "tereus" followed by an icy refusal ever again to be "so rudely forc'd." Those whose love dared not speak its name, much less demonstrate for equal-employment opportunities, made pointed jokes about each other's overtures from Smyrna merchants, and a one-night stand inevitably was called a weekend at the Metropole. Indeed I felt, as I read Eliot's sermon on the hollowness of loveless sexuality, that my years as a student had been no more than a long violet hour, and yet it seemed to me, in spite of a few squalid affairs and feelings injured by callow intrigue, on the whole to have been a pleasant time, and that Eliot was allowing more than a little melodrama to creep into his depictions of sexual dalliance. The famous *cinq à sept* of the typist and the house-agent's clerk seemed tainted by a sentimentalized drabness, its details chosen as though they were meant as an

illustration of a Victorian homiletic. I could now, after all, compare it with my own rendezvous in furnished rooms, and the most tepid of them always involved at least some pretense of affection and human courtesy. Here, for once, Eliot had missed the natural nuances of his setting.

But this was the only serious objection I remember raising during the time of secluded reading. The next two sections, "Death by Water" and "What the Thunder Said," with their explicit symbols of death and tenuous implications of resurrection, brought the poem finally to a unity of such power that it allowed me to end my scanning with the knowledge that I could never really experience the poem again. I might read it many times, but such occasions would be little more than curious revisitations of former feelings. The presentment of *The Waste Land* as a total clarity, I realized, should happen only once in a person's life.

IN THE years since this last close listening to the voices of *The Waste Land*, the poem and the cultural attitude it fostered have fallen out of fashion. The past civilization Eliot taught my generation to mourn would hardly be missed by the majority of today's students who believe firmly in the present and themselves as the tests of relevance and meaning; sexual enigmas are studied and solved in clinics where every effort is made to keep human copulation from being inhibited by old mythologies of fertility and regeneration; "the awful daring of a moment's surrender" must seem a quaint line to those who have been copulating since puberty; Coriolanus is the last Shakespearean character anyone wants to revive: *Detta*, *Dayadhvam*, *Damyata* would find meaning only in becoming a Third World revolutionary slogan.

The Waste Land is a poem for those who entertain at least the possibility of spiritual action, of a world formed by sin and redemption that is beyond political sentiment and social law. It is a poem for those who would fret and speculate even in the best of times, and who confirm their prisons with each thought, preferring such confine-

ment to the freedom that comes when life is made a matter of rational progress and harmless pleasure. Perhaps after all it is best that the Waste Landers should at no time be regnant, and that there should always be something cultic and comic about those who insist on remembering moments of excellent joy that the majority of mankind has learned long ago to forget.

I, at any rate, by the time the original manuscript of *The Waste Land* was published, had traveled a long way since those days when all one sought was a personal *lacrimae rerum* note. I was glad no one talked about, or quoted from *The Waste Land* any more, for the poem had taken on the aspects of a cultural commonplace to those who had grown up with it, and like many other themes of young adventurous conversations, *The Waste Land* was best left a matter of private memory.

THEN came the publication of the original manuscript and the discovery of plans, scaffolding, and rough adumbrations that promised once and for all to solve the puzzles of *The Waste Land*. For a long time I put off buying a copy out of respect for the decision I'd made never to enter the poem deeply again. But I, too, had moved with the times, and I had to admit that such a vow now seemed excessive, hysterical even, the sort of romantic reaction which as a literary professional I'd often ridiculed. Still, it was some time before I purchased the annotated transcript and retired for one more long communion with the poem.

I spent days reading and collating various versions of the manuscript. It was a compelling experience in lucidity, a lesson in practical poetics that fully compensated for any feeling of spiritual loss which that part of me still mired in the 50's might have felt. The energy of the intellects that carved, pared down, and shaped the poem infused even the blurred photographs of the original manuscript pages, and far from making one embarrassed by old enthusiasms and reverential feelings for the finished poem, these signs of argument and rough labor proved them justified. The sacrifice of hundreds of almost perfect lines

Eliot made to his own and Pound's judgment confirmed his status as a poet almost as much as did the poem that remained.

THERE is no way of discussing all the ways in which Pound's proposals and Eliot's disposition to listen forged a hard, compressed work out of a diffuse mixture of materials. The following is only a random and meager sampling of the revisions I found personally interesting.

First, concerning the epigraph: somewhere long ago I had read that instead of Trimalchio's eyewitness account of the Sybil's degradation, Eliot had originally intended using a quote from *The Heart of Darkness*, so I was only surprised by the tone of the chosen passage. It is the description of Kurtz's death which ends with his last words, "The horror! The horror!" and it struck me as far too specific to introduce the many entwining themes that followed. Pound felt so too, and told Eliot that Conrad wasn't "weighty enough to stand the citation." Eliot argued a bit, calling the quote, with customary understatement, "somewhat elucidative."

Next, as an epigraph elucidative of the poem's manner, there was on the original manuscript above the title of the poem's first section the sentence HE DO THE POLICE IN DIFFERENT VOICES. It is from *Our Mutual Friend*, and is spoken by Betty Higden in praise of the way Sloppy, the "love-child" she'd adopted, added creation of character to his readings to her from the newspaper. No reason is given for Eliot's removal of this hint about the structure of *The Waste Land*, but I think if he was prepared to shout, "The horror!" at us, he might have eased our bafflement about the variety of vocal modes the poem employs.

Next one finds that the famous lines on April did not originally begin the poem. Instead, there are fifty lines of a monologue spoken in the vernacular of a Sweeney, in which a man describes a night of sexual prowling about town. It is the sort of attempt to make poetry out of ordinary speech which I spoke of earlier, and it is hard to say if the poem could have sur-

vived such a prominent inclusion of language which Pound derided as photography. Eliot, even when not particularly prodded by this judgment, seems to have removed all such efforts from the poem except that of the successful pub scene—which, it should be noted, Pound kept from a clumsy start by furnishing the word "demobbed" when Eliot was floundering in question marks between "discharge out of the army" and "coming out of the Transport Corps."

Pound also provided "demotic" to describe Mr. Eugenides' French; and in dozens of other places throughout the poem, he aids Eliot in finding the right word and the palpable image. My favorites among his marginalia are the "dam per'apsez" and "Perhaps be damned" he left next to those lines which Eliot had weakened with this cautious adverb. There is no better example that I know of constructive criticism than the final outburst Pound makes against the line in which Eliot has said of the seduced typist that "across her brain one half-formed thought may pass"; Pound's comment is: "Make up yr mind—you Tiresis—if you know damn well—or else don't!"

IF ELIOT had a weakness as a poet that endangered the substance of the poem, it was letting his depiction of the lower forms of emptiness become bathetic. I had thought this flaw was most evident in the scene just mentioned and I found that again I agreed with Pound. The relevant page of the manuscript is covered with comments that on all levels criticize the facile poeticizing of squalor and the unearned and strained lyrical heightenings with which Eliot tried to give to the low social moments of *The Waste Land* a poetic tone consistent with the rest of the work. In the days when an excessive image or a lurid simile inspired a fear unto silence in a young poet, how much comfort it would have been to have known that Eliot himself was capable of lines like

—Bestows one final patronizing
kiss,
and gropes his way, finding the
stairs unlit;

And at the corner where the stable is.
Delays only to urinate, and spit.

which stunned Pound into uncharacteristic litotes in his comment that the last two lines were "probably over the mark."

And so *The Waste Land* slowly revealed itself as a work of human effort, after all. There were even comic stumblings in its making, and many of those lines that

seemed inviolable to us who memorized and quoted them, had been hacked and chopped into being by two poets who shared an enjoyment of rough and often rude labor. I can't honestly say that this last reading of *The Waste Land* rekindled in me a desire to live again for a time in its emotional landscape, but it did give me another justification for holding the poem in steady if distant affection.

Movies

Antonioni '75

William S. Pechter

AMBIGUOUS clues point to a murder having taken place, and a photographer sets out to establish if it has. A young man, sought by the police for his involvement in a campus protest which has erupted into violence, steals an airplane to make his getaway. A man assumes the identity of another man who died, and finds himself enmeshed in a web of intrigue and gunrunning. These mystery-thriller plots (the last even includes an auto chase) are, of course, not from Hitchcock movies (though the first sounds exactly like *Rear Window*) but those of the last three fiction films—*Blow-Up*, *Zabriskie Point*, *The Passenger*—of Michelangelo Antonioni, celebrated purveyor of plotless ennui. To be sure, these films do stand apart from Antonioni's previous work, but not, I think, for reasons of their plottedness. By one of those chance occurrences which seem to govern the distribution of films, Antonioni's first fea-

ture film, *Story of a Love Affair* (*Cronaca di un Amore*, 1950), is being released in this country at the same time as his latest, and it turns out to be a story (I rely on the description of others, since I haven't seen it) of an adulterous couple who plan a murder.

Ought one to be surprised? A young woman disappears, and her lover and her closest female friend join in a search for her. What I'm describing might be the plot of *Psycho* (but for the fact that, in *Psycho*, the lover is joined by the missing woman's sister); in fact, it is that of *L'Avventura*, the film which introduced Antonioni to an American audience, and permanently earned him his reputation as either a heroically inaccessible leader of the avant-garde or a pretentiously attitudinizing herald of alienation, obscurity, and boredom. Writing of *L'Avventura* at the time of its release I noted that "The narrative has all the immediate appeal of a good mystery, evoking, quite

properly, all of the mystery's appropriate questions: Where is she? Will she be found?" What is surprising is not so much the extent to which the Antonioni of *The Passenger* is using the same kind of plot as the Antonioni of *L'Avventura*, but the extent to which he's using the same plot: still using a plot whose action hinges on a "missing person."

How is this plot used in *The Passenger*? At the outset, we find the film's protagonist, David Locke, a well-known television reporter engaged in preparing a documentary on Africa, in some remote country where he's trying without success to make contact with a force of guerrillas. Natives look through him as though he were invisible, guides unpredictably present themselves and just as mysteriously vanish; finally, his vehicle stuck in the sand, he's abandoned in the desert, and, one feels, at the end of his rope. He returns to the primitive hotel at which he's quartered and discovers the other European (Robertson, a businessman, also named David) who's been staying there, and with whom (as we see in a flashback) Locke had struck up a casual acquaintance, dead in his room of a heart attack. Locke studies the dead man, then methodically goes about exchanging places with him, switching rooms and passports (his deception aided by the native staff's inability to distinguish or indifference to distinguishing between the two white men). Disguised as Robertson, Locke leaves Africa and, after going for a moment to the threshold of his own London home, instead sets about keeping the itinerary indicated in Robertson's appointment book. In so doing, he soon discovers that Robertson's business was selling guns to the African revolutionaries that Locke had sought in vain to contact, and, as far as he's able, Locke attempts to fulfill Robertson's commitments.

Meanwhile, Locke's wife and a colleague of his have learned that a man named Robertson was the last person to talk with Locke before he died, and they join in a search for Robertson, tracking him to Spain and very nearly crossing paths there with the man they presume dead. Locke discovers that

the two are looking for him, and flees, picking up a young woman companion along the way. He still tries to keep Robertson's appointments, but now pursued not only by his wife (who's found the altered passport in her husband's effects) but also by agents of the African country's government, who follow the wife, having been alerted of her intention to contact Robertson. Finally, after appearing for several rendezvous to which no one else comes, Locke is about to abandon Robertson's itinerary, but he's urged not to by the woman traveling with him. He temporarily separates from the woman, but goes to keep the next appointment—with a "Daisy," who has failed to appear on several occasions before. There, at the appointed place, the counterrevolutionary agents track him down and kill him. Accompanied by the local police, Locke's wife arrives, as does the woman who's been his passenger (though the passenger of the title is surely Locke, having become a passenger in Robertson's life). "Is this David Robertson?" the police ask. "Do you recognize him?" The woman answers, "Yes"; the wife replies, "I never knew him."

ANTONIONI made five feature films before making *L'Avventura* in 1959. Aside from the aforementioned *Story of a Love Affair*, only two of these have received even the most limited exhibition in this country: *L'Amiche* (1955), an adaptation from Pavese (which I've seen only in an unsubtitled version many years ago), and *Il Grido* (1957; starring the American actor, Steve Cochran), an attempt to weld the socially-conscious materials of neo-realism to Antonioni's thematic preoccupations, which, despite some extraordinary things in it, remains only partially successful. *L'Avventura* was the first film of a loose trilogy completed by *La Notte* (1961) and *Eclipse* (1962). What unites the three films is not any continuity of narrative or character, but their thematic concerns: taken together, they constitute the seminal expression of the loss of self, the death of feeling and ebbing of vitality—of alienation—in the modern cinema.

L'Avventura is, with Godard's *Breathless* of the same year, one of the two great path-breaking films for the 60's. Unlike *Breathless*, however, *L'Avventura's* importance lies not in any technical innovation but in its giant appropriation for the film medium of a territory of psychological subtlety and emotional nuance previously thought exclusively to belong to the novel. (And some of the lashing out at the "pretentiousness" of *L'Avventura* and other films which followed in its wake—I think particularly of an attack on the idea that films could be "deep" by Nicolà Chiaromonte in *Encounter*—smacked of the literary intelligentsia's futile determination to see to it that movies were kept in their place.) How *L'Avventura* achieved its effects wasn't easy to say. Antonioni's stylistic traits—his choreographed long takes, characteristic positioning of actors within the frame, slight lingering on a place for a moment before someone's entered or after someone's left, and penchant for the slightly disorienting viewpoint—could all be isolated and analyzed; yet the effects remained, as such things usually do, more a matter of a particular artist's temperament and sensibility. And before long there was a host of Antonioni imitators to prove that these things could be imitated without creating a like effect (one has only to compare the use of place in an Antonioni film with the programmatic use of landscapes in Alain Tanner's recent, *The Middle of The World*). The famous epilogue to *Eclipse*, with its hushed, expectant montage of places and things, all of them pervaded by a sense of the characters' absence and of an appointment between them which may or may not be kept, contains nothing, technically, that is extraordinary, yet it's one of the most overwhelmingly and amazingly resonant passages in all of film. One could, perhaps, reproduce some facsimile of the characteristic Antonioni space, and of the Antonioni words, but not the sense his films convey of somehow capturing the space between words, and words echoing in space.

COMING after *L'Avventura*, *La*

Notte, a depiction of a married couple brought by a visit to a dying friend to face the death of feeling in their marriage, seemed to lack some of the earlier film's mysterious allusiveness, to be more insistent in its mood and meaning, and less spacious. But *Eclipse*, of which one might expect (and in which the critics found) a more ponderous despair, is perhaps the most impressively unstressed of the three, with the odd if fugitive gaiety and the emotional delicacy of its account of a sometimes childish but always affectionately drawn young woman seeking vitality and fulfillment in an affair with a dynamically energetic stockbroker. (We're introduced to the man in the film's famous stock-exchange sequence which critics tended to regard as a savage denunciation of capitalist frenzy, but which seems to me not without an envious appreciation of the manic, misplaced energy of the place, and puts me in mind less of some Pudovkin-like satire than of Yeats's "The best lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity.") *Eclipse* opens with the heroine's ending of an old love affair, and goes on delicately to trace the new affair's burgeoning and development until it reaches just that stage at which an atrophy of feeling like that which caused the end of the earlier affair seems, with a paralyzing inevitability, to settle over this one.

Eclipse was followed, two years later, by *The Red Desert*, which seemed, at least in its middle and later sections, to verge on becoming just that sort of heavily oppressive, modishly bleak work Antonioni's detractors had been accusing him of making all along. *The Red Desert* seemed also a work of artistic exhaustion: an exhaustion of Antonioni's ability to give fresh expression to the themes of which the trilogy was a summation. All of Antonioni's work to follow can be seen as a response to that exhaustion, not, as in Fellini's case, by an ever greater self-absorption and self-indulgence, but by a bringing to the fore of those plot elements which underlay the earlier films, and by a change of locale. *Blow-Up*

(1966) was Antonioni's London film (and his first English-language work), and, compared with his earlier films, a superficial work, a deliberate externalization of the materials of his work before. Yet, in its sheer film-making brilliance, it's also an immensely exciting work, and probably no film has captured more indelibly the dream London of the 60's: London as a mod City of Youth.

Blow-Up was followed in 1970 by *Zabriskie Point*, Antonioni's American film, which despite my initial disappointment, I find something a good deal more than that unmitigated disaster it was generally taken to be. Testimony to how far the film is from the mindless "fellow traveling" with America's youth culture of the 60's it was accused of being is how little it was liked by that leftist counterculture it was supposedly romanticizing; the film's attitude toward America's student "revolutionaries" is sympathetic and even hopeful, but it depicts them nevertheless as posturing, feckless, and self-destructive. (Antonioni's failure to defer to those one might presume him to be trying to please can be seen further in the criticism leveled by the Chinese authorities at his documentary, *China*, his only film between *Zabriskie Point* and *The Passenger*, and a work I was unable to see when a shortened version of it was shown on network television.) And far from being the hysterical, anti-American travelogue-of-ugliness its hostile critics labeled it, *Zabriskie Point* seems to me marked by its open, curious, and surprised response to the rough, outsized, but not unbeautiful look of its Western American setting. (One recalls here that Antonioni said of *The Red Desert*, in a conversation with Godard published in *Cahiers du Cinéma*, that he actually found much that was aesthetically exciting in that film's industrial lunar landscape, and thought one ought to adapt oneself to the transformed world in which one lived.)

Above all, like *Blow-Up* before it and *The Passenger* after, *Zabriskie Point* is distinguished by that painterly beauty of surface which characterizes the visual aspect of

Antonioni's work since *The Red Desert*. *The Red Desert* was Antonioni's first color film, and, in making it, he grew absorbed with the expressive possibilities of color to an almost obsessive degree (painting grass, etc.). But the kinds of schematic uses of color which mar some of *The Red Desert* give way, in the later work, to a richly sensuous employment of color for no other sake than its own. There are moments when my recollections of *The Red Desert* crystallize into a set of studies of the red shack that figures so prominently in the film's earlier sections (which are also much the film's most successful sections dramatically). And *Zabriskie Point* may spring to mind solely in the images of a foreshortened, billboard-jammed skyscape, and the American flag seen flapping outside Rod Taylor's office window in variations ranging from a sculptural solidity to a Jasper Johns-like flatness. Even now, only a week after seeing *The Passenger*, I sometimes find myself thinking back on the film as a succession of abstract canvases in white, beige, and a range of cool blues.

The Passenger is based on an original story for the screen by Mark Peploe, and scripted by Peploe, Peter Wollen (a British film critic), and (presumably, in its later stages) Antonioni. I don't know the extent to which the project was actually tailored for Antonioni by Peploe and Wollen from the beginning, though internal evidence suggests very strongly that it was. I gather, however, that Antonioni has said that he hesitated for a fairly long while before deciding to film the script, finally undertaking to do so out of some sort of intuition. The intuition is understandable—*The Passenger* is not only full of echoes of Antonioni's previous work, it is, in a sense, *L'Avventura* told from the viewpoint of the one who disappears. But a sounder instinct is reflected in Antonioni's long hesitation.

"In Italy, forty thousand people disappear each year. They'd fill a stadium," one of the characters in *L'Avventura* remarks. There's an exchange of lines in *The Passen-*

ger that seems to me worthy of *L'Avventura*, when the woman Locke picks up says, "People disappear every day," and he replies, "Every time they leave the room." More typical of the film, however, is the lugubrious despair of Locke telling her, "I've run out of everything . . . my wife . . . a house . . . an adopted child . . . a successful job . . . everything except a few bad habits I can't get rid of," and such vacant dialogue as, "Excuse me, I was trying to remember something / Was it important? / No." More typical still is the speech by an old man on how children only repeat the mistakes of their elders, and a plodding allegory recounted by Locke just before he meets his death about a blind man (clearly, Locke himself) who recovered his sight only to have his initial elation turn to pain at his discovery of the world's ugliness. Thus far, in the language of his three English-language films, Antonioni (who's not, I gather, fluent in English) has been well served only once—by Edward Bond in *Blow-Up*; but rarely have so many wooden and portentous lines been employed to so little effect as in *The Passenger* (their effect not enhanced by the toneless readings Jack Nicholson has apparently been coached to give them). Perhaps I overestimate Wollen's influence on the work, but it seems to me very much a critic's idea—a bad idea—of what an Antonioni film consists of.

AT ANY rate, symbols and symmetries pile up in *The Passenger* in a way quite unlike that of any Antonioni film before: there's even another copy of *Tender Is the Night* (that famous instance of a switch in narrating voices, whose appearance in *L'Avventura* makes for what's perhaps that film's one false note), unless my eyes played tricks on me, though the neat dovetailing of this with the Fitzgeraldian "Daisy" who recurs in Robertson's appointment book suggests they did not. (One felicitous symmetry that strikes me as typically Antonioni's own is provided by a shot of Locke "flying" at great height in a cable car while he's still intoxicated by his new lease on life, and a later, similarly

exhilarating image when his woman companion asks him what he's running away from and he has her turn to look back from their open-topped, speeding car.) In addition, the kind of mystery-thriller plot that's been used so unobtrusively by Antonioni in the past has been fancied up in *The Passenger* with some appointment-in-Samarra-like fatalism (one of the film's working titles was *Fatal Exit*) as Locke keeps Robertson's final rendezvous with Daisy at the Hotel de la Gloria. Given the way the movie's themes announce themselves, it's not surprising that *The Passenger* promises to be not only Antonioni's greatest popular success (Jack Nicholson insures that) but his best-received film to date, with the reviewers obliging from one's declaration that "It may turn out to be the definitive spiritual testament of our times" to another's mind-boggling assertion that "Antonioni shows how this . . . modern inability to communicate transcends language barriers."

BUT such things as I've mentioned are only the least of what goes wrong in *The Passenger*. Wollen and Peplow have correctly seized on the metaphor of the "missing person" (extending, in a film such as *Eclipse*, to embrace the sense of a person with something vital missing in her life) which has figured so centrally in the director's work before, but they've failed to see how the mystery-plot elements have been used to serve the theme by Antonioni. If the plot of *L'Avventura* can be summed up as the search by two people for another who's missing while the film's unfolding, by the end one would more accurately say: a young woman disappears, and an entire world seems sucked into the vacuum left by her disappearance. Even in a work as outwardly similar to *The Passenger* as *Blow-Up*, the plot elements

gradually transform themselves until, by the end, the protagonist's search becomes no longer one for proof of a murder but for proof of an act of passion, an act bespeaking an intensity of feeling of a kind which so utterly eludes his affective range that, by the film's last shot, he's seen to be cut off from the sources of feeling so thoroughly as literally to vanish from sight, as though he were only an optical illusion. But *The Passenger* starts, in effect, where the other films end: with its protagonist in a desert, at the end of his rope. Whereas in earlier Antonioni films the mood and meaning gradually emerge from, and are an extension of, the plot, in *The Passenger* mood and meaning are needed to propel the plot: Locke's despair provides the only logic for his assuming Robertson's identity. *The Passenger* starts out with a heavy freight of alienation from which an unresonant mystery-thriller plot trails off through the remainder of the film like an appendage.

There are, of course, some admirable things about *The Passenger*, among them that extraordinary visual beauty which has marked all of Antonioni's later work; anyone caring about movies can't help but be excited by the stylistic accomplishment with which this film's been made. And at least on first viewing (contrary to my expectation, it seemed even thinner when I saw it a second time) the film is kept alive by Antonioni's characteristic eye for seemingly marginal but curiously riveting and affecting detail: from the way Locke studies Robertson and touches his hair when he finds him dead to such things as the couple quareling off to the side in a sequence set in a Gaudi house; from a shot of a hotel porter listening for a moment at a door to the way Locke, before keeping his final appointment, picks a small red flower and smashes it into a crumbling

white wall which he leaves with its stain. Indeed, for all the acclaim being lavished on the film's penultimate sequence for its technical innovation (the camera, attached to a newly developed mounting, is enabled, with an extraordinary freedom, to travel from the inside of a building to a courtyard outside which it then roams in a single shot), what is most impressive about it is the selection and choreography of the often seemingly extraneous but marvelously evocative wealth of detail which the shot contains: an old man sitting in the distance, a dog playing, a boy in a red shirt throwing a stone, a woman in a halter running across the frame. Yet in some ways even more impressive is the film's very last shot: a distant, head-on but asymmetrical view of the hotel in which Locke has died, as evening turns to night and the lights inside warmly glow: another of those Antonioni "still lifes," mysteriously reverberant with the sense of something momentous and ineffable which has taken place and left its residue.

But for all such felicities, *The Passenger* seems to me an enervated work, one signaling the kind of exhaustion of its director's most recent vein that *The Red Desert* did of the phase before. And though Antonioni's films since *The Red Desert* have been distinguished by their formal brilliance, they have really, in no sense, constituted any development in his art, offering, at best, only a pause for self-renewal. The Antonioni of *The Passenger* seems to me at a turning point in his career, and a crucial one. It remains to be seen whether the "success" of *The Passenger* will prove, far more than the "failure" of *Zabriskie Point*, a dangerous omen for his work to come, whether he really is and will remain where his new work seems to find him: in a desert, and at the end of his rope.

The U.S. & OPEC

THE GREAT DÉTENTE DISASTER: OIL AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By EDWARD FRIEDLAND, PAUL SEABURY, AARON WILDAVSKY. *Basic Books*. 210 pp. \$7.95.

Reviewed by EDWARD N. LUTTWAK

MULTIPLE authorship rarely succeeds; haste and passion are the enemies of thought. But this book, written in obvious haste by three dissimilar authors, and evidently strongly felt, has one very great merit that easily outweighs its faults: the oil-price crisis caused by OPEC is treated throughout as a *political* crisis, and not as a natural catastrophe or a dissociated economic phenomenon. Nothing is more revealing of the essential shallowness of American foreign policy under Secretary Kissinger's regime than its failure to do likewise.

It was perfectly apparent that there was a causal nexus between the laissez-faire stance of American policy in the first days of the October 1973 war and the first talk of output reductions by the Arab oil producers; and it was only by slow stages and with obvious hesitation that the reductions were imposed by men who clearly feared and half-expected a strong American reaction. But in Washington there seemed to be no recognition of the obvious possibilities for strong diplomatic action: the response, by omission, was total acquiescence. Only one member of the cabinet urged that the Arabs be told publicly and clearly that an embargo would be treated as a hostile act. He was promptly overruled.

There followed the spectacle of the Saudi oil minister being wined and dined in Washington even while a Saudi oil embargo was in force against the United States;

and he was the first of many. During the talks conducted in the wake of the war to secure an Israeli retreat, a peculiar one-way linkage preceded the one-way "disengagement": while Arab spokesmen continually threatened further supply cuts unless the Israelis withdrew, at no point did Washington choose to make an Israeli withdrawal conditional on a lifting of the embargo.

Much more destructive in its consequences was American passivity toward the price-rigging of OPEC. In fact, the administration itself virtually provided the rationale for the price increases in the person of James Akins (now ambassador to Saudi Arabia), author of a now notorious article in *Foreign Affairs* which came close to advocating both the Arab embargo and the extortion of OPEC. It was only with agonizing slowness and with an ill-concealed reluctance that the State Department finally formulated an oil policy—which astonished the world. At a time when the West was in deep crisis because the price of oil had suddenly increased from \$1.40 to more than \$10.50 per barrel, the main plank of this policy was to insure a high floor price, its major preoccupation being that a decline in the price of oil would remove the incentive to conservation and energy substitution. The preoccupation was well founded, but protective tariffs have been used since the 7th century C.E. precisely to stimulate domestic production. Indeed, after yet another delay, the energy side of the Ford administration came out in favor of a high tariff that would make a floor price unnecessary. The man who is officially charged with such matters in the State Department, Assistant Secretary Thomas Enders, spoke on the same day on the same issue as did Secretary Kissinger, one stressing the importance of a high floor price even while prices were still rising, the other making feeble statements about the need to reduce prices, if only just a little.

The resulting confusion has not been dissipated to this day.

In the meantime, the only active aspect of State Department policy was to insure that visiting dignitaries from the Arab oil states were treated as royalty. Men whose only claim to importance was that they had successfully cartelized a natural resource found and developed by Western money and Western talent were thus taught the personal lesson that the way to fame and power was more extortion. It is a lesson they have learned well.

Official policy cannot be faulted for the disorientation the mass media manifest in the eager submissiveness shown to the pretensions of the oil producers, and the enthusiasm with which Middle Eastern potentates were promoted to the rank of leaders of world caliber. It would be a grave mistake to ignore the purely personal dimension of the issue. Arab leaders and the Shah do not see themselves through the spectacle of their own controlled media but are heavily influenced by those of the West, and especially the American. The message relayed by the media was that the oil producers had become great powers, and could do as they liked. The oil producers acted accordingly. After having done all they could to injure the West, the Shah of Iran and Faisal must have been pleased, though a little surprised, to see themselves portrayed as loyal friends of the United States. (Faisal missed the culminating spectacle of a TV reporter on a major network, very near to tears, mourning the death of "a great friend" of the United States.)

On a more tangible level the policy of the United States continues to endorse these attitudes. Nothing whatsoever has been done to mobilize countervailing economic pressures against the oil producers; no attempt has been made to restrict their access to American products or American financial markets. None of the various counter-cartel proposals, such as the rejection of short-term "hot" money de-

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posits or the creation of a bidding system for oil sales, has been tried. Instead, there is still more wining and dining, and the wholly unrestricted sale of military equipment. Neither amounts to a policy.

Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky address the different aspects of the oil-price problem—economic, monetary, and physical (there is no physical oil shortage in the simplistic sense conveyed by the mass media)—but always within the dominating political framework. By contrast, the analyses that find a ready welcome in journals like *Foreign Affairs* are distinguished by an insistence on treating the oil problem as a purely economic issue, but with the addition of a few words on the sound ethics of transferring wealth to the deserving rich who inhabit the Persian Gulf. Nor do the present authors, like so many of their colleagues, insist on viewing the problem in terms of the best-case assumptions that dominate much of the debate. The widely circu-

lated estimate by a senior official of the World Bank that the "cost of OPEC" to the Western world is 2 per cent of GNP is, for example, based on the assumption of a very healthy rate of economic growth, 4 per cent or more per annum. It continues to be quoted, even though there has been no economic growth at all, or very little, in most Western economies, while in the United States there has been an absolute decline in the GNP.

The oil-price crisis is one of those rare and peculiar problems that may usefully be examined from a crude Marxist perspective. We find the international bankers, and those who speak for them, quite happy with the situation: the capital surpluses being accumulated by the oil producers are to be "recycled" and all will then be well for the Western economies, not to speak of the bankers who will do the recycling. In fact, according to the bankers, capital inflows from OPEC will help a great deal, given the inadequacy of long-term industrial investment in the United States.

But how is this additional capital created in the first place? We know that it is now "accumulated" by additional production (and savings) in the oil-producing states. The answer is obvious: it is extracted from the mass of Western consumers, and very regressively, since George Ball and the average worker pay exactly the same price for their heating oil and gasoline. In other words, the capital that the oil producers are accumulating in spite of their penchant for jet fighters and other expensive toys comes from the pocket of the consumer in the Western world, and is to be recycled into the industry of the Western world, thus benefiting in the first instance the owners of industry and the bankers who control the transaction. Eventually, it is true, some benefits will filter down by way of increased productivity, but in the meantime ordinary people are being forced to sacrifice their standard of living for the benefit of those much richer than they, both in the Persian Gulf and closer to home.

It is possible to satisfy the Shah and his colleagues by one policy; it is possible to satisfy George Meany by another sort of policy; but not both at the same time. The effects of the price-rigging of OPEC are sharply asymmetrical in their impact on different layers of our own society. This no doubt explains the curious alliance between foreign oil-producing states and much of the Eastern establishment, an alliance which has done so much to paralyze American reaction to OPEC.

THE authors of *The Great Détente Disaster* are appropriately cautious in their discussion of the option of force. At present, the possibility of another Arab embargo, or of a further round of politically-inspired cuts in output, seems remote, but then the situation in the Middle East is always volatile. As against this, a further sharp increase in the price of oil is already in prospect for the autumn.

The slow strangulation of ever-higher oil prices inflicts damage as real as that of any supply cut but cannot constitute a *casus belli*: those who can, will pay; those who cannot, will go without. But none

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will fight over high prices. The option of force, now much more realistic since the military has been prepared and a variety of arrangements have been made, remains applicable only if there is an embargo.

No serious observer expects any conference with the oil exporters to lead to beneficial results other than more of that "good atmosphere" which the mills of détente are forever venting. The leaders of the oil states have seen the countermeasures being readied against them, and they are not impressed. As in any adversary relationship, a balance of threats and incentives is needed to make a compromise possible, and no such balance exists. For the same reason, few serious observers expect very much to come from the consumers' union that has now been formed largely owing to the brilliant political staff work of a small band of dedicated Europeans (one of whom, Roger Ockrent of Belgium, ought to be remembered, for he almost certainly died of overwork in the effort). It is symptomatic that American diplomacy played no great part in the detailed work needed to create the energy agency, the one thing which gives some substance to consumer cooperation. Secretary Kissinger's reluctance to cooperate with allies, his insistence on secret and therefore narrow staff work which makes collaboration with other departments virtually impossible and the steady opposition of those holding the Arab and oil-state desks in the State Department, all militated against a vigorous effort.

It is now apparent that the only action that will count is energy substitution at home, both to reduce dependence on OPEC and to relieve the pressure on other consuming states which lack the resources for large-scale substitution. Industrial bottlenecks are being overcome, but the formidable obstacles to increased energy production, and to the more efficient use of energy already available, are legal—that is to say, political. The post-1969 environmental hysteria has already crystallized in much legislation which compels inefficiency in the use of coal and gasoline and restricts the development

of nuclear power. Other legislation compels the inefficient use of natural gas. Until very recently, a strip-mining bill threatened to impede the rapid exploitation of the most important resource of all, surface coal.

Protection of the natural environment is the most general of common interests, but it is obvious that many separate strands of restrictionist legislation can gulliverize America and fatally constrict efforts to produce more energy. By now it is obvious, in addition, that much of the environmentalist movement is animated by a desire to arrest growth and development *tout court*, a desire which reflects an unacknowledged hostility to the civilization itself—hence the lack of enthusiasm for gradual and cumulative measures which would eventually reduce pollution in the same degree but without disrupting the economy. Fortunately the ordinary person is beginning to realize that *he*, and not just big business, is the real victim of environmental restrictionism. Upon this realization, and its successful translation into effective political action, our hopes must rest.

Biography and Culture

SAMUEL JOHNSON By JOHN WAIN.
Viking. 388 pp. \$12.50.

Reviewed by MARTIN GREEN

"THERE is no research in this book," John Wain tells us frankly in his Note on Sources, and he positively avoided reading modern studies of Johnson while writing it. "This book, like all my work of the critical and expository kind, is addressed to the intelligent general reader." He wants to make Dr. Johnson a living figure to such readers, who tend to think of him as a "stupid old reactionary," or at least ignore "the finer and more humane points of his thinking." Mr. Wain's book is therefore not addressed to Johnson scholars, and it would be inappropriate to discuss it in terms of any new light of an academic nature it might throw

MARTIN GREEN, whose works include *Cities of Light* and *Sons of the Morning* and *The von Richthofen Sisters*, is professor of English at Tufts University.



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on its subject. The book is a contribution to general culture today, to the culture of the reading public's mind and heart, to what used to be called humanism.

The intelligent general reader is a ghost from the 19th century. George Eliot and Charles Dickens addressed themselves to him; Samuel Beckett and Susan Sontag do not. This cultural tradition, which calls on the writer to make his major effort in the task of relating his theory or new knowledge to its imaginative and social uses, is still comparatively strong in England; American scholars have been more influenced by German and French examples, which expect the writer's major effort in areas of speculation and research that defy social application.

If we consider Wain's book within the English tradition—which would include Orwell's critical essays, Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*, and Johnson's own *Lives of the Poets*—we can say immediately that it does not disgrace its affiliation. Wain has a strong, vivid, and original sense of Johnson, and an especially vivid sense of his geographical and social contexts, and he writes very easily and unaffectedly about him, participating in all his predicaments without intruding his own personality:

Life was hard in those winters of 1738 and 1739, not only for Johnson but for all the underpaid, overburdened creatures whose fate it was to scratch out a living with a pen.

The book has a strong narrative and character interest, and at the same time is full of a serious engagement with what Johnson means to us. It is a book full of an idea, even though its vocabulary is insistently concrete, pictorial, narrative.

What Johnson means to us, according to Wain, is suggested by a sentence like this: "Johnson's steadiness, his sturdy roots of Staffordshire commonsense, protected him from sliding into incurable habits of improvidence and self-indulgence." He is an example to us, in other words, of steadiness and sturdiness, and of manliness above all; of the roots of these virtues in popular culture, and of their flowering in the realm of po-

etry, religion, literature. To take such a man as hero implies a "populist" view of art which is the natural complement of a critic's addressing himself to the intelligent general reader. So the book's choice of subject too is part of that tradition of scholarship which has been England's characteristic contribution over the last generation or so.

I have mentioned George Orwell's essays as belonging to this tradition, and it is worth noting that Orwell is a longstanding favorite of Wain's, who here compares him with Johnson. There is also much in the criticism of F. R. Leavis, that other intellectual hero of England in the 50's, which belongs to that tradition; and even more in the work of Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart, who between them have been the masters of serious young minds in England since the 50's. Hoggart's *Uses of Literacy* and Williams's *Culture and Society* and the many books that follow from them are all concerned with the interactions of high with popular culture, of "cultural" values with political ones, and all breathe a noble provincial conservatism. That is, they press the claims of old achieved values, popular as well as literary, and are suspicious of metropolitan and "American" sophistication and technological and theoretical innovations in culture.

In the realm of art this sensibility has not been so triumphant, even in England, as in the realm of ideas and the essay. But it has found expression in the work of that group of novelists and poets first known as the Angry Young Men—to whom Wain himself belonged—and in Philip Larkin and Kingsley Amis's early novels. Their work took up some of Orwell's themes, and created images of working-class provincial virtue, in contrast to metropolitan dandyism. Amis has recently followed another path, but Wain's novels still present choices and call upon sympathies of this conservative and provincial kind. Thus, in his *A Winter in the Hills* (1970) his protagonist begins with an attraction to a rootless California blonde named Beverly, but finds his real adventure in getting in-

involved in the unglamorous affairs of a few families in a provincial Welsh town. *Samuel Johnson* can be taken as an extension of just the same teaching into the areas of biography and criticism.

Thus Wain characterizes 18th-century England for us—and stresses its difference from the 20th century—by noting its *stability*; and describes Johnson going to an Oxford "unimaginably more beautiful and peaceful than she will ever be again." There is nothing wrong with this, but it is powerfully conservative in feeling, and it is to the point that Wain himself has recently gone to live in Oxford. Similarly, he praises Johnson as being unlike the average intellectual, whose thought about the world begins and ends with himself. Johnson saw that the world must arrange itself in a way that suits the majority of its inhabitants; and that he, and other intellectuals, must take their chance of happiness within that order. Johnson is contrasted with Bertrand Russell—the typical modern intellectual; all Wain's preference goes to the former.

Like Johnson, Wain has published several volumes of literary criticism and of poetry, and he challenges us more or less openly to consider him as a 20th-century version of Johnson. Despite the differences, there are times when he does sound like his subject:

I have been reading the *Lives of the Poets* for thirty years, and can testify that in all that time I have never known the day or the hour when I failed to find interest, instruction, amusement, somewhere in their pages.

Clearly, some stylistic identification has been going on here. Wain tells us he sees Johnson's life from the inside since he himself was born in the same district and social milieu, went to the same university, Oxford, and has made his living in Grub Street. "The literary and social situation Johnson knew in its early days, I know in its twilight." (The word "twilight," like the word "winter" in the title of his novel, sounds one of Wain's dominant notes.) Moreover, having been rebellious in his youth, like Johnson, Wain is now largely conservative. And manliness, finally,

is clearly the mode of his moralism. The jacket invites you to compare the two faces, Johnson's in his wig, Wain's in his cap and muffler; there is no physical similarity, but both are attractive and impressive in somewhat the same way.

"ATTRACTIVE" and "impressive" must remain words to apply to this book. But . . . there remains a but. The category, "conservative," does in the end circumscribe it, in its tactics, its own inner life, and its aim and message. It seems to me that Kingsley Amis, who by his literary and intellectual tactics betrays and insults this kind of moral conservatism, will in the long run serve it better. Amis's ways of insulting those values—to which he himself is ambivalently loyal—are unattractive, but exploratory, challenging, lively. There is nothing exploratory or challenging in Wain's view, and its long-range effect may be to arouse restlessness.

I can perhaps suggest what I mean—the seed of discontent sown beneath the mind's surface—by examining one feature of the writing in the book. Wain lays much stress on Johnson's size: his huge limbs and weight, to start with, then his awkwardness and grossness and ugliness, which intensify that character of size, and then his gross appetites and angers; all of which lead on to the theme of his emotional and moral and intellectual size. To give a few examples: "huge bones not yet adequately covered in flesh, wild staring eyes, scrofula-scarred face"; his "terrific mule-kick at Chesterfield"; "like the heroic caryatid that he was." This vocabulary expresses a generous admiration, but it is disturbing that it is an admiration that focuses so much on Johnson's force; on his knocking men down.

Not that Wain is alone in this image of Johnson. The earliest biographers dwelled on his size, as did Johnson's friends to one another and Johnson to them. As Wain points out, Johnson emphasized the size of men he admired and invited his readers to connect them with him. Nor is the point that Johnson was a tyrant; he sternly disciplined his impulses to domineer. But still it was *he* who did the disciplining—his friends had

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to rely on him to protect them from himself. He inspired fear, as well as affection, respect, and disrespect. Knowing him was a rich experience just because so many conflicting feelings were held in tension in his friends' relationship to him. His personality was a work of art, and his life was a theater. He performed his own powerfulness within a social and comic context, and his admirers got the thrill of touching power itself, without having to give up more "mature" values. (In his writing, and his inner spiritual life, Johnson disciplined himself much more completely; his life as a Christian was not theater.) To say all this, then, is not to criticize Johnson, even as a social performer, but to criticize Johnsonians. Johnson is too easy and safe a figure to worship in the name of manhood. He promises that one can have it both ways—be all forcefulness and all social discipline, all spontaneous power and all mature responsibility. To take him as hero is to cease dealing with those who represent either extreme in an unreconciled manner.

I find much to like and admire in this book, but the feeling it leaves me with is sadness—not for Wain but for England. This is what the country has come to. For the twilight and the winter out of which Wain writes are national; and the memory of Johnson is a fire around which he invited his English readers to gather to comfort themselves, in the winter of their discontent. I'm not sure what better there is for them to do, but that this should be the plight of English high culture, once so full of life, is surely heartbreaking.

Portrait of a Nation

JAPAN: THE FRAGILE SUPERPOWER.
By FRANK GIBNEY. Norton. 347 pp. \$10.00.

Reviewed by
EDWARD SEIDENSTICKER

MANY more people should read this book than will. Mr. Gibney has set out to tell us everything

EDWARD SEIDENSTICKER has translated many Japanese works, including those of Nobel Prize-winner Kawabata Yasunari.

about the modern Japanese, and to a very considerable degree he has succeeded. He assembles his compendium, moreover, with a light grace that makes it seem not at all compendious. Wisdom and erudition are matched by felicity of expression.

All this to recommend it—and yet it will probably sell a tenth of a myriad of copies for every ten myriads or so which that book telling us all about the Italians sold. The other side of the story is that one book telling us all about the Italians was enough, whereas book after book tells us all about the Japanese. Without in any way wishing to belittle Mr. Gibney's achievement—indeed precisely because it is so very considerable—one rather hopes that there will be no more compendia. There will be, of course. One book about the Italians suffices because it is read with a series of wry smiles of recognition, and put down with a certain self-satisfied resignation. That is how things are, and one didn't really have to be told; and one will go on living with these eccentrics even as one goes on living with a wife who is late for everything or a daughter who won't eat anything except wheat germ. The Japanese is more like the gardener who comes in once a week, and whose ways of hacking and uprooting ask for explanation from time to time. Those who write explanations are read by the few who have gardeners and the few who, from the accidents of history, specialize in the behavior of gardeners; and because each of the explainers hopes to achieve the breakthrough and make the gardener a part of the family, and himself the Dr. Spock of gardeners, they go on being written.

That too is how things are. To say that the Japanese are important to us and we to them does not, and probably never will, really change things. The Italians have been in our ken for much, much longer, and no Popes dwell among the Japanese (though there are a few aspirants to the title, aided by earnest bands of missionaries). One may take comfort, if it is needed, in the fact that to understand all is not to forgive all. We are more likely to be murdered by

the people who know us best than by strangers, and when we declare war upon our brethren it is always with a peculiar savagery; and to be gardener for the Western world is not the worst possible of fates.

MR. GIBNEY is naturally better at some things than at others. He is better at simile than generalizations, at description than theory. Some of the similes are rather splendid. My favorite is that in which he likens himself, presiding over a Tokyo office reception, to a peanut floating upon an ocean of Kirin beer. It is not so much that the generalization and theory are unacceptable as that they are not as satisfying as the description. They do not quite seem to fit all the circumstances. One comes up with theories of one's own—though it may be so with most theories, and something of the sort may be the main reason for having them in the first place.


In the matter of religion, for instance, Mr. Gibney seems to accept the common view that the Japanese are not a religious people. "The gods are gone from Japanism," he says. He seems to contradict himself a little later when he describes Buddhism as "more congenial than Christianity and, hence, permanent"; but the dominant view is of a very advanced secularization. It may be valid. Yet one feels that matters of definition are important. Somehow to the Western mind the matter-of-fact, rather perfunctory way the Japanese have of acknowledging the presence of numerous Shinto gods does not qualify as religious. It is not thoughtful enough, or absolute enough. If, however, a belief in invisible worlds and spirits and powers is central to the religious, it may be argued that the Japanese are more religious than we are. I was rather startled one evening not long ago when the mother-in-law of the late Mishima Yukio remarked that he would without doubt be reading certain of my translations with approval. There was of course an element of flattery in the remark, but it had in it none of the fulsomeness or the strained, forensic quality that it would have had from the mouth of an American.

For his theories about the emotional organization of the Japanese, Mr. Gibney relies very heavily on Professor Doi Takeo and the concept of *amae*. There can be no doubt that Professor Doi came upon something good when he came upon *amae*, and that there is no other word available to characterize a very important quality and mode of behavior. Indeed the fact that there is no word at all for it in English has a great deal to do with Professor Doi's initial discoveries. Yet one gets very

tired of *amae*, and wishes that there were another word, one that does not have the cloying, wheedling quality of *amae*, to describe the remarkable faculty the Japanese have for transplanting family relationships into other institutions and indeed making the nation itself into a kind of mystical family. The fact that most Japanese children are spoiled and overmothered certainly has a great deal to do with the case, and it is to a childlike presumption that indulgent and permissive affection

Three political analysts take a critical look at Kissinger's "triumphs."

"When the United States itself (not merely an ally) was hopelessly mired in Vietnam, the Soviet Union did not intervene to extricate her. Instead, the Soviet Union contributed materially to make a bad situation worse. But in the Middle East, Kissinger did agree to rescue, not even the Soviet Union itself, but a Soviet ally, by calling off the Israelis when they had the Egyptians encircled. As a reward for this sacrifice, the Soviet Union acted so that the President felt compelled, just a few days later, to issue a nuclear alert. If that defines détente, then it has become a synonym for surrender."



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OBSERVATIONS

is one's natural due even when one is no longer a child that *amae* refers. But somehow it fails to account for the virile energy and enterprise with which these spoiled children face adult problems. It is a valuable yet tiresome and inadequate concept.

Mr. Gibney is very good on Japanese women and the Japanese language, and perhaps best of all on what he calls "the mandarins," the grand satraps of the intellectual world and the press. Those who do not read Japanese will wonder whether his description of the big newspapers is not biased and unfair, and indeed numbers of people have asked me whether "it is really as bad as all that." The answer is that it is perhaps even worse. Mr. Gibney's wish to avoid the overkill, one may imagine, coupled with the fact that these are the people he must live and do business with, has made him pull his punches. Of the "big three" papers, the *Asahi* and the *Yomiuri* (the *Mainichi* is a little better) can be counted upon to ruin one's breakfast with mechanical, ruthless efficiency, morning after morning. Their hypocrisy is the worst thing about them. Their "liberal" predilections might be vaguely tolerable if they were admitted, but they are not. Behind a sanctimonious pose of neutrality lurks a consistent anti-American bias, and their toadying to mainland China and North Korea is downright loathsome.

Yet perhaps "it" is not so bad after all, because it is not so terribly important. The reporting on China is so uniformly silly and dull that no one pays much attention to it, and one may be assured that a discriminating and well-informed readership (how it got that way is one of those mysteries) is making allowances, and assigning praise and blame with more fairness than the papers themselves. The *Mainichi* lost circulation drastically after the scandal in which one of its reporters was the crucial agent in a leakage of official secrets, and the reason obviously was that the public was outraged both at the reporter's behavior and at the failure of the newspaper to maintain discipline.

LIKE most compendia, this one contains numbers of statements that are of dubious validity or distinct invalidity. Most of them do not matter a great deal, though they may sometimes touch a nerve. Many of us who number Tokyo among our principal *pieds-à-terre* are proud of our taxi drivers, and we do not like to have them described as "inept." They are very lawless and sometimes they can be maddeningly unresponsive to suggestion, but if the lawlessness were not accompanied by a most wonderful mastery of their trade, the carnage would be horrible.

Occasionally, however, a statement of doubtful validity strikes close to the heart of something very important. One is made to doubt the validity of appearances in this land of the plausible appearance. There is an example in Mr. Gibney's thoughtful concluding chapter. His treatment of disaffected youth depends in considerable measure on the World Youth Consciousness Survey conducted a few years ago by the prime minister's office. "Only in Japan did the pessimism run so heavy. Among Americans, West Germans, and Swedes, the percentage of 'dissatisfaction with your way of life' ran about 45 per cent. Japan's was 73.5 per cent, by far the highest of the group." It is dangerous to contend that one can describe the mental workings of another better than he has described them himself; but I may say with some firmness that I do not believe what that poll seems to tell us about Japanese youth. I have had rather a lot to do with the youth of two important countries, Japan and the United States, and I feel strongly, despite the violence of the student revolt a few years ago, that Japanese youth is much the more accepting and unrebelling of the two.

The trouble is that a Japanese respondent in these polls is likely to behave as most of us do when playing the stock market. We ask ourselves, as we deliberate buying and selling, what all those other buyers and sellers are going to do. The response in this instance was to keep in step with the market by selling satisfaction and buying dissatisfaction. Perhaps the most re-

markable thing about the poll is that a quarter of the respondents mustered the courage to go against the crowd and buy satisfaction. Social researchers have a way of distorting the truth by their very presence, and the risks are greater for the delver into Japanese opinion, unless he asks very specific and emotionally neutral questions, than for most.

Studying Islam

SOCIETY AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN THE ARAB WORLD. Edited by MENAHEM MILSON. *Humanities Press*. 338 pp. \$12.50.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN-ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT 1918-1929. By YEHOASHA PORATH. *Frank Cass*. 406 pp. \$18.00.

Reviewed by BEN HALPERN

IT is frequently charged that the Israelis have helped bring about their perpetual conflict with their neighbors by ignoring the Arabs' existence, by not studying their language and culture or trying to understand their views, and by not pursuing opportunities for rapprochement and agreement as swiftly as these opened up. It is natural that especially sensitized circles, like the distinguished school of Israeli Orientalists, Islamists, and Arabists, should voice this complaint; yet their own internationally recognized achievements cast considerable doubt on the accuracy of the indictment. The faculties of Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at Tel-Aviv University have trained a steady stream of outstanding scholars in the field. They have provided policy expertise and generated a level of information that truly deserves to be envied.

According to their own reckoning, the scholars now teaching at Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa, and Beersheba represent a third generation of Israeli Islamists, and the first to be made up largely of *sabras*. Each boasted a group of lumin-

BEN HALPERN, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Brandeis, is the author of, among other works, *The Idea of the Jewish State*.

aries of the eminence of S. D. Goitein (in the first generation) and Uriel Heyd (in the second). The current galaxy of young stars has already achieved its own distinguished reputation, and many of them are represented in these two recent volumes. Both books exhibit the special qualities which, in different ways, set apart Israeli Islamists among scholars in the field, whether native Middle Easterners or Western.

First, next to the Arabs and Muslim scholars themselves, the Israelis can draw on the largest pool of students who from youth have acquired a thorough command of the languages and literary canon of Islamic and Arabic culture. This is not primarily a consequence of the fact that half of Israel's Jewish citizens, not to speak of its Arab citizens, are native sons of the Middle Eastern, Arab-speaking cultural sphere—that is an asset Israel has so far drawn upon only in part, and more for purposes of policy and intelligence expertise than for general academic service. The current crop of Israeli Islamists is the direct heir of the brilliant line of Jewish Semitic and Islamic scholars in Europe, from Geiger and Munk and Margoliouth to the late Leo Strauss and Harry A. Wolfson. Not only the universities but, in particular, schools like the Haifa *Realgymnasium* (the famous *Bet-Sefer Reali*, which is also the cradle of so many Israeli military men) have continued this tradition, turning out successive classes of young Hebrew-speaking Semitists who are also Arabic speakers from youth and whose training in critical methods has the special rigor and thoroughness of the combined talmudic-Germanic scholarly tradition.

The second special feature of Israeli Islamists is the hard-nosed, contemporary quality of their learning. They are, initially, specialists in such classical subjects as Islamic mysticism, Arabic literature, or medieval Arabic sources of the history of the Crusades: interests which in the case of many European Islamists have often presented barriers of vested interest and antiquarian romanticism to the development of modern Middle Eastern studies. The tradition-

ally-trained Israelis, however, eagerly enter into modern studies, backed by the full weight of their classical background but also open to the methods appropriate for investigating the modern world.

Thirdly, a factor which reinforces alertness to contemporary policy studies is the strong interest of Israeli universities in promoting close contact between their faculties and the major centers of research and learning abroad. The Israeli Orientalists, like other Israeli academics, have studied and taught and frequently visit abroad. The application of social science to regional studies, as practiced at London and Manchester or Harvard and Princeton, is thoroughly familiar to them, and they have actively and prominently contributed to the current literature of the field.

A fourth factor, finally, distinguishes their approach to contemporary Middle Eastern studies from that of many Western colleagues. There is a tendency among Anglo-Saxon scholars, with their pragmatic empiricism, to eschew major historical generalizations. If interested in policy studies, they tend to conduct sociological fact-finding surveys—of large and sweeping scope, to be sure, but chiefly intended to verify one or another currently fashionable hypothesis of limited, "middle-range" character: for example, the role of "communications" or middle-class entrepreneurs or technically-trained military bureaucrats or some other particular aspect of the local culture which is thought to be a possible key factor in modernization. Israeli Middle Eastern specialists are saved from this faddism partly by their rigorous Rankean historiographic training, which teaches them to focus on the concrete historical instance; in addition, the left-wing, frequently Marxist, youth-movement background common to so many *sabras* has predisposed them to look for the systematic coherence of historical societies. They therefore apply current research hypotheses with an eye for pertinence, in the light of a given society's fundamental, comprehensive system.

MENAHEM MILSON's preface gives a clear indication of the perspec-

tive from which the book he edited and the colloquia preceding it were constructed. The collapse of the Ottoman empire into a congeries of separate states presents problems of compatibility between ideology—whether the old, traditional Islamic world-view or its proposed replacement, the ideology of Arabism—and the requirements of "development and progress." In view of the literary bias of traditional Islamic studies, it is not surprising that the favored approach to these problems by scholars has concentrated on the "realm of ideas and symbols . . . the common intellectual tradition of the Arab world. . . ." But the Israeli scholarly community, taking up the lead of contemporary policy-oriented research in other fields, such as Soviet and Far Eastern studies, wishes also to address itself to another topic, "the variety of political forms and socioeconomic conditions in individual Arab countries." Its approach to this subject draws upon a thorough knowledge of current modernization and development theories, guided by a sense of the importance of each society's individual history and a nose for the basic conditions underlying policy.

The two cross-sectional studies included among the eight colloquium papers in Milson's volume illustrate the point. One, by a Manchester-trained Israeli anthropologist, Emanuel Marx, takes up the problems of Middle Eastern nomadic groups, who throughout the area represent a historically and socially distinct system within, or alongside, the sedentary society. Marx's studies of the changing ecological base of Bedouin society, in its relation to the surrounding socioeconomic system, is part of a new wave of anthropological studies of nomadic tribes that is distinguished by common-sense realism and a critical methodological approach.

Another cross-sectional study, by Eliezer Be'eri, an established authority on his subject, deals with "Military Coups d'Etat in the Arab World during the 60's": a topic not only markedly characteristic of current Arab politics, but one which brings into focus the phenomenon of military regimes,

a cardinal feature of political development in the great majority of underdeveloped countries. There was a recent academic fad, in this country and elsewhere, which attempted to fasten on military cliques as the key to growth of the rationality deemed vital to modernization. Be'eri's cool, detailed accounting of the record of achievement and failure (written, to be sure, before the October war) leaves little credibility to that tattered myth. Even the higher performance of the Arab armies in the October war does not support the hypothesis that the military class is the magical ingredient capable of modernizing a civilian society. In the case of Egypt, improved performance should be credited to the Egyptian peasant, whose personal bravery was never in question, and to Egyptian officers who at last concentrated seriously on the specific duties and responsibilities of their own craft.

THE remaining six studies are all dedicated to particular countries. They combine with rigorous fidelity to the individual history of each case a concentration on core issues, reflecting a well-judged use of current theories and models of modernization derived from worldwide comparative studies. The latter feature is especially notable in the article on Tunisia by L. Carl Brown of Princeton, a non-Israeli contributor, whose work has always been marked by lucidity, a comprehensive grasp, and an eye for essentials. He treats his subject in direct relation to "the other two independent or autonomous units of the greater Ottoman political world—the central Ottoman empire and Egypt."

The reference to general models is implicit but no less judicious in two other studies devoted to the peculiar problems of particular countries: Gabriel Baer's paper on Egypt and Moshe Ma'oz's paper on Syria. Both concentrate on a major issue, to which Brown also gives primary attention: the gap between the emergence of power at the center and the lagging political integration of the people. The salient difference between Egypt and Syria in this respect is the low level of local organization long

characteristic of Egypt and the considerable, heterogeneous, and traditionally antagonistic profusion of the local power structures in Syria.

The three other studies focus on issues of central significance in the recent history of the several countries treated. Gabriel Warburg's study of Sudan revolves around the intricate relation between neo-traditionalist revival movements and modern nationalism, a subject of importance in many other local histories within the region but especially crucial in Sudan. Uriel Dann's meticulous, Kremlinological-style accounting of personnel changes in Jordanian politics traces the background and political attitudes of prominent establishment and anti-establishment figures in the country's history since the annexation of the West Bank in 1949. Finally, a paper on the Palestinian-Arab national movement by Yehoshua Porath sums up and brings to more recent times the detailed account of the early period of the movement, from 1918 to 1929, which is contained in his book on the subject.

PORATH's book on the emergence of the Palestinian-Arab national movement is written throughout from a point of view internal to the movement. When he speaks of success, it is Palestinian-Arab success, as Palestinian Arabs themselves would see it; and when he speaks of failure, it is as if the Arabs' failure were his own. To adopt such an internal viewpoint is, of course, the endeavor of any conscientious historian, but there is also apparent an "Israeli" motivation in Porath's espousal of the Arab perspective. The underlying political tendency of the book (which first appeared in Hebrew) is an effort to convince Israelis that Palestinian Arab nationalism has historic roots of long standing and is a well-grounded reality. But this is also a work of solid, conscientious scholarship, and the evidence it lays before us does not depend for its cogency on any political tendency.

In a careful, succinct summary, the author states that

the sanctity of Jerusalem in Islam and in Christianity, the setting up

of the administrative unit of *Filastin* [Palestine] by the Arab conquerors, the survival of this unit in various forms during the course of Muslim rule, and the rise in the status of the district of Jerusalem after the first half of the 19th century—all these factors contributed at the start of the 20th century to the development of *Filastin* as a concept having geographical and religious significance. This non-political concept began to take on political significance as a result of pressure from an external, foreign element, namely Zionism.

In his narrative, Porath makes it clear that the Islamic evaluation of Jerusalem's sanctity ran an uneven course until Saladin's battles to regain the city from the Crusaders; and that *Filastin* "survived" as an administrative unit in highly variegated forms indeed—usually nominal. The decisive element was the one that eventually made the concept political; namely, the pressure from, and resentment of, Zionism.

IF ANYTHING, Porath underplays the local opposition to attempts by Jewish foreigners to take title and possession of land and to obtain a recognized legal status different from the traditionally subordinate position of the Jews as a *millet*. Not just Zionism but Jewish (or Christian) pretensions to equality aroused resentment. Zionism, however, which first projected the long-dead conception of Palestine as an independent territory, aroused not merely resentment but a politically self-conscious opposition. Long-brewing Muslim-Arab hostility now expressed itself ideologically, according to Porath, as resistance to an invasion by despised outsiders insolently seeking to acquire title. All this long antedated the Balfour Declaration; indeed, the first Jews to have difficulties in purchasing land for settlement in Palestine were not Zionists at all, but groups organized within the traditionalist old *yishuv*.

Porath notes that "the general Arab awakening penetrated into Palestine at the end of the First World War with the officers and propagandists of the army of the 'Revolt in the Desert,' which in late 1918 had established a semi-

independent Arab government in Damascus." This is the stage at which the official Zionist movement attempted to deal with Arab nationalism, arguing that if the Palestinian Arabs were no more than part of a broader Arab national movement, then they should regard the concession of the "small notch" of Palestine to the Jews, in return for Jewish support of the broader Arab federation, as both politically wise and morally just.

The main point of Porath's book is to revise this (historical and political) conception by stressing the independent political ambitions of Palestinian Arabs, separate from and often opposed to the broader pan-Arab objectives. Full and convincing as his evidence on this point may be, one can hardly say it was unknown to the Zionists who formulated official policy in the 1920's. In fact, Porath's main sources are, on the one hand, British archives and, on the other, the intelligence reports submitted to the Jewish Agency's political department. Working on the basis of the same material, the Zionists perceived not a group of incipient nationalist leaders, as Porath does, but a reactionary clique of effendis, concerned only with their clan and class interests.

WHAT is involved here, of course, is evaluation, a notoriously uncertain matter. Porath leans to a view represented, for example, by Chaim Kalvarisky and, in a way, by Frederick Kisch among Zionists in the 1920's: he, too, tends to believe that, until the 1929 outbreak of violence, moderate Arabs were working toward a policy of cooperation under the Mandate which could also, perhaps, have been a bridge to understanding with moderate Zionists. Whether this speculation holds water or not, Arab writers on Palestinian nationalism are as little inclined as Zionist officials were at the time to see its origins in the traditional landlord and money-lender class that dominated the Muslim-Christian Associations and Arab Executive of the 1920's. Today's Arab writers regard Palestinian nationalism as a popular uprising of the peasants over issues of land tenure, first signaled in the Young Turk era and then revived

A Photographic Journey to the Past

The Old Country

by Abraham Shulman

Introduction by
Isaac Bashevis Singer


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in full maturity in the uprisings of 1929 and 1936-39.

Whatever other causes may be assigned to the latter event, one obvious fact, removed beyond question in Porath's writings on the subject, is the crucial role of a group of younger leaders in the 1920's and 1930's, among whom Haj Amin el-Husseini achieved preeminent authority. His ability to raise the masses in revolt rested, above all, on his appeal to religious hostility and on his control of a ramified religious establishment, reaching into every corner of the country. Porath tends to view his crucial success in subverting the program of the Arab moderates as a fortuitous break in the organic development of Palestinian Arab nationalism. However that may be, the complete destruction of any other leadership of the Palestinian Arabs beginning in the 1930's decisively fixed the direction of the movement's subsequent development. Given the pan-Islamic, and not merely pan-Arab, scope of Haj Amin's ambitions and strategies, Porath's case for a separatist Palestinian Arab nationalism becomes obscured.

THE commonly accepted explanation for the defeat of the Arabs in 1948 and the subsequent flight of refugees is the absence or removal of local leaders. Some leaders fled after the 1936-39 revolt, others in the course of subsequent battles which they initiated, having meanwhile effectively eliminated any local leadership opposed to their line. The people, never adequately integrated into the nationalist movement, were thrown into the conflict without leaders and were then left behind by virtually the entire class of their presumptive leaders.

If there has been any change in this situation since 1948, it has been in the equivocal relationship of leaders and led in the UNRWA refugee camps. In those elements of the Palestinian Arab population that remained or were stably resettled in Israel or Jordan, on either the West or East Bank, not much was altered (except the involvement of local leaders in Israeli or Jordanian political institutions). The common people remained

largely uninvolved and significantly detached. In the refugee camps, the combined effect of the policies of the UN and of the Arab host nations produced a decisive separation of the Palestinians from local Arab society. The camp facilities for health and education were staffed by leading elements among the Palestinian Arabs themselves, who were able not only to instill an intense nationalistic self-consciousness but to organize the camp population into paramilitary bodies with distinctly Palestinian ideologies.

WHETHER these bodies can be reasonably connected with the historical background Porath constructs for the Palestinian-Arab movement is far from clear. Their connection with the settled, non-refugee Palestinians, whether in Israeli or Jordanian territory, is equally uncertain. What still further complicates the question are the extensive involvements of the Palestinian Arab guerrillas, and especially their leaders, in general Arab and Third World politics. It is not simply that all the numerous contending groups in the movement are financed by one or another contender for pan-Arab leadership, and in some cases are obvious instruments of a non-Palestinian Arab state. Even the most singlemindedly Palestine-centered leaders consider themselves to be carrying out struggles involving much more than Palestine alone, whether pan-Arab or revolutionary socialist in orientation.

It is still, in fact, an open question whether the Palestinian nationalism of the guerrillas—at least, of the leaders—is a “strategy” or a “tactic,” to use the terms of their own debate on the subject. Since the answer to that question is the key to any possible peace between them and Israel, Israeli scholars devote much careful study to this problem, as, indeed, to all aspects of the Arab and Islamic world. That their study of these subjects is conducted on a high level of competence should surprise no one. Nor for that matter should anyone be surprised at the capacity for sympathy which, together with unsentimental realism, is a hallmark of their work.

Dilemmas of Modernity

PYRAMIDS OF SACRIFICE: POLITICAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE. By PETER L. BERGER. *Basic Books*. 242 pp. \$10.00.

Reviewed by JEANE KIRKPATRICK

SOCIAL scientists have frequently been criticized for their preoccupation with the present, and their fondness for static models and static analyses, but in fact a principal concern of sociologists, economists, and political scientists throughout this century has been the process of transition from “traditional” to “modern” society—hardly a static model at all. Such diverse and distinguished social scientists as Marx, Weber, Tonnies, and, more recently, Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye, and Samuel Huntington have attempted to identify essential characteristics of traditional and modern societies and to describe the processes of modernization that lead from the one to the other; to discover the interrelations among social, economic, psychological, and political change; and to determine the various human and social factors that affect the course of modernization. The study of modernization blends almost imperceptibly with much larger intellectual enterprises: the study of social change, social integration, historical evolution, the rise and fall of civilizations.

Eventually, all students of modernization confront two basic and interrelated questions: Is modernization an inevitable, unilinear process which unfolds without reference to human plans and preferences, or is it susceptible of control by enlightened policy-makers? Secondly, is modernization a single, multifaceted process, whose diverse parts “hang together” in such a way that a change in one area—techniques of production, for example—will entail a parallel change in other spheres—for example, social, psychological, and political characteristics; or are the

JEANE KIRKPATRICK teaches political science at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. and is the author of *Political Woman*.



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various components of modernization (industrialization, urbanization, occupational mobility, expansion of literacy, etc.), discrete social processes, going on at different rates? A third question also recurs, and that is whether modernization is desirable or undesirable, whether it is to be welcomed as progress or resisted as the agent of dehumanization. But because many social scientists lack, or feel that they lack, the tools needed to answer moral questions, most investigations of modernization deal with this third question obliquely, indirectly, or simply by assumption.

Peter L. Berger, sociologist, churchman, an associate editor of *Worldview*, and a prolific commentator on the contemporary scene, is a voluntarist who believes that the choices of policy-makers affect the course of history; he is also a social scientist who believes that the ethical questions attendant on modernization should be confronted head-on. His new book, *Pyramids of Sacrifice*, submits the two dominant schemes for national development—capitalism and Communism—to human cost-accounting. Berger thereby takes a long step toward uniting “two attitudes that are usually separate—the attitudes of ‘hard nosed’ analysis and of utopian imagination.”

Pyramids of Sacrifice is an essay on the human dimensions of development. It views development not from the perspective of world history or of ideological combat, but through its impact on the individuals whose lives are transformed by social, economic, and political change. This perspective makes Berger sensitive to human problems which are too frequently ignored in the calculations of philosophers of history, revolutionaries, and reformist social engineers. Viewing history from below, Berger reflects on the moral imperatives of policy-making for the Third World. Foremost among such imperatives, for him, are that those affected by a policy have the opportunity to participate in the making of decisions; that policy-makers carefully calculate the likely human costs of alternative policies in order to avoid those that come too dear; and that no devel-

opment strategy be adopted which would require the sacrifice of a generation to the achievement of long-range goals.

Pyramids of Sacrifice begins where no other book on development has begun: at Cholula, site of the great pyramid on which ancient Aztec “theorists” sacrificed tens of thousands of human victims to Quetzalcoatl, in the belief that the universe would fall apart if the gods were not regularly fed with human blood. The conceptual edifice that supported (caused?) this “meso-american Auschwitz,” was the product of an intellectual. “History,” Berger notes,

is not only a succession of power structures but of theoretical edifices, and every one of the latter was first thought up by somebody . . . whether it is a case of intellectuals convincing the wielders of power to carry into practice some particular scheme, or power-wielders hiring intellectuals to concoct theories that will legitimate that particular exercise of power ex post facto. . . . [Thus] the great pyramid at Cholula provides a metaphorical paradigm for the relations among theory, power, and the victims of both—the intellectuals who define reality, the power-wielders who shape the world to conform to the definitions, and the others who are called upon to suffer in consequence of both enterprises.

The definition of reality is a subject of persistent concern to Berger, who devoted an earlier book, *The Social Transformation of Reality*, entirely to this subject. In *Pyramids of Sacrifice*, Berger argues persuasively, as a first postulate of enlightened and humane social policy, that people be permitted to define their own situations and that their definitions be treated with seriousness. The implications are enormous: permitting people to speak for themselves and assigning weight to their views in the definition of collective goals would prevent their being made the objects of programs designed to “raise (transform) their consciousness” on the basis of someone else’s perception of reality.

False consciousness is the name by which revolutionaries deny the reality of human experience, and the doctrine of false consciousness,

which is at least as old as Plato’s Republic, plays an indispensable role in all theories of comprehensive revolution, explaining why most people do not share the vision of the revolutionary—do not want what he wants, do not hate whom he hates. Theories of false consciousness (as found in Plato, Marx, Hitler, Marcuse, Fanon, Laing) not only deny the authenticity of others’ experience, they provide the epistemological basis that justifies the revolutionary’s disregard of the values and goals of real people in favor of his own interpretation of their “real” interests.

The view that everyone outside a particular revolutionary movement is confused about almost everything underlies programs of “consciousness raising.” In social situations the “crucial assumption of the concept,” Berger notes, “is that lower-class people do not understand their own situation, that they are in need of enlightenment on the matter, and that this service can be provided by selected higher-class individuals.” Berger attacks the “hierarchical view of consciousness” which implies that intellectuals possess a superior understanding of what it is to be “truly human” (as opposed to possessing better information on specific topics), and he observes the irony in the fact that revolutionary intellectuals who arrogantly and undemocratically insist on defining reality for the masses almost always see themselves as “genuine democrats.”

Frequently the new consciousness imposed by the revolutionary calls for renunciation, risk, and sacrifice in war and violent revolution, but the intellectuals who plan and justify the sacrifice “are generally in a good position to avoid the sacrificial platform.” Especially given to this kind of dehumanization of the people in whose name they act are socialist revolutionaries, who purvey the Communist model of development and see themselves as a “vanguard” and the “embodiment” of “the will of the masses.” Here Berger stresses a fact ignored by too many students and advocates of violent change: that “revolution, like war, involves the killing of human be-

ings," that revolutions "demand a high toll in human suffering." The Communist path to modernization promises not merely to improve men, but the achievement of this goal requires transforming the entire structure and culture of the old society, which means transforming (and/or suppressing) the masses of actual people in whom the old society and its culture were embodied.

Still another reason for the high cost of the socialist model of development, in Berger's view, is socialism's "built-in tendency toward totalitarianism"—a tendency that derives from the effort to absorb the economy within the state and that results in "an uncomfortable correlation" between "regimes of revolutionary socialism," and the systematic use of terror. Berger reminds us of the dismal findings of Robert Conquest's investigation of the Stalinist era: three-and-one-half million dead as a "direct consequence" of collectivization; one million dead by execution during the great purges, two million by starvation and disease in the forced-labor camps. The Chinese record, Berger believes, bears comparison with that of Stalinism: untold millions dead by execution in the 1945-55 period of collectivization and "rectification," still more during the Cultural Revolution. And in both the Soviet Union and China the toll of terror is augmented by the suffering of millions in Soviet camps and prisons, and in Chinese "Reform Through Labor" and "May 7" schools.

Still, Berger argues, it would be "unfair and inaccurate" to identify socialism with this kind of terror because there exist socialist regimes in which there has been little or no terror. Nonetheless, he goes on, socialism "has a built-in disappointment factor," for "*What begins as a liberating community ends up as an all-embracing state*" (emphasis in original). Beyond the question of terror are the less dramatic failures of socialism: its tendencies to leveling and to uniformity and, especially, its economic inefficiency, its "negative correlation" with productivity.

Why, then, do the people of the Third World consider socialism a

feasible model of development? To Berger's mind the explanation lies in the failures of the alternative model of development: capitalism. "If socialist systems have been created at the price of great human suffering, so have capitalist systems. Not only revolutions cause suffering and death; the status quo can also kill, often by hunger rather than bullets." The principal sins of capitalism are those of omission, but these are no less serious in Berger's eyes. He does, to be sure, reject as untrue three common criticisms of capitalism: that the economic development of capitalist nations was made possible by colonial exploitation, that the contemporary affluence of capitalist nations derives from the continued exploitation of the less developed countries, and that imperialism is an economic necessity of capitalism. He does not doubt that industrial capitalism has spawned "the most awe-inspiring productive economic machine ever conceived" and can provide a "high level of prosperity for nearly all levels of the population," and he also notes capitalism's historic association with political democracy and individual liberties. But the capitalist path to development, he believes, has its own human costs, and, as with socialism, these costs are too high.

To support his case for the human cost of capitalism, Berger cites Karl Polanyi on the brutality and ruthlessness of England's industrial revolution and the contemporary example of capitalist Brazil, where deep poverty persists (especially in the Northeast), reports of torture still circulate, income distribution was less equal in 1970 than in 1960, and "the government is doing less than it could to alleviate . . . suffering." In fact, Berger's discussion of Brazil is seriously flawed: Delfim Neto's policy of deliberately holding down wages to accelerate capital accumulation has been abandoned, the unemployment problem of the early 60's has been replaced by a labor shortage in the 70's, and the process of "political decompression" (Samuel Huntington's phrase) has meant the progressive relaxation of previous controls on individual freedom and the institutionalization of

a genuine, though limited, opposition party. Still, high infant-mortality rates, poverty, and widespread malnutrition and disease in the Northeast do testify that though the capitalist path to development has led to an annual growth rate of at least 10 per cent and an enormous expansion of the middle class, it has not yet provided basic necessities to Brazil's burgeoning population. China has eliminated starvation; Brazil has not. The fact that the rulers of China have had a quarter of a century while Brazil's governors have been in power for only a decade does not sway Berger, who reproaches the Brazilians not merely for what they have failed to achieve but for what they have tried. The capitalist myth, he asserts, makes growth a good in itself, and in Brazil economic growth has been given greater priority than the eradication of human suffering.

BERGER acknowledges that wealth must be created before want can be abolished, and that Communist no less than capitalist governments have embraced the doctrine of economic growth. Still, he thinks capitalism can be more severely criticized for its preoccupation with productivity and growth *because it promises nothing else*. The capitalist model of development begins with material wants and needs; it promises comfort, well-being, and plenty. The Marxist model begins with a vision of justice and brotherhood. "The ultimate questions," Berger asserts, "are those of value: . . . is general affluence more important than relative equality? And most importantly, which values are given moral priority: Individual freedom or collective security? Pluralism, or community? Enterprise or harmony?" Modernity and capitalism alike, Berger believes, tend to fracture the bonds of community, and to deprive life of meaning. Both confront the individual with choices unknown to traditional society: what shall he believe? whom shall he join? what shall he become? who, in short, will he be?

Capitalism is historically associated with pluralism, and in pluralist societies it is not the business of government to offer moral prescriptions or to define moral pur-

poses. Pluralism presupposes the existence of multiple subcultures, each with its own values, cognitive maps, and goals. Berger worries that the corrosive power of rationalism may have destroyed these subcultures and, with them, the glue that binds individuals into communities. With Durkheim and others, Berger worries that modern society, especially modern capitalist society, results in normlessness, meaninglessness, internal division, alienation: "the dichotomization of the individual's social existence between the public and private sphere." In an essay published two years ago in the *Public Interest*, he credited totalitarianism with at least "the intention of overcoming" this "modern dichotomy of private and public spheres." Regardless, then, of whether its doctrine is true or false, revolutionary socialism remains an attractive alternative for the Third World because it offers "meaning" and an end to modern man's isolation. The greatest strength of Marxism—especially the Marxism of the Third World—is that it is "overtly religious"; the myth of revolution contains powerful "counter-modern" themes attractive to people threatened with the loss of meaning.

This seems to me the weakest aspect of Berger's argument—and for several reasons: because it is not at all clear either that the dichotomy between self and society is a specifically modern phenomenon or that totalitarian societies cure it; because, as Herbert McCloskey, William Kornhauser, and others have demonstrated, the theory of mass society does not hold up under testing; and because there is no evidence that citizens of totalitarian societies enjoy a greater sense of community, harmony, or collective security than those of Western societies, though it is surely clear that they enjoy less individual freedom and personal security. In fact, there is little evidence that revolutionary socialism is attractive to anyone—except middle-class intellectuals. Berger comments caustically on the special susceptibility of intellectuals to "revolutionary visions," and he notes that "intellectuals have a dangerous facility to imagine themselves

occupying the seats of power in the wake of, so to speak, the revolution of their choice." But he does not pursue the vested interest that intellectuals have in a political system that gives them the right not only to govern, but to define reality. A symbolic environment manipulated by rulers for the purpose of transforming conceptions of reality not only deprives citizens of "cognitive participation," it gives the "symbol-specialists," whom 20th-century revolutions have everywhere brought to power, total control of an arena in which they have a particular interest.

I do not suggest that Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, Ho, Castro, Che Guevara, and other middle-class purveyors of revolutionary socialism have espoused Marxism only out of the lust for power. Marxism probably does have a large capacity for what Berger calls "mythological synthesis." Beyond question, it offers a blend of social explanation and mysticism, of indulgence and renunciation, of loving and hating, of destruction and regeneration that has proved attractive to some of this century's most talented political leaders. But it remains difficult to demonstrate that, by contrast, the lives of ordinary people are in fact rendered meaningless by modern, urban, commercial, democratic, affluent society. It was not the workers on Detroit's assembly lines who sought "meaning" in the revolutionary movements of the American 60's, any more than it was the workers of Uruguay who sought meaning through the guerrilla movement of the Tupamaros. It may be, as Herbert Marcuse especially has asserted, that capitalist society has left modern man so alienated from himself and from reality that he does not even feel the lack of purpose and the absence of solidarity from which his critics *know* he suffers. It may also be that intellectuals have a special need to make sense of the world with words and that in Marxism they have found a myth which serves this purpose and offers them power besides.

FINALLY, Berger insists on the right of people to say "no" not only to "the myth of growth" and the "myth of revolution," but to mod-

ernization itself. Berger considers himself a "humanistic conservative." A conservative, he has written elsewhere, "is suspicious of the idea of progress" and "skeptical of innovation," he "accepts human beings as they are," "values order, continuity, and triviality," "is inclined to leave people alone," and "is skeptical of grand intellectual designs for the improvement of society." Conservatives are unenthusiastic about change, "not because they have profound convictions about the merits of the status quo, but because they have profound suspicions about whatever is proposed as an alternative to the status quo."*

This spirit of skepticism pervades *Pyramids of Sacrifice*. For Berger, modernization does not necessarily spell progress, and modernity is not necessarily preferable to tradition. The United States can make its greatest contribution not by intervention in the affairs of other nations, but by continuing to be a "vast laboratory for innovative experiments to solve the dilemmas of modernity." Neither social engineers, revolutionaries, nor cold warriors should tamper with the lives of others—except with their participation and permission.

Berger's newest book is an essay, not a scholarly treatise. It includes some oversimplification. Personally, I wish that Berger had a more highly differentiated conception of the pathways to development (one, for example, that took account of the "British" route eloquently explicated by Daniel P. Moynihan in his recent COMMENTARY article, "The United States in Opposition") and that he had explored the exemplars of his two models—China and Brazil—in greater depth; I wish, too, that he had faced squarely the moral differences between governments which cause problems and those which fail to cure them. But I am very glad that he wrote *Pyramids of Sacrifice*. It is a rewarding book for anyone interested in the moral dimensions of contemporary politics.

* "Between System and Horde: Personal Suggestions to Reluctant Activists," in Peter L. Berger and Richard L. Neuhaus, *Movement and Revolution* (Doubleday/Anchor, 1970), pp. 14-27.

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
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